



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

BY

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TAT TVAM ASI
(THOU ART THAT)

PREFACE

This book has been written with the object of restoring the purity of the great truths uttered by the ancient thinkers of India which, unfortunately, has been obscured by a mass of prevailing misconceptions. It is an irony of fate that the land, which gave birth to the incomparable thinkers of the Upanishad period, should have lacked in persons who could properly expound their thoughts to posterity. One reason for it lies in the fact that the Upanishad truths, which are extraordinarily deep and comprehensive, have been handed down more in the form of final results achieved than in the ordinary mode of exposition, so very necessary to the treatment of philosophical subjects. Another reason is the great change that has since overtaken human outlook, due to the manifold forms of life in which adult humanity is manifesting itself. Those who are anxious to bring back the form of simplicity that distinguished infant mankind are completely mistaken in their estimate of the manner in which life gradually unfolds itself. Simplicity is without doubt a great desideratum, and may be said to be the keynote of existence, but the simplicity that will have to be discovered in connection with the innumerable forms of developed human life, is to be achieved, not by a process of regression or supersession, but by a process of progressive assimilation, in which the ever-expanding activities of man will have to be arranged under fundamental conceptions of a simple nature. This is only possible when human intellect has reached its full maturity. Till then man is apt to get lost in the diversity of life and is unable to take that detached view of things, which the ancient thinkers could

take, by reason of their simple environment. The inevitable consequence is that a narrow spirit develops, which finds fault more with the order of things than with the present human inability to grasp it. When, therefore, rare ancient truths, which contain the solution of the problems of life, are approached, their profundity is apt to be missed, and this is what has happened in the case of the great Upanishad truths.

Unhappily for India, its theologians have in recent times usurped its philosophy. This has been brought about to a large extent by its political condition. For the last seven centuries, the country has been under the political control of persons, who could not possibly have more than a cademical sympathy with its philosophy. The stress felt in the practical fields of life may extinguish the real spirit of philosophical enquiry, but religion continues to exercise its sway, and its influence becomes greater, for the unhappy adjustment of the practical demands of life drives more rapidly a person to obtain that solace from religion, which unfulfilled desires in life fail to give. The theologians had therefore everything in their own way and the philosophy of the land suffered considerably. The effect of the continued control of the intellectual field by the theologians has been such, that no one would think of interpreting philosophy except in the manner in which one of the theologians has chosen to interpret it. I have broken the spell and have in my humble way shewn the way in which the highest philosophy of mankind should be approached and interpreted. My satisfaction lies not in what I have been able to achieve, but in the hope I entertain of what persons better qualified than myself would be able to achieve, in this direction, in future.

I do not blame the *Orientalists* for failing to catch the spirit of the great truths of the A'tman philosophy, for the task of properly expounding the Indian philosophy



primarily rests on the Indians, who should, because of their natural aptitude, give the lead in the matter.

I have shewn, for the first time, that the A'tman philosophy does not destroy the world, but yet is rigorously monistic, and this directly follows from the Upanishad texts, and that Samkara had no justification whatsoever to override clear and repeated texts and destroy the world, by introducing his doctrine of *Maya*, any more than Rámánuja had for perpetuating the individual.

It has also, for the first time, been shewn that during the Upanishad period in India, as in other countries, two distinct philosophical currents, one idealistic and the other materialistic, ran side by side, and that the former ultimately emerged as the A'tman philosophy, while the latter reached its climax in nihilism, and that the greatest confusion has been caused by failing to recognise this.

I have finally shewn that the current metaphysics of the world makes it impossible, either to uphold the freedom of will or to give a rational explanation of evil, both of which, however, are most satisfactorily solved by the A'tman philosophy, which proclaims autonomy, in the real sense of the term, and also explains that the conception of evil is entirely the product of ignorance.

Like every modern writer on Indian philosophy, I have derived considerable assistance from the well-known series of the Sacred Books of the East. The recent books on Indian philosophy, by such Indian writers as Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, and Mr. R. D. Ranade, have provided me with no less stimulating thoughts than the popular works of Deussen, Max Müller, Kaegi, Macdonell, Gough and other Orientalists. But in the main, I have looked for guidance from a close and unprejudiced study of the original texts, which I have found far more inspiring than the existing literature on the Upanishad philosophy. If I have at places expressed myself strongly,

it is because I have felt strongly. I hold the view that no toying should be allowed with ideas that are fundamental, for a single unthinking observation made either way is productive of the greatest mischief.

My gratitude to the authorities of the Calcutta University, and to the Vice-Chancellor, Mr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee, M.A., B.L., Barrister-at-law, M.L.C., in particular, who is bidding fair to be a great son of a great father, for encouraging me by publishing the book, is beyond expression. I cannot help referring in this connection to the deep and genuine sympathy which the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, as Vice-Chancellor of the University, felt for those engaged in works of research, and to whom first occurred the idea of helping them to place their lifelong labours before a wider public, with the aid of the University.

My grateful thanks are due to Sir S. Radhakrishnan, for kindly going through the MSS. and for his very sympathetic appreciation of the mode of treatment adopted in the book. I have also to thank Dr. Adityanath Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., for kindly going through the MSS. and improving the English at several places.

I express my thanks to my brother, Mr. Saratchandra Chakravarti, B.A., B.L., who, in the midst of his multifarious works, found time to assist me by making the manuscript ready for the press.

Lastly, the indulgence of the reader is craved for errors inevitable in the first edition of a book of this kind.

June, 1935.

S. C. C.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIFE OF MAN

The notion widely prevails that philosophy made its appearance at an advanced stage of human progress, when man was able, by reason of his accumulated experience, to systematise his thoughts and to take a comprehensive view of the world, and of possible things beyond it. On closer examination it would be found that, like many ideas cherished and handed down through ages, this is not and cannot be strictly true. Whatever may be the store and character of his experience, man has been more or less philosophising, ever since the dawn of his intellect. Even the infant human mind could not help musing over the bearing of the multitudinous environment upon itself, as well as upon one another. The streak of lightning that swept the sky, and the closely following thunderbolt that reverberated through space, were interpreted by the early group of human beings in their own way, though, in view of our modern scientific knowledge, in a rather fantastic manner. The fact of death, which followed a long or short span of earthly existence, and what may exist beyond it, were similarly explained by our remote ancestors, though we may now look upon their inferences as extremely childish, conceited as we happen to be with

our supposed advanced notions about them. In the same manner, our early forefathers drew their conclusions about the course of conduct that ought to be adopted as between one man and another, and pursued it, however far it may be removed from our present-day utilitarian or altruistic conceptions.

In support of the view that philosophy is the late result of the developed human mind, the argument is advanced that for a long time the need for it was not felt, as the need for it is not felt even now by a considerable portion of mankind. This latter observation is far removed from the truth like the former, for just as it is not a fact that for a considerable time human beings went without what is commonly implied by philosophy, so it is not a fact that, at the present day, a very large number of our fellow beings have no concern with philosophy.

Looked at from one point of view, this wrong notion may be said to have arisen out of the boast of later generations of human beings, with their comparatively advanced equipment of knowledge, and thus may be taken to be rooted in human vanity itself. Looked at from another point of view, the idea will be found to have been encouraged by the belief that an easy-going manner of spending life, taking things as they come, without bestowing much thought on the future, has nothing in it to raise it to the rank of philosophy, and that, therefore, the thoughtless manner in which the bulk of human beings spend their lives justifies the conclusion that philosophy is the exclusive occupation of the advanced and the seriously minded few.

If we could divide into separate epochs, the different stages through which human knowledge has up to now passed, we will find each succeeding epoch characterised by a kind of natural derision, with which the men of the period looked upon the ideas and attainments of the men of



the preceding epoch. Those who in modern times appear to be very much swelled with their developed scientific notions about things, would be simply shocked—though, I daresay, some of them, with a rare gift of enjoying a situation, even when the tables are turned against them, may be complacently amused—at finding how their boasted acquirements are being twitted by their own descendants, if they are given the exceptional privilege of taking their rebirth, with their past state of consciousness, amidst human beings, two centuries hence. It is the same human vanity running its course through ages, though now and then, a savant may be born, who might stress the fact that, what is at any time known is infinitesimally small, compared with what still remains to be known. We might be tempted to say that the generations of human beings, which constituted the rude human society of the remote past, were devoid of philosophy or what is known as the thinking consideration of things, but it will still remain a fact that the present has grown out of the past, and though the character of philosophy has considerably changed, the tendency to philosophise exhibited itself from the very birth of the race.

Notwithstanding the desire on the part of a considerable section of men to wash their hands of all philosophy, which they hold in great dread, and to perpetuate what they are pleased to call the care-free way of leading their lives, it remains a fact that their notion of existence has got its assigned place in the history of the world's philosophies, and in spite of their eagerness to part company with philosophers, they form a class of thinkers by themselves. Who has not heard of the Indian Chárvákas, the followers of Brihaspati, and the Greek Hédonists, the followers of Aristippus and Epicurus ?

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION : THEIR ORDER OF APPEARANCE AND COMMON GROUND

It is, therefore, evident that the effort to understand things as a whole, with whatever degree of success, has characterised human thought from the beginning. It will then have to be accepted that, in the order of things, the stage of making some kind of generalisation of human experience has preceded what we understand by religion and science. Leaving science aside for a while, for admittedly the pursuit of exact knowledge is of later growth, it may be laid down broadly that, in the remote past, the philosophy of a particular epoch invariably gave birth to the religion of the times. As the philosophy of the people of an epoch was, so became its religion.

Those who claim the position of a privileged class of thinkers, would not like the idea of making religion an offspring of philosophy. Such is their notion of the dignity of religion, that they would like to keep religion severely alone, high on a pedestal, where most things cannot touch it. The less attention is paid to this class of thinkers the better. In their anxiety to maintain the dignity of religion, no one offends it more than they. It is high time to openly acknowledge, and apply to our daily thoughts, the fundamental fact that man is a rational whole, and that you can no more cut one aspect of life from another, than you can sever any limb from the body of man, and keep it alive, disjointed from the rest of the organism.

It is of utmost importance to consider the intimate relation that exists between philosophy and religion. A great deal of mischief has been committed by keeping them separate for what, in a very pedantic manner, is called the better development of their legitimate purposes. Never has bombast of language been employed more sedulously for perpetuating a traditional way of effete thinking. The

inevitable consequence has been that, instead of philosophy enriching religious thoughts ever and anon with its new blood, religion has gone on stagnating, and the desire of those who want to keep religion as a nursery for the propagation of a particular kind of ideas for ever, has been strangely fulfilled, by this unnatural separation.

The point of contact of religion with philosophy is the common process of arriving at certain basic or ultimate ideas, derived from the facts of actual experience. Philosophy properly speaking begins, where the sciences end, though the sciences themselves are the main feeders of philosophy. Gaps always remain, though scientific method may have been carefully followed in analysing the facts of experience. This is inevitable, on account of the imperfect nature of human understanding. It will take an indefinitely long time for human intellect to complete its thoughts without gaps, which it may possibly accomplish, in the last stage of human evolution. The utmost that man can meanwhile achieve is to lessen the number of gaps, as time flows on.

If we look upon these gaps as constituting the region of the unknown, which science has yet been unable to explore, and consider the achievements of science, as constituting the region of the known, it will be easy to see how the region of the unknown is sought to be pierced through, from one side by philosophy, and from the other by religion. This is the essential common ground of both. Though conventionally they go by different names, the object of both is one and the same, to fill up the gaps left by science. For that reason, it may be safely asserted that there can be no separation between philosophy and religion, and a time is sure to come in the history of mankind, when philosophy and religion will not be treated as two distinct things, but as one and the same entity, looked at from two angles of vision.

Inspite of man's vanity, he has never been able to understand things as parts of a connected whole, without taking them at first piecemeal. The links connecting the different groups of experience, he takes a long time in understanding, and understands last, if he understands at all. This inner connection of the different groups of experiences forms the main subject-matter of philosophy, and the inferences drawn ultimately assume the shape of religious beliefs.

At first there was no difference between religion and philosophy. The philosophy of the age was practised as its religion. The latest result of man's thinking was transformed into an added item of his creed. This went on for a long time, until the stage was reached when religion, instead of being the individual concern of the members of the community, as it was for a long time, became the care of a group of persons, who came to be known all the world over, as a distinct class, called the priesthood or clergy. Since then the intimate relation between philosophy and religion has been broken.

HOW RELIGION WAS SEPARATED FROM PHILOSOPHY

The severance of the link is an instructive subject of study for those who are interested in the progressive thinking of the race. This severance was in a manner inevitable. There was a time when every man was his own barber, washerman, labourer, and also his priest. Just as a time came, when he could not himself meet the numerous demands of his daily life, and the result was the establishment of different classes, with different occupations, within the community, there also came a time when the multiplicity of his religious demands could not be met by himself, and were made over to the care of a special class, the class of priests or clergymen.

In the history of the human race, the division of occupations, that is to say, the classification of the community for its numerous purposes, has been productive of immense good, and to a large extent accounts for the rapid progress made by it. But such is the irony of human fate, from the same class distinctions has come the greatest amount of tyranny, which the world is groaning under. Restricting ourselves, in the present instance, to the class of priests that came into existence, as time went on, and the sanctity and privileges of the class became great, the desire to maintain the same also became very great, and the activities of religion, which had hitherto synchronised with those of philosophy, became a closed circle, into which the access of philosophy was stoutly resisted by the newly formed class, lest its exclusiveness, and along with it, its privileges, would be gone. Here and there, a few doctrines of philosophy found their entrance into the charmed circle surreptitiously, or by sufferance, but for all subsequent time, the separation of religion from philosophy had been effected.

Let us next consider the practical form which the severance of religion from philosophy took, and the immense mischief that resulted therefrom. As soon as the separation was effected, from the religious house-tops it was loudly proclaimed that Faith was the basis of religion, and that philosophy rested on Reason. As if philosophy has not, and will not continue to have its share of faith, as if philosophy has explored all regions, and there is not a vestige of the unknown, regarding which its many theories are not so many articles of faith. But since the proclamation, that faith is the essential basis of religion, the scrutiny of reason was shut out from its sphere, and the blind submission to dogmas, now and then clothed in the garb of reason, began to be rigidly enforced. Such is the cumulative effect of continuous thinking, within narrow grooves, and the obstinate habit it engenders, that even the brightest of intellects of modern

times would hesitate to give philosophy unqualified admission into the domain of religion. What havoc would it not then play in the preserve of religion, and will not then the gates of Heaven, which are easy of access, be closed for ever !

CHANGE IN THE MODERN OUTLOOK

Before the severance of the link, the certainties, the hopes, and even the fears of philosophy used to become the certitudes, hopes and fears of religion. When the two intimate aspects of life were ruthlessly separated, the wholeness or integrity of thinking of man was broken. The highest aspirations of man, in the sphere of religion, became cramped, but the yearnings of the human heart could not be stifled for ever, nor could the intellect be prevented from playing its legitimate part for all time in the domain of religion. Once more philosophy is knocking at the door of religion for entrance, once more the heart of man is yearning to believe those things that have the stamp of reason on them. Man is eager to regain his integrity of thinking.

In this state of things, in an age in which reason is trying to take its rightful place, how are the members of the class in charge of the religious beliefs of the race behaving ? Unable to remain complacently satisfied by basing their claims solely on faith, they have become restive, and are trying their utmost, by means of utterances, written and spoken, to secure for the dogmas whatever semblance of reason they can lay their hands on. It would be very unfortunate if the reader were led into the belief that the object of the writer is to cry down religion in general. Nothing could be further from his intention, though the plain hint is being given to clear practical religion of the injurious weeds that have grown over it, on account of its separation from philosophy. If God is not dethroned or chased away, but only an attempt



is made to form an intelligent idea of Him, religion has nothing to be afraid of.

DEMAND FOR A REASONED FAITH

How has this change been brought about ? What has led to the revival of the desire, which at one time used to be fulfilled as a matter of course, to admit into the fold of religion the claim of philosophy ? The rapid strides with which scientific knowledge has, in all directions, developed in modern times, aided by the spread of education amongst the general masses, has set people thinking whether they should not revise their ideas about time-honoured dogmas, to which their faith has been pinned. "The vast extension, both of scientific knowledge and of scientific modes of thought, which, though helpful to essential religion, are antagonistic to the mental attitude of some religious people, has done much to increase the drift away from the organised Christian Churches—a drift characteristic of the present age. A growing number of both the critically minded and the careless ignore the Churches, leaving in them those who, for one reason or other, accept the familiar doctrines, literally and with a whole heart fervently."¹ What applies to Christian countries, the centre of modern scientific progress, applies to the rest of the world, into which the researches of science are rapidly spreading. Mysticism, the great citadel of orthodox religion, which lends support to most of the orthodox ways of thinking, has been vigorously attacked. It cannot be said that the vast multitude of people has turned all on a sudden irreligious, though that plea may find favour with those who want the unquestioning allegiance of the people to continue to the old rituals and dogmas. It is very much to be doubted if it has been fully realised,

¹ W. C. D. Dampier-Whatham, *A History of Science*, Cambridge, 1929, p. 48.

how deep is the desire on the part of man to find out a really abiding faith, to which he can cling in hours of necessity, a necessity which is ever on the increase, in this world of miseries and distresses. Man is panting to rest on beliefs which, though they may not improve his worldly condition, may at least provide him with really consoling thoughts, armed with which he may boldly face the vicissitudes of life, just as a warrior, fighting for a cause that he feels to be just, boldly faces the enemy and death. Man is by nature intensely religious, but, alas, the obduracy of the orthodox systems would not allow him to remain so.

The man of average intellect is now-a-days more venturesome than before. He is eager to try his luck, with the help of means, and in regions, hitherto untried. The forwardness that characterises him in the ordinary activities of life is also goading him on to adopt new ways of thinking, that are afloat in the region of faith, and to see if these can shape his life in a more satisfactory manner. The present age is eminently the age of change, the age of breaking down old structures and rearing up in their places new ones, with the hope of deriving from them the satisfaction man stands direly in need of. He has, to a large extent, ceased to offer unquestioning obedience to authority, however great or exalted, or to ideas, however time-honoured they may be. He has turned critical. The scientific mood is abroad. The age that has produced scientific marvels and has given birth to an Einstein, who has in a remarkable degree upset orthodox ways of thinking, in the sphere of physical sciences, has infused in man a new spirit, visible in the sphere of religious thinking. In its practical form, it is responsible for the demand for more freedom in the matter of acceptance of articles of faith, which had before commanded unquestioning obedience. In other words, critical thinking or philosophy is knocking at the door for admission, to take its rightful place by the side of religion,



in order to strengthen and vivify it, to make it worthy of continued allegiance.

THE EVIL OF A PURELY ANALYTICAL METHOD

We can now bring science into line with philosophy and religion, and find its appropriate place in the trinity. It should be stated that the exclusiveness with which the different branches of knowledge have gone on developing, and the confusion that has resulted therefrom, are attributable to the analytic method that has been pursued galore in their respective spheres. The different branches of knowledge have necessarily to be treated separately for ensuring accuracy and progress, but this method of separate treatment in course of time breeds a spirit of exclusiveness, which produces amazing effects over the minds of the devotees. Such is the enthusiasm created in favour of an isolated branch of study, the disposition steadily grows on the part of even eminent researchers, to construct a whole out of a part, to develop an arc, on which they are working, into a circle. Over and over again, in the field of physical sciences, most eminent workers in the past, men such as Wallace, Darwin and Herbert Spencer, unconsciously forgot that they had set themselves to work in a limited field, and ended ultimately by enthusiastically raising up a complete philosophical structure over it. If that be the case with trained enquirers, in the sphere of exact sciences, in a greater degree the spirit works in the case of philosophical and religious enquirers. Every generation witnesses its crop of philosophers and religious enthusiasts, and the world is treated to new theories and religious maxims, developed in complete isolation from the bulk of human experience, though marked by the ostentatious use of only a tiny portion of it, in order to make the pet ideas look attractive and systematic.

THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF RELIGION

If religion is to hold its proper place in the life of man, it cannot any more remain dissociated from the facts of experience, the conclusions of the scientific researches of the times. Religion must absorb, make part and parcel of itself, the conclusions of science. It is a most thoughtless frame of mind to be in constant dread of them. Any one who has studied the changes, working themselves out in historical times, in ways quite unlooked for, would admit that this spirit of isolation can only be maintained for a limited time. The conflagration is bound to come, as it has always come, to destroy the old rickety structures. But the need of real religion is so great, its outlook so vast, the fundamental idea underlying it so comprehensive and elastic, that it can take within itself the demonstrations of countless ages of science, and remain the same serene, grand, and incomprehensible phenomenon, permeating all known things, and at the same time extending its invitation to explore the vast regions of the unknown for its benefit, for ever and evermore. There need, therefore, be not the least apprehension on the part of real religion, from the quarter of science, however startling, at first sight, its results may appear to be.

It is not implied that the conclusions of science can meet completely the demands of religion. They cannot, in the present state of exact knowledge, and would not be able to do so, for a long time to come. Religion will have to take the help of philosophy for filling up the gaps, which science would leave behind. Scientific study will have to be supplemented by a course of systematic philosophical thinking. Religion cannot be allowed to draw its conclusions in an irresponsible or unsystematic manner. It is childish to assert that it can grow in a manner, peculiar to itself. So far as the conclusions of sciences, and the

inferences of philosophy, based upon facts of definite experience, are concerned, it would be idle to say that religion can choose to reject them. With regard to the region of the unknown, which, till humanity reaches its perfection, will always yawn before the known, religion may be free to proceed in any manner that best appeals to it. But it can do so only for a limited time. As soon as, and to the extent, philosophy, aided by exact knowledge, is able to explore the region of the unknown, religion will have to give up its *ipse dixits*, and faithfully accept the conclusions of exact knowledge. This is the process, by means of which a religion, that desires to keep itself healthy and abreast of times, must pursue. It is rank prejudice, and therefore unworthy on the part of a rational man to maintain, that any particular set of ideas about religion, not based upon exact knowledge, should command obedience till the end of time.

MODE OF ARRIVING AT TRUTHS

Truths can be drawn only from experience, by the interaction of self and not-self. To say that they can be drawn in a different manner is to commit a blunder of the first magnitude, fatal to the enquiry that may be carried on. It is sometimes urged that, in the field of religion, truths are drawn by the religious seer in a manner which does not conform to the ordinary method of gathering knowledge. One can have no objection to accept a new mode of acquiring knowledge, if one test is allowed to be applied to it. The truth should be always objective, never subjective. By this is meant that a method or process, which works in the case of an individual, should also be found to work in the case of every other person, in similar circumstances, by reason of which the truth becomes objective. The method must be capable of being explained and followed. We do

not know and cannot permit the existence of what may be claimed as super-normal experience. Whatever can be experienced by even a single individual must be looked upon as a normal experience, in the circumstances of the case. Given the circumstances, the experience must follow, in each and every case. If this test is fulfilled, experience gathered in this way must be treated like other experiences, and becomes truth. If any one comes forward and says that he has seen God in a lonely field, or on a hill-top, or in the seclusion of his room, let him for the benefit of humanity and cause of advancement of knowledge, give out the manner in which he has been able to do so. It is absurd to say that a man like him cannot be found, and the same circumstances cannot exist, and the result repeated. It is quite possible that there may be some sense, which properly understood and developed, may yield experiences of a nature which cannot be gathered by the ordinary methods, but it should be made to go through the necessary tests, by means of which doubts for ever may be removed regarding its genuineness. It is ridiculous to say that there are some high and lofty things which avoid the gaze of common people and disappear from view, when the eyes of the masses are turned towards them. Many experiences of a new type have been subjected to scientific tests and have ultimately helped to widen the sphere of human knowledge. ¹

The place of experience, and, accordingly, that of science, thus become definite and assured in the field of knowledge. One has to begin from experience, the sphere of science, and then pass on to the regions of philosophy and religion. The conclusions of science, and those of philosophy and religion, so far as the latter are

¹ *Vide Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, and Myer's Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, London, 1904.*

directly based upon facts of experience, will constitute positive truths, while the inferences drawn by philosophy and religion, by speculating about matters unknown, will be of a tentative nature, liable to be set aside as soon as actual experience points to a contrary direction. Philosophy or religion is allowed to go farther than actual experience, for a time, if it likes, but on the distinct understanding that it cannot claim those ideas, which have not their root in actual experience, as positive truths.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS THEORIES

The real character of those philosophical and religious ideas or theories, which cannot be placed on the same level with truths or facts of actual experience, calls for some explanation. It has been said that they will necessarily be of a tentative character, but all the same they deserve serious consideration at the hands of enquirers and truth-seekers, unless they are purely conjectural or fanciful. This is not an extraordinary concession made to philosophy and religion. This kind of procedure, for arriving at ultimate truths, is also adopted by science. At first, theories regarding scientific subjects are advanced. In course of time, as these theories are able to explain phenomena, and stand substantiated by facts, they are no longer treated as mere theories, but are raised to the rank of laws. On the other hand, when certain theories that have, by reason of their ability to explain a mass of physical phenomena, ranked as laws of nature, but are afterwards found unable to explain new matters, which they ought to be able to explain, they are at once pulled down from the high place they were occupying. This has often happened in the region of physical sciences in the past, and will continue to happen in the future. It is inevitable, on account of the limited nature of human intellect. Researches extended

over a long period of time have to be made before conclusions, which are free from all manner of defects, can be arrived at. But for the time being what is able to give a fair solution of a problem, has to be accepted as a working theory. There is no blame in doing so. This applies also to the regions of philosophy and religion. If certain philosophical or religious theories are to a large extent able to lighten up the region of the unknown, they can certainly be accepted, but only tentatively. A long list of such theories may be claimed at any particular period by philosophy and religion, but they should not be treated as positive truths. We have to wait patiently for the time when they can be so treated. There are more surprises, agreeable as well as disagreeable, for man, which it is impossible for him to anticipate, in his present state of knowledge.

MUTUAL RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND SCIENCE

We can now put the trinity, as we have called, philosophy, religion, and science, in their proper order and perspective. Science has been found to be fundamental, on which both philosophy and religion mainly rest. Truth can only be gained through the channel of experience, with the help of the scientific method. But the truths of science, which are analytically arrived at—often the facts of one branch of science being developed in isolation from the other branches—have to be synthetically put together by philosophy. In so far as philosophy tries to put together synthetically the results of the different branches of science, it is pursuing the method of arriving at exact knowledge. But when it finds that science has left gaps, as naturally it must, and tries to fill them up with the help of theories, these theories will be treated as being of a tentative character, until science, by its exact methods of arriving at truths, has been able to confirm them as facts of experience.



In normal circumstances, philosophy passes on to religion its conclusions, which are then covered over by a layer of feeling, and they begin to play a conspicuous part in building up the fabric of life, composed of joy, happiness, hope, fear and misery. A religion which is essentially philosophical stops there. But a religion which parts company with philosophy, and thereby loses touch with the actualities of life, has its healthy growth arrested, and stagnates, in course of time.

A CAUTION

As we will have to mainly confine ourselves to philosophy, it is necessary to utter a word of caution to philosophers as a class, and to the students of philosophy in general. When a person commences to write on a philosophical subject, and has made up his mind to give to the world a new set of ideas, it is very necessary for him to remember the roots from which his philosophy, or for the matter of that the philosophy of the cleverest man of any age, should spring. The facts of experience are the ultimate basis upon which philosophy rests. He should not forget this. He should not also forget another very important thing, which is characteristic of human experience, that ideas are liable to changes. Facts at any time may be discovered, which would sweep away the existing conclusions, or so modify them as to give them an entirely different character. He should therefore stop to consider what fate may overtake the philosophy, boldly proclaimed by him, when the data upon which they rest undergo change. This may be illustrated in the light of the latest achievements of science. The subconscious self is being vigorously explored by students of analytical psychology, telepathy and television, as branches of science, have passed their infancy, and lastly, the scientific theory of Relativity has thrown its

challenge to all classes of thinkers. Where do the philosophies of the past stand in face of the results of modern researches? The twentieth century is certainly not going to see the end of scientific achievements. If the data of philosophy go on changing at this rapid rate in future, it behoves the present-day philosopher to cease to boast like Hegel of old that he has brought his philosophy down from Heaven for human appreciation, and be a little modest in drawing his conclusions and pressing his claims. It is well known that when a philosopher draws his conclusions, he often puts forward the claim that they are good for eternity. This was tolerated in ages when scientific achievements were few and far between. The modern philosopher should remember that we are living in completely different times, which are rapidly changing, and he should cease to speak for eternity. He should modestly begin by saying that, in view of the existing data, conclusions which he draws may be found acceptable, but in a changed state of things, his conclusions would stand altered. Students of philosophy should also remember this, when they feel themselves very much attracted by the conclusions of any philosopher.

Mutatis mutandis, the same caution applies to the doctors of religion. Religious dogmatists should beware of the fate that overtakes the philosopher who boasts of speaking for all time.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE RIG-VEDA

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

According to some, a history of Indian philosophy, in the absence of authentic historical records, is a misnomer. "Nowhere is the difficulty of getting reliable historical evidence so extreme as in the case of Indian thought. The problem of determining the exact dates of early Indian systems is as fascinating as it is insoluble, and it has furnished a field for the wildest hypotheses, wonderful reconstructions and bold romance. The fragmentary condition of the material out of which history has to be reconstructed is another obstacle."¹ According to others, in spite of want of accurate chronological data, a history of Indian philosophy is still possible. "It is no doubt true that more definite chronological information would be a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little chronological data we have, gives us a fair amount of help in forming a general notion about the growth and development of the different systems by mutual association and conflict."² I do not, on the one hand, share the regret which a class of writers feel, on account of the task being found hopeless to write a history of Indian philosophy, in the sense in which it is understood in the West, nor do I participate in the enthusiasm of those who feel pleased

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, London, 1923, Preface, pp. 8-9.

² S. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 5-6.



that, notwithstanding deterrent circumstances, a history of Indian philosophy, after the Western model, may be attempted.

STANDARD OF JUDGMENT

I may be pardoned by the Western scholars, and their Eastern followers, for not subscribing to some of the standards of judgment, that have been set up by them. I have no desire to undervalue the worth of chronology, in connection with the records of thoughts of those who have gone before us, but what I consider more important, and obviously for which the value of chronology came to be recognised, is the task of finding out the development of thoughts, which, at least in the field of philosophical research, is more valuable than the mechanical recording of dates in succession. If the development of thoughts, which I consider to be most important, can be watched and pursued, for which the standard of rational evaluation can be the only proper guide, the object of philosophical enquiry may be said to have been fully achieved. Once the craze for dates and names is set aside, it will be found that the real history of mankind, in all its branches, consists of judgments, in order of worth, according to the standard of reason, on its achievements. Whether there has been a march forward or a setback, can be best ascertained from the character of works and thoughts on record, and as mankind marches onward, when, for instance, the present year of 1934 has swelled into 19340, minute references to dates will be certainly without significance, just as some of the dates, computed in thousands of years, which are freely mentioned, in some fields of scientific investigation, do not convey any definite idea, apart from awakening a sense of magnitude, in the minds of the readers. So far, however, count of time is necessary, for the purpose of philosophical enquiry, broadly marked epochs, or periods,



even in terms of centuries, record of which, in the case of any system, will never be lacking, will be found quite sufficient.

ABSENCE OF DATES AND NAMES OF AUTHORS

If we now reflect on the two drawbacks that meet us on the threshold of our enquiry into the philosophies of India, namely, the want of reliable information about the names of authors of different modes of thoughts, and the exact time when they lived and thought, we would understand why no great value was attached to either of them, and our foregoing view would stand justified. Individual thinkers in India were not so anxious for fame as they were for finding an abiding place for what they thought, though in the anxiety to do so, they sometimes resorted to the questionable practice of attaching to their writings the names of reputed sages or mythical persons. When, on account of his utterances, a sage like A'rūni came to be held in high reverence—we are told in Satapatha Bráhmaṇa that A'rūni was a very renowned sage of antiquity and Yájñavalkya, the greatest sage of the Upanishad period, was his pupil—we find the name of A'rūni used by thinkers of a later period, for securing importance for their writings. Kaushitaki Upanishad admittedly belongs to a later period, while Brihadárányaka and Chhándogya Upanishads are the oldest of the extant Upanishads. The dialogues of A'rūni and his son Svetaketu are some of the rarest gems of Upanishad thoughts. But in complete disregard of chronology, the same A'rūni is re-introduced in the Kaushitaki Upanishad, and made to play a rôle, quite unworthy of him.

The old thinkers of India likewise did not attach much importance to dates, when dealing with ultimate ideas, for the reason that, according to them, they belonged

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to no particular time, but were meant for all time. But so far as dates are necessary for the main object of enquiry, the marking of the development of thoughts, Hindu philosophy does not present difficulty worth worrying about. No one would commit the error of transposing the order of appearance of the Vedas, the Bráhmaṇas, A'ranyakas and the Upanishads, nor can there be any confusion in the matter of assigning the rise of historical Buddhism to its proper time. The Sutra and other periods that followed, also stand sufficiently marked out from one another. It would be too much to expect, in the case of records of events that took place several thousands years before the Christian era, and preserved by means of mnemonic literature, more detailed chronology than is thus available.

VALUE OF OLD INDIAN THOUGHTS

We will, in this chapter, concern ourselves, as preliminary to the main enquiry, with the progress of philosophy from the earliest times till the period of the Upanishads is reached. No one would be inclined to require rigid compliance with the conventional stages of evolution, in the case of the evolution of philosophy, and it has only to be stated that by evolution, as applied to philosophical thoughts, is meant nothing more than the gradual expansion of ideas, or the passing on from thoughts of an elementary kind to those of a comprehensive or basic nature. This kind of evolution follows the development of the faculty of perception or the natural expansion of the intellect. It cannot be said to have happened only in the case of the Indian philosophers. The development of ideas in all countries has followed the line of the gradual accumulation of experience. This was the case with the earliest European philosophers, with whom some of the philosophers of the Vedic period may be compared. Dr.

Das Gupta sorrowfully quotes, in the introductory chapter of his history of Indian Philosophy, Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University, to show that though the earliest Greek philosophers, by which I think the earlier Ionic thinkers are referred to, are given a place in the Walhalla of the philosophers, the old Indian thinkers¹ are not acknowledged as philosophers by the present-day writers of the West, and Dr. Das Gupta contents himself by characterising such beliefs as untrue and uninformed.² Professor Thilly is writing in the twentieth century. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a countryman of Schopenhauer, who was born a year after Schopenhauer wrote his famous book, "*World as Will and Idea*," in 1818, in which frequent references are made to the philosophy of the Upanishads, had also openly refused to include in his History of Philosophy any notice of the Indian thinkers, on the ground that they were not real philosophers, but mythical and theological writers, even after he had the benefit of reading Schopenhauer and knowing his view, that the Upanishads are the products of the highest wisdom.³ It is sheer waste of time to attempt to refute the views of writers in whom the superiority complex dominates, even when they are engaged in the writing of philosophical treatises.

THE AGE OF RIG-VEDA

The earliest record of the the Indian thought is to be found in the Rig-Veda. The age of the Rig-Veda has been

¹ According to A. E. Gough, the author of the *Philosophy of the Upanishads* (London, 1903), they belonged to "a rude age and race," and had the blood of "Negroid aborigines" and "Tartar hordes" running through their veins!

² *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1922, p. 3.

³ Schweigler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 5.

the subject of prolonged discussion, but scholars still widely differ in the matter of assigning a date to it. The two extreme views are represented by Balgangadhar Tilak and Max Müller. Tilak thinks that the Vedic hymns are as old as 4500 B.C. Max Müller could not give Rig-Veda an earlier date than 2200 B.C., though he freely admits that Rig-Veda consists of the earliest record of Aryan thought.¹ I do not aspire to gain fame by arbitrating in a matter like this, as, for the reason stated above, I consider it useless for the purpose in hand. If Rig-Veda is taken as containing the earliest utterances of the Aryans, I quite agree in thinking with Max Müller that it does not matter whether its age is 1500 or 15000 B.C. But what I feel called upon to observe is that Rig-Veda cannot be taken as the earliest utterances of the Aryans, in the literal sense. The period of Rig-Veda marks the period of comparatively advanced civilisation of the Aryans, and it can certainly be inferred that before hymns could be composed in the manner in which we find them in the Rig-Veda, several stages of life must have been left behind. The authority of records cannot be brought forward in support of this contention, but the view would be unhesitatingly accepted that, before a people could think of composing hymns to deities, whom they invoked for powers and blessings, a long time must have elapsed, during which period the tendency of the mind, which felt the necessity of composing such hymns, had been gradually developed.

Another matter deserves more than a passing notice. The Rig-Veda contains epochs of thoughts, which may be

¹ "No one has doubted that in the Veda we have the earliest monument of the Aryan language and thought, and, in a certain sense, of Aryan literature which, in an almost miraculous way, has been preserved to us, during the long night of centuries, chiefly by means of oral tradition." *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1916, p. 33.

looked upon as different and distinct, as poles asunder. Let us take up hymn 38 of Mandala I, addressed to the Maruts or Storm-gods. The naïve enquiry is made of the Storm-gods as to when they would take the chanters of the hymns, as a dear father would take his son, by both hands, followed by the enquiry about the place where the God's cows were sporting. Let us place alongside of it, two other hymns, which belong to an altogether different class. Hymn 121, Mandala X, is addressed to the Unknown God. Therein it is stated that the Hiranya-garbha, or the Golden Child, arose at the beginning, and that as soon as he was born, he alone became the lord of all that exists, that his commands all the bright gods revere, that he established the ether, that he begat the Earth and the Heaven and also the waters. Hymn 1, 164, 46 R. V., runs to the following effect : "*Ekam sad vipráḥ bahudhā vadanti, Agnim, Jamam, Mátariśvánam áhuḥ.*" Freely translated, it means that the sages call the One by many names, such as Agni, Jama, Mátariśvan. Can any one doubt for a moment, that the two kinds of thought, recorded in these two classes of hymns, represent two widely different stages of thought, which must have belonged to two different historical periods, separated by a long distance of time ? It is practically rising from a polytheistic to a monotheistic conception, from the deifying of one isolated attribute of the Creator to the bringing together of the entire class of attributes and attaching them to one supreme head, which is thenceforward considered as the sole object of worship. Even in modern times, from a Trinitarian conception, a jump could not be taken to the Unitarian conception, in less than six hundred years. If we consider the case of the Christian conception of God, followed, nearly six hundred years afterwards, by the Mahomedan conception of God, we find that from the conception of Godhead in the form of Trinity, the conception of one indivisible Godhead took six hundred years to

reach. Can a computation of time not be made, in order to find out the different historical epochs, that were represented by the two very different classes of conceptions, quoted above from the Rig-Veda? Without making any attempt to fix the age of the Rig-Veda, it can be safely said that, although the different hymns of the Rig-Veda have been placed together in one Samhita, the component parts of the Rig-Veda cannot be taken to have been composed at one and the same time, and therefore no particular historical date can be fixed as the age of the Rig-Veda. It will have to be admitted that the hymns of the Rig-Veda, from the beginning to the end, must have taken numerous centuries to compose.

RELIGION NOT YET SEPARATED FROM PHILOSOPHY

In the Vedic times, religion had not been separated from philosophy. The evolution of religion went hand in hand with the evolution of philosophy. It has been pointed out that experience is the common basis of philosophy and religion. As experience began to grow, ideas about the environment and what may lie beyond it, began to develop, and along with them grew the religious faith. In the Vedic period, we shall have to watch the growth of theology, simultaneously with the development of cosmology and ethics. The cosmological theory, like its theological counterpart, in that period, is neither a well-ordered nor a comprehensive one. Knowledge, following experience, is at first fragmentary, and, therefore, at the beginning of human civilisation, there is more or less a groping in the dark, in the shape of attempts to explain the whole by means of, some time, one part, and some time, by another. Each of the elements was represented by a deity, and, at one time or other, claimed greater or less share of consideration, until all the elements were brought under one central control, followed

by the placing of all gods under one central divine head. The philosophers were then the representative heads of religion. It can be said, without fear of contradiction, that in no other country in the world did philosophy penetrate so deeply into its religion. But, alas, there came a time when practical religion parted company with the philosophical ideas of the times, and thenceforward higher philosophy was cultivated by a limited few, while religion in the case of all, even those who breathed high philosophical ideas, reverted to the old polytheistic type.

THE BRAHMANAS : SIGNIFICANCE OF RITUALISM

The stage of polytheism, in the Vedic times, was accompanied by reverence for strict ritualism. The praises of the gods were sung in the Vedas, and were followed by the Bráhmaṇas, or theological treatises, which explained the value of the different rituals. The hymns of the Vedas grew in number with the increase in the number of gods, and the sacrificial ceremonials also went on multiplying. In this stage of the Bráhmaṇas, it is important to consider the significance of ancient ritualism. In the early ethical life of man, ritualism has a value of its own. Merit is sought to be acquired by the performance of rituals. To acquire the capacity for performing the rituals, a course of virtuous life has to be led. Those who see in the rituals nothing more than the performance of a course of superstitious acts of formalism, entirely fail to understand their deep significance for early mankind. We do not wish to exaggerate the value of ritualism in the developed ethical life of man, but in the early life of mankind, performance of rituals was synonymous with the leading of a course of virtuous life. Reward for the performance of rituals was expected, but for that reason they were not robbed of their ethical value. In Europe, until the

time of Kant, no one thought of seriously pressing that virtue should be practised for its own sake. It would be childish to expect developed ethical conceptions in the life of early mankind. So we find that as early as the period of the Bráhmanas, the ethical standard was at work. From the very beginning, a system of cosmogony was followed by a system of ethics. It is not a fact, as has been observed by a class of shallow Orientalists, that in the life of the Hindu, in the Vedic period, there was no place for ethics.

Ritualism, which took the form of sacrifices, in the Vedic times, has its counterpart in modern times, though in a different shape. The act of propitiating God has been continuously practised in one shape or another. In one age it is sacrifices, in another age it is the doing of such prescribed acts as are looked upon with favour by God, who judges in the last instance, or it takes the form of submission to the Divine will, in whatever manner outwardly expressed. All these acts have one and the same object, that of securing merit for the person performing them, the same object with which sacrifices were performed in the Vedic age. The ethical standard is almost one and the same, though it finds expression in changed forms. When we reach the period of Upanishads, we find that a thorough change has taken place in the ethical standard, which followed closely the changed cosmological and theological conceptions.

SUPPOSED ORIGIN OF THE LAW OF KARMA

The ritualism of the Rig-Veda has been taken to be the precursor of what in later times developed as the law of Karma. Sacrifices which were enjoined to be performed were bound to bring about the desired results, which were in a sense the necessary sequence of the acts of sacrifices.

Though in the sacrifices the gods were invoked, the view is sought to be maintained that the gods were merely instruments in bringing about the completion of the course of the mystical ceremonials, over which they had in fact no control. The conception of Rta, which means literally the course or order of things, is taken by Macdonell, in his "Vedic Mythology," to contain in it the germs of the law of Karma or the unalterable law of producing effects. I find myself unable to follow the lead of Macdonell in this matter, as has been done by some of our present-day Indian writers. The belief in Karma has its position assured in the evolution of Indian thought, but it is a product of later times, when the intelligence of man failed to adjust many matters in accordance with his ideas of merit and demerit, following the performance of acts. Infant human mind had not met with that check in its buoyant course of anticipating favourable results from acts, which the developed human mind found afterwards, from varied experience, extending over a long course of time. The ritualists of the Vedic period were not troubled with any doubts. They confidently approached the higher powers and fervently expected that their prayers would be granted, by going through the round of ritual, which they claimed well to understand, and the performance of which they knew would please the gods. Every one looked forward to the happy fruition of his desires by approaching the right god, in the right manner. All expected to draw prizes and there were no blanks. It is rather a strained idea that the gods, who were invoked, were looked upon as themselves not possessing the power to grant the prayers of those who performed the sacrifices. The power of every god, what he could do and what he could not, and how far he was subordinate to other superior gods, was claimed to be so thoroughly understood, that there is no room for the inference that the prayers were so to say wasted, which necessarily would be

the case, if the gods had not the power of granting the wishes of those who approached them. The theory of Karma came to exist in an age, when man had found that disappointment, more than fruition of desires, was the order of the day, and it was then employed to explain the failures that happened in spite of strenuous efforts and the due performance of Shastric injunctions, as also for explaining the inequalities prevailing among men. The theory of Karma is a kind of rational explanation sought to be substituted in the place of what used to be, and is still, considered by many, as the mysterious working of a kind of divine dispensation, overhanging man, which cannot be peered into, much less understood.

VEDIC HYMNS : NECESSITY FOR RE-ARRANGEMENT

It has already been pointed out that the Vedic period must have spread over many centuries, and can be divided into stages, by classifying the hymns, according to their probable order of composition. In the last stage, the conceptions, which were at first fragmentary, are found arranged under comprehensive heads. The cosmogonic idea presents a comprehensive character, as also the ethical and theological ideas. Such is the conservatism of the Hindu mind, and the Vedas being treated as *Sruti* or Revelation held in such great reverence, that no one can think of changing the order in which the Vedic hymns were for the first time reduced to writing, although every one fully believes that, during the long course of time they were handed down orally, the exact order in which they were composed could not possibly have been maintained. Besides, while old hymns were being preserved with the help of memory, fresh hymns were composed from time to time, and it is difficult to believe that some kind of choice was not exercised in assigning a place to the later hymns,

which upset all chronology, and added to the existing confusion. What is however important to remember is that a class of hymns of the Rig-Veda contains thoughts which are decidedly of a highly developed character, and which, accordingly, should be taken as belonging to the last stage, whatever may be its position in the Rig-Veda and whatever class of hymns it may be found mixed with.

THE LAST STAGE IN THE VEDIC PERIOD

In the last stage, the monistic idea of the origin of creation, as distinguished from the pluralistic idea, is found in all its magnificence. The questionings of the mind, and the answers they receive from growing human experience, precede the formation of every advanced theory. Through a long course of contact with the environment, the human mind is able to outgrow its narrowness, and is prepared to entertain a much higher class of ideas relating to the cosmic order and the inner spirit that dwells in it. In the 129th hymn of the Rig-Veda, X, the origin of the creation is contemplated in a manner which even the most advanced philosophers of the West would not in the least be ashamed to appropriate as their own. The hymn is ascribed to Hiranyagarbha Prágápatya, and addressed to the Unknown God, and has been already referred to. The conception of one God has been formed and the creation is solely attributed to him. The elements to which, one after another, the place of honour had been given as the progenitor of the creation, have vanished, and in their place reigned supreme the One, to which all the created things and beings owe their existence.

THE ÁRANYAKAS

Apropos of the later Vedic conceptions regarding cosmogony and theology, it is necessary to consider the A'ranyakas

or the forest treatises. It is very difficult to subscribe to the view, which is commonly held, that these treatises were composed for the guidance of old men who had retired into the forest, and could not therefore perform the sacrifices. The current error is due to the name which these treatises bear. The naming of the treatises as forest treatises clearly admits of another meaning, which will be found to be quite natural. Forest, to us modern people, who are accustomed to live in big towns and villages, signifies a place, where persons retire, when they want to renounce the world. In the Vedic times, no such significance was attached to forests, where sages lived, often with their families, and found such places more congenial to the nature of the work in which they were interested, namely, self-realisation, and imparting knowledge to those who were in quest of it. These habitations of the sages were places of well-known repute, to which kings also went, as occasion required. During the period known as A'ranyaka period, which is a natural sequel to the period of Bráhmanas or the period of ritualism, the merit of sacrifices had come to be held in low estimate. It is not implied, nor is it reasonable to infer, that all the wise men or sages, whose ancestors had taken prominent part in sacrificial ceremonies, had found in contemplation the object they were seeking to gain by means of sacrifices, but there is no doubt that the more advanced among them did not find any longer the same merit in the sacrifices, which continued to be performed by the ordinary householders, and that instead of spending their days in the midst of the latter, they preferred to go to suitable places in forests, where they could pursue their mode of attaining their ends unhampered. These places in the forests, where the sages took up their abodes, may be compared to Plato's Academy, where the Greek sage lived and taught. It has also to be remembered that in spreading the idea that the A'ranyaka teachings were meant for old

and disabled persons, the motive is apparent, not to allow these A'ranyaka teachings to be put on a level higher than the cult of sacrifices, as the sacrificial rituals were still very widely practised, and an influential section of the community was interested in its maintenance.

CHANGE IN THE ETHICAL STANDARD

The period of A'ranyakas, which belonged to the last of the Vedic stages, represents a great advancement in the ethical standard. The conceptions of what man ought to do, the sort of life he should lead, how he ought to adjust his relations with other members of the community, were formed in a manner which was in keeping with his fundamental ideas about God and the creation. The ethical standard had been raised to a very high level, by freeing it from ritualism, the inner self had become the subject-matter of attention, man had become self-reliant, and was not any longer anxious to secure virtue or merit, by propitiating the numerous gods, one God claiming thenceforward his sole reverence. The list of virtues, that had existed before, continued to exist during this period ; the path of righteousness, the separation of the good from the evil deeds also existed, but their conceptions stood enriched in the light of the new relationship that was established between man and God, and man and man.

We thus find that the way is paved for the growth and cultivation of the philosophy of the Upanishads, the crown of Indian philosophy. From a pluralistic view of the origin of the world, a monistic view had been arrived at, and simultaneously with it, a monotheistic religion had come into existence, while the ethical idea had come to its own, by freeing itself from an artificial ritualistic standard.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UPANISHADS

LATE INTRODUCTION OF WRITING : ITS PROBABLE CAUSE

It is fairly certain that writing in India was not used for literary purposes before the Buddhistic period. Even the dates of birth and death of Buddha are matters of dispute. Some hold the view that he was born in 568 and died in 488 B.C. ; others would place the dates of his birth and death in the years 623 and 543 B.C. respectively. Max Müller is of opinion that Buddha died about 477 B.C. During Asoka's reign, in the third century B.C., when literary and philosophical activities were very great, writing, as a means of preserving national achievements, may be taken to have been well established. It would seem that there existed a strong disinclination to reduce sacred matters, at least those that were accepted to be of divine origin, to writing. These were considered best preserved in the memory of specially chosen holy persons, who handed them down orally to persons, similarly considered fit to be their custodians. To this must be attributed the very late appearance of writing in India, or else it cannot be imagined, considering the activities which found vent in numerous other practical directions, why the genius of the people was not applied to finding out, at an early date, means for keeping in a safe manner the record of what they valued most in life. The same spirit which kept people back from subscribing their names to their productions, and announcing the dates when they first appeared, also manifested itself in the disinclination to preserve them by means of writing. Though it cannot be doubted that this led to the door being

kept wide open for errors and unfair practices, it should not be thought that the people had committed themselves to such a course, without serious thinking, in their own way though. Secrecy was looked upon by ancient peoples as the very life-breath of certain matters, want of which was considered to destroy their virtue or efficacy. Even in modern times, in various parts of India, persons may be found, who have acquired rare knowledge regarding certain matters, which is of considerable utility to people in general, unwilling to make it public and content themselves with handing it down orally to some chosen persons.

Like the Vedas, the Upanishads were carefully preserved in memory and handed down orally from generation to generation. This however was the case with the old Upanishads only, for, long after Buddhism had consolidated itself and gained ascendancy over the minds of people, Upanishads continued to be composed, far down into the late Mahomedan period. Once the Upanishads had come to have a hold upon the popular imagination as a storehouse of what is sacred and great, enterprises were not wanting to raise into the ranks of Upanishad literature, teachings of new schools of thought, in order to secure for them sanctity and authority. Up to date, as many as 112 Upanishads have been found, and who knows some more may not be added, as the result of further enterprise. One of the latest Upanishads, the Muktika Upanishad, carefully enumerates as many as 108 Upanishads, so that there may be no doubt left in the minds of believers about each and every one of them being a sacred and authoritative production.

ORIENTALISTS AND THE UPANISHADS

About the middle of the seventeenth century, Dārā Shukoh, the eldest son of Emperor Shāh Jehān, and the brother of Emperor Aurangzeb, prepared a collection of

Upanishads, about 50 in number, which he had got translated into Persian, from the Sanskrit texts. Similar translations had been prepared during Akbar's reign. From one of the Persian translations of the Upanishads, in 1801, a Latin translation was prepared, which attracted the attention of Schopenhauer. The high estimate in which Schopenhauer held the Upanishads is too well known to need special mention here. What may in passing be noticed is the sad betrayal of the inner feelings of dislike of some of the Orientalists to the praise that was so unstintingly bestowed by one of the most intelligent of the latter-day German philosophers upon the Upanishads. To Max Müller will always go a very great share of praise, for exploring in the regions of the Sacred Books of the East, and giving a lead in a field of work which was till then very unattractive. After this is said, it cannot, however, be left unsaid that in spite of his ardour for the great cause, he kept his appreciation within fixed bounds, and did not like, at least at the time when he wrote, in 1876, his introduction to the Upanishads, Sacred Books of the East series, that Schopenhauer's view, which he could not refrain from quoting, should be allowed to be taken, either by the European enquirers or the Indians themselves, very seriously. Schopenhauer had late in life written, "In India our religion will now and never take root: the primitive wisdom of the human race will never be pushed aside there by the events of Galilee. On the contrary, Indian wisdom will flow back upon Europe, and produce a thorough change in our knowing and thinking." This was too much for Max Müller. After previously extolling Rammohan Roy, in a manner in which the very limited section of the Indians, who think very highly of this pioneer English translator of the Upanishads, would hesitate doing, so that he can be pitted against such a high authority as Schopenhauer, Max Müller writes, "Here, again, the great philosopher," referring to Schopenhauer,

whom he had before described as a person possessing the lynx-like perspicuity of an intrepid philosopher, "seems to have allowed himself to be carried away too far by his enthusiasms for the less known. He is blind for the dark sides of Upanishads, and wilfully shuts his eyes against the bright rays of eternal truth in the Gospels, which even Rámmohan Roy was quick enough to perceive behind the mists and clouds of tradition that gather round the sunrise of every religion." ¹ Poor Schopenhauer, if he had only lived to read this. It is well known how successfully Schopenhauer used his sharp wit and humour against Hegel, Schelling and Fichte. If he had lived to read the passage and considered it worth his while to reply, we would have been treated to such logic and rhetoric as would have damped the ardour of Max Müller for a long time in carrying on the very arduous work he had taken in hand. I must, however, point out that in 1899, 23 years afterwards, Max Müller, who had then passed three score years and ten, in his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, made some amends for his previous views regarding the Indian Philosophy, of which he then took a comparatively fair view.

THE EARLIER UPANISHADS

I will, in dealing with the Upanishads, limit myself, as others have very justly considered it necessary to do, to the earlier Upanishads, which do not exceed thirteen in number. Deussen places the number of the old Upanishads at eleven. Samkara thought that the Upanishads, which could be stamped with the highest authority of Sruti, and which Bádaráyana, in preparing his sutras kept in view, were ten in number, namely, Chhándogya, Brihadáranyaka, Katha, Kaushitaki, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Mundaka, Prasna, Svetásvatara and Jábála. It will be noticed that the Isá, Kena and

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. I, Introduction, pp. lxiv-lxv.

Maitri Upanishads are not in the number, while Jábála, which is not ordinarily included in the list of older Upanishads, has been included. The following thirteen Upanishads are here treated as the oldest, and attention is restricted to them for arriving at the fundamental doctrines : Brihadára-nyaka, Chhándogya, Isá, Kena, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Kaushitaki, Katha, Mundaka, Svetásvatara, Prasna, Maitri and Mandukya.

SUTRAS AND COMMENTARIES

For a real and profitable interpretation of the philosophy of the Upanishads, I consider it unnecessary, as well as unsafe, to go either to the Sutra writers, such as Bádaráyana and Jaimini, or to the Commentators, such as Samkara and Rámánuja. It will, however, be necessary to refer to the views of Samkara, Rámánuja and Mádhava, whose influence upon the generality of people has unfortunately been much more than the actual contents of the Upanishads which, according to the strict orthodox view, ought only to be looked upon as Revelation. It is a great pity that the general readers often do not keep in view the distinction between the Upanishads and sutras, or the respective values of the direct texts of the Upanishads and the glosses of commentators, such as Samkara and Rámánuja. In popular imagination their relative values stand reversed. While no great attention is paid to the simple and clear texts of the Upanishads, exaggerated importance is attached to the Brahma-sutras of Bádaráyana and the oft-time laborious interpretations of Samkara and Rámánuja. In 1922, I gave expression to this view in very strong language.¹ I am glad to find that in 1926, Mr. R. D. Ranade has in equally strong language given expression to his views regarding the respective worth of the Upanishads, and the sutras and their commentaries.

¹ *Vide my Theory of Unreality, Calcutta, 1922, p. 32.*

Mr. Ranade observes, "Indeed, when we recognise that all the great commentators, Samkara, Rámánuja and Mádhava had made the Brahmasutras the pivot for their philosophical speculations, and when we remember also that the Brahmasutras were an aphoristic summary of the doctrines of the Upanishads, it would seem a little strange why we have not discussed the arguments of these philosophers (Commentators ?) at even greater length than we have done. There are however two reasons why we have not done so. In the first place, we wanted to take recourse to the objective method of presentation, going to the texts of the Upanishads themselves, unbiassed by any theological interpretations of the commentators whether on the Upanishads or the Brahmasutras. And, in the second place, it was thought desirable that a full discussion of all the theologico-philosophical points would best be reserved for a later volume on Vedánta philosophy proper. Indeed the Vedánta Philosophy stands to the Upanishads almost in the same relation in which the philosophy of the Schoolmen stood to Aristotle. We might say about the theological disquisitions of these commentators what Bacon said about the arguments of the Schoolmen, borrowing the idea from Ariston, that they 'resemble more or less spider's web, admirable for the ingenuity of their structure, but of little substance and profit' * * * * . This might be a little harsh judgment ; but it shows how there is a fundamental difference in the methodologies of the Upanishads and the Vedánta. In the one case, we have the intuitional method, in the other only the logical." ¹

I also made the same observation which Mr. Ranade has made at the end of the above quotation. "With the older Upanishads the stage of intuitive knowledge came to an end. Discursive knowledge followed, and all the pregnant truths

¹ R. D. Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, Preface, pp. 5-6.

gathered in the stage of intuitive knowledge stood in danger of being seriously misunderstood.'¹ If other persons like Mr. Ranade will have the courage to speak out what they feel deeply in their hearts, one effect at least, which I consider very necessary, will be to divert the minds of the Indian readers, whose number is steadily on the increase, from the bewildering and worthless glosses of the commentators to the texts of the Upanishads, which will be found to be a perennial source of knowledge and delight. The ideas and language of the Upanishads are often so direct and simple, that even an ordinary reader cannot miss their meaning and would understand them far more quickly than by going through the commentaries, in the wandering mazes of which he gets lost in no time. The name of Vedānta does not occur in the old Upanishads and the philosophy that has been developed by the commentators, under that name, in the guise of an attempt to interpret the Upanishads, is as one-sided as it is misleading. It has to be borne in mind that what is ordinarily supplied to a reader by a commentator of ancient Indian literature has often undergone a double course of dilution, firstly, at the hands of the Sutra-writer, secondly, at the hands of the commentator himself.

THE AGE OF THE UPANISHADS

The age of the Upanishads, like the age of the Vedas, has given rise to much speculation. By some it is placed at about 1200 B.C., while others would not assign to them an earlier date than 700 B.C. As I have already said, for the purpose of philosophy, the exact dates are not so necessary, as it is necessary to ascertain the stage to which a particular class of ideas belongs. The real purpose is served, if the

¹ *Theory of Unreality*, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 32-33.

stage of the older Upanishads, with reference to the Vedas and the Bráhmaṇas on the one hand, and to the literature of the sutra period on the other, can be distinctly ascertained. Since regarding such distinction there is not a shadow of doubt, that is to say, as there is not the slightest doubt about the fact that the thoughts or ideas recorded in the Upanishads came at the end of the Vedic period, and long before the period of the sutra literature, all that is necessary to observe is that the age of the Upanishads will be relatively earlier or later, according as the age of the Vedas is fixed. One who does not agree with writers like Max Müller, but holds that the age of the Vedas must be at least 4000 B.C., may be allowed to say that the Upanishads ought not to be placed at a date later than 1500 B.C., while those who agree with Max Müller and others in placing the Vedas at about 1500 B.C., can certainly content themselves with assigning the Upanishads to the seventh century before the Christian era. In either case, the relative position and importance of the Upanishads will remain the same.

MEANING OF 'UPANISHAD'

The sense in which the word 'upanishad' is to be understood has created some difficulty on account of the different significations sought to be attached to it. The comparatively easy way of finding what is conveyed by the word is to derive it from the root *sad*, to sit, with *upa* to mean near, and *ni* meaning down. It would then mean sitting down before the teacher for instruction. This meaning of the word has appealed to most of the European scholars. The word is understood by some of the Indian commentators in a different sense. According to them, the word 'upanishad' is used, either in the sense of destruction or in the sense of approaching, because a study of the Upanishads destroys ignorance or because it helps to form

a knowledge of Brahman. In that case, the word has to be derived either from the root *sad*, meaning to destroy, or *sad*, to approach. Samkara uses the word in either of these senses. Max Müller considers this disposition on the part of the Indian philosophers to understand upanishad to mean, either to destroy ignorance or to help the devotee to approach Brahman, "so wilfully perverse that it is difficult to understand the unanimity of native scholars."¹ Deussen is also of opinion that these interpretations are justifiable neither on grounds of philology nor of fact.² He, however, agrees with those Indian writers who explain the word 'upanishad' by *rahasyam*, i.e., secret, and concludes by saying, "If the passages collected in my index to the Upanishads under the word upanishad are examined, it will be at once evident that, taken together, they involve the meaning, 'secret sign, secret name, secret import, secret word, secret instruction,' and that therefore to all the meanings the note of secrecy is attached. Hence we may conclude that the explanation offered by the Indians of the word *upanishad* as *rahasyam*, 'secret,' is correct."

That Deussen is perfectly justified in taking *upanishad* to mean secret teaching or instruction will be accepted by all critical students of the Upanishads, who have tried to grasp the real spirit pervading the Upanishads. The sense in which Samkara understands the word *upanishad* may be at once put aside, for the reason that it contains nothing more than a plea for explaining the Upanishads in the manner in which he has interpreted them, with the help of the doctrine of Maya. The great illusion, that the world is real, or that anything except an abstract Brahman can be real, has to be destroyed, and since the teachings of the Upanishads help in destroying it, the word *upanishad*,

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. I, Introduction, p. lxxx.

² Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 10.

according to Samkara, should be understood in that sense. But a critical student of the Upanishads, who has not been caught in the meshes ingeniously woven by Samkara, or who has not been side-tracked by the so-called realism of Rámánuja, would find himself led, stage by stage, into such a grand climax of ideas, that he would be amazed to find all his cherished ways of looking at and valuing things melting into the thin air. The sublime teachings, that Brahman is the sole reality behind everything, and that A'tman is Brahman, rightly understood, will ultimately raise before him such a vista of thoughts and implications, that he will at first tremble to accept them in their entirety. He will find that all conventional psychological and ethical stand-points have to be left behind. As very few persons can be found qualified to understand the real teachings of the Upanishads, the injunction was considered necessary to be given that they should be kept secret and not imparted to those who were unworthy to grasp them, for, if not properly understood, instead of doing good, they would produce great confusion in the minds of unworthy persons. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that the teachings of the Upanishads were looked upon as secret teachings and great caution had to be exercised in imparting them to others. The path of ritualism, belief in a God who could be propitiated and would confer boons, even the path leading to non-belief in a God or an active Creator, are easy enough, but the teachings of the Upanishads are reserved only for those who can breathe another atmosphere and are prepared to take things not on their face value but as their ultimate worth may be.

THE TERMS BRAHMAN AND A'TMAN

Though there is no great ambiguity about what is ultimately understood by the term Brahman in the Upanishads, it is interesting to consider shortly the manner in

which the term came to have the meaning attached to it later on. I do not consider it necessary to take notice of the literary battles between Max Müller and Weber, regarding the matter whether the Alexandrian *Logos* was influenced by the Vedic *Vāk*, or whether the Alexandrian schools were indebted in any way to Indian thoughts. I leave such matters to scholars of the type of Gough, who enjoy the pleasure of their conclusions, in whatever manner and for whatever purposes arrived at.¹ Deussen gathers six definitions of Brahman from the Upanishads, such as speech (*Vāk*), breath (*prāna*), eye (*chakshus*), ear (*srotram*), *manas* and *hridayam*, all of which he considers inadequate.² The meaning of 'prayer' assigned to Brahman by Deussen, is considered by Max Müller to be "decidedly modern and without any analogies in the Veda itself." Max Müller holds the views that Brahman had the original meaning of what breaks forth or shines forth, that is, the word or speech. The term may be derived from *Vrih* (*Vridh*), to grow, from which it came to mean subsequently the universal force (*Tad Ekam*) which manifests itself in the creation of a visible universe.

In this matter of defining 'Brahman,' I am afraid, Deussen cannot be our safe guide. He is a follower of Schopenhauer, whom he looks upon as a complete Kant, that is to say, according to Deussen, Schopenhauer made complete what Kant had left incomplete, for Schopenhauer found out the thing-in-itself which Kant could not. Whether thereby Schopenhauer improved matters is another thing and cannot be considered here, but since, according

¹ A. E. Gough in his Preface to the *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, London, 1903, at page xii, says, "I think he," meaning thereby the general reader, "will pronounce that India had little intellectual wealth for exportation to the Alexandrian Emporium."

² Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 89.

to this school of thinkers, Brahman is unknowable and Deussen is out to find in the Upanishads, the Indian counterpart of Kant's philosophy, the idea conveyed by Brahman must necessarily be a fugitive thing, a thing which eludes the human grasp, and accordingly he is inclined to find in the Upanishads only a symbolical meaning attributed to Brahman, Brahman being incapable of representation.

It is a truism that ideas or thoughts are expressed by words or speech. Human thought first found vent, or burst forth, by means of articulate sound. For that reason, in the eyes of the primitive peoples, word or speech came to possess, from the very beginning, an important significance, and it cannot be said that this view of the matter presented itself only to the minds of the ancient Indians, though in their case, owing to their environment and bent of mind, it assumed in course of time, a sacred and mystic character. It has to be remembered that for a long time speech was the only medium by means of which divine truths were communicated in India, including the idea of *Tad Ekam*. Since the idea of the One came by means of inspiration, or by being *breathed* into the mind of the seer, it is not difficult to conceive that the idea relating to Brahman would remain associated with breath or word or speech. Accordingly we find that Brahman in the Upanishads was at first identified with speech.¹ It may therefore be taken that Brahman at first meant speech or word and as the ideas relating to Brahman began to expand, the sense in which the word Brahman came to be understood also expanded, until it became synonymous with the idea of the One reality or thing existing.

The term A'tman does not present any difficulty. It means the Self within, the Soul, the Spirit, or the inmost essence of man. It meant at one time the breath simply,

¹ *Chânda*, 7, 2, 2.

and thereafter came to mean the essential nature of anything. It has sometimes been used in the sense of the highest person, the soul of the world or the ultimate essence of the universe.

UPANISHADS CONTAIN THOUGHTS OF DIFFERENT PERIODS

At the outset of his study of the Upanishads, the reader has to bear in mind that, like the Rig-Veda, the Upanishads do not represent the thoughts of one exclusive period. As the thoughts of many successive periods were juxtaposed and formed what we find extant as Rig-Veda, similarly successive periods of thought were strung together into the texts of the older Upanishads. Whoever expects to find in the Upanishads one main idea systematically running through them will be greatly disappointed, and he will have to end by saying what many Orientalists, including Max Müller, have said that they contain a heap of rubbish, from which solitary fragments of gold have to be extracted.¹ I do not contend, nor would it be done by any Indian writer, that the Upanishads, from the start to finish, consist of brilliant expositions or bits of quintessence of human knowledge. On the other hand, I shall have to establish that portions of Upanishads, or what pass as Upanishads, will have to be expunged before the integrity of the Upanishads can be maintained. The main reason why many, mostly foreign readers, have found the Upanishads to consist of a mass of disjointed thoughts, is that they have not brought to bear upon their study the historical mind, which is essentially necessary for finding out the cohering threads in the case of ancient thoughts, where very often the historical sense is lacking.

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. I, p. x.

In preserving the ancient Indian thoughts and transmitting them orally through a long course of time, the remarkable feat of rescuing them from oblivion was achieved, but it was not possible to keep them arranged exactly in the order of their development. So long as anything that appeared to be of value in the eyes of the thinkers of the times could find a place in the living volumes of human record, the persons charged with the responsibility of maintaining them seemed to have been very well satisfied. Instead of developing the spirit of fault-finding at coming across what at first sight appears to be the conglomeration of numerous disconnected ideas, the research student, imbued with the ideas and sentiments of ancient times, should with widened sympathy try to find out the links of connection or growth, among the mass of matters thrown together. I must frankly say that such a task can rarely be accomplished by foreign scholars who, however great their enthusiasm, scholarship and industry may be, would be naturally lacking in that instinct and sympathy, which an Indian investigator can command, when studying the thoughts of his ancestors. This is well illustrated in the case of recent investigations carried on by Mr. R.D. Ranade in the field of Upanishad literature, who has been able to show that the roots of all the systems of Indian philosophy are to be found in the Upanishads.¹

¹ "The Upanishads indeed occupy a unique place in the development of Indian thought. All the later systems of Indian philosophy, as we believe has been shown in detail for the first time in the history of the Upanishadic literature in the fourth chapter of this work, have been rooted in the Upanishads. The indebtedness of particular systems of philosophy to the Upanishads has been partially worked out by a Garbe or an Oldenberg; but the entire problem of relation of all the later systems of philosophy to the Upanishads has been hitherto an unattempted task."—*Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, Preface, p. 3.

ROOTS OF THE DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHIES IN THE UPANISHADS

I fully agree with Mr. Ranade in thinking that in the Upanishads will be found imbedded the germs of all Indian philosophies, which subsequently sprouted out into full grown and vigorous distinct systems. There is nothing extraordinary in this. The culminating idea of Brahman, embracing or including within it everything, could only have been synthetically arrived at, after exploring all possible metaphysical aspects, such as materialistic, atheistic, nihilistic, theistic and idealistic standpoints. In spite of the bewildering number of systems, which are to be found in India or elsewhere, the distinct heads of thought are broad enough and few. Informed and intelligent views will always oscillate between the limits set by them. All the thinkers in the world have passed through the inevitable stages, at some time or other, which characterise human thoughts, namely, conception of a world with or without an intelligent Creator, and the adjustment of relations subsisting between the Creator and the created, when his existence is acknowledged. The earliest philosophy of the Indians will be found in the Upanishads, as well as the latest products of the Indian thinkers. For the reason stated above, no historical order could be maintained, and it will be found that in the same Upanishads thoughts of widely different periods have been thrown together. The Upanishads do not record the thoughts of the philosophers, according to the order of time in which they appeared, but are only the condensed records of the essential heads of thoughts of different groups of thinkers, promiscuously placed.

CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL UPANISHADS : HOW TO DETECT THEM

At the same time it is necessary to remember that the Upanishads have not come down to us exactly in the form in which they first appeared. The same caution has been uttered by all who have carried on their investigations in the fields of the sacred Indian literature, except those who persist in thinking that every text in an Upanishad is a separate piece of Revelation, a belief which unfortunately, as we have observed, emboldened persons to manufacture any number of Upanishads, for their own purposes. "We must remember that those who handed down the ancestral treasures of ancient wisdom, would often feel inclined to add what seemed useful to themselves, and what they knew could be preserved in one way only, namely, if it was allowed to form part of the tradition that had to be handed down, as a sacred trust, from generation to generation."¹ Sometimes narration would be found cleverly woven into texts, which are subsequent additions and had no reference either to the subject-matter or facts of history.

A broad principle may be laid down, by means of which, the portions that have been either added to or modified, may be detected. When it has been once found that a distinct stage of progressive thought has been reached, any attempt, however subtle, to go back to a past stage, which must have been traversed before, should be looked upon with suspicion and treated as exhibiting a lingering desire, on the part of the conservative portion of the thinkers, not to part company with a mode of thinking which they had been

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. I, p. xv.

once accustomed to. It may be illustrated thus: if by means of progressive thinking, carried on through a long course of time, it is ultimately found that certain matters are only the attributes of a thing, though for a long time, each of the attributes was mistakenly taken for the thing itself, any subsequent attempt, to resuscitate the attributes into life and treat them as the thing itself, should be looked upon as the outcome of a desire to bring back the ascendancy of the old mode of looking at things. So long as in the search for a final controlling cause of the creation, sometimes Indra or sometimes Agni or Varuna, is taken as the ultimate cause, these attempts may be looked upon as natural stages in the search for a first cause, but when once the One or Tad Ekam is clearly and definitely found, as the ultimate cause, from whom Indra, Agni and Varuna derive their powers, the attempt to reinstate in their old places, Indra, Agni, Varuna or any other deity, must be looked upon as a distinct act of metaphysical regression, manifesting nothing more than the desire to go back to the old state of things, which had in past exercised great fascination. With the help of this criterion will be detected cases of unfair attempts made to push back distinctly later stages of thought, and to bring in their places ideas that had been already superseded.

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

I do not think the claim of the philosophy of the Upanishads is satisfied by merely pointing out that the different systems of Indian philosophy had their roots in the Upanishads. It goes much further. A careful study of the Upanishads would shew that its philosophy followed an intelligible line of evolution, till the ultimate generalisation was arrived at. Most investigators have felt themselves satisfied by stating that the different systems of philosophy have

certain common fundamental ideas, but all have failed to perceive, what is most important, that the different systems are not the isolated systems, which they appear to be, but are only stages in the evolution of thoughts in the Indian mind, until the ultimate and the sublimest of conceptions, *tat twam asi*, is reached. Such an analysis of the Upanishads will help, more than anything else, in removing the reproach that has been unjustly cast upon them, that they contain only a mass of unintelligible matters, which are not in any manner related to one another. As a matter of fact, with the Upanishads was concluded the work of constructing the mint of Indian thoughts, of which the different systems of philosophy that were developed later on are the small coins, and that the ultimate conclusions which were arrived at proved too staggering for the smaller race of Sutra-writers and commentators, that came into existence subsequently.

I will now proceed to shew the manner in which the different systems of philosophy, which had been independently and elaborately developed, by the time the Sutra period was reached, are connected as successive stages in the evolution of philosophy during the Upanishad period. It should be remembered that though the roots of all the different systems, namely, Vaiseshika, Nyáya, Sánkhya, Buddhist, Chárváka, Yoga and Vedánta, are to be found in the Upanishads, as the main object was to lay stress upon, and develop in all its aspects, the great A'tman doctrine, the elements of the other systems which were in a manner ancillary to it, were treated, according to their relative importance, and were either very briefly referred to or explained at some length. It will, accordingly, be found that the elements of the Nyáya-Vaiseshika philosophies, elaborately developed later on, do not occupy much space in the Upanishads, while on account of their importance, the elements of the Sánkhya, Buddhist and Yoga philosophies have been more fully stated.

VAISESHIKA AND NYÁYA PHILOSOPHIES

Though the two systems of Vaiseshika and Nyáya are closely connected, they came to have afterwards different bodies of Sūtras. The authorship of the Vaiseshika Sūtras is ascribed to Kanáda, and Gotama is taken to have compiled the Nyáya Sūtras. The Sūtras of Kanáda and Gotama are considered by some to have been composed in the fifth century B. C., but as the germs of these two systems are to be found in the earlier Upanishads, the fixing of exact dates of the Sūtras becomes of minor importance. The Vaiseshika philosophy, which deals with the subject of attainment of salvation, as the result of real knowledge, proceeds to consider such categories as substance, quality and class concept. The Nyáya philosophy also aims at salvation, which, according to Gotama, is to be realised by a knowledge of the topics or padárthas, which form its subject-matter. All these topics, such as Pramána and Prameya, according to Gotama, constitute the logical methods for the attainment of truth. No higher philosophy is possible until the subject-matters of the Vaiseshika and Nyáya philosophies are discussed, and correct notions formed about them. No one claims for the Vaiseshika and the Nyáya philosophies the merits which are to be found in modern treatises on Science and Logic, but that a knowledge of the material world is fundamental is stressed by the Vaiseshika philosophy, while the Nyáya philosophy gives prominence to the fact that for arriving at truths, logical methods have to be studied and applied. The highest object of these two philosophies, salvation, is to be attained by the study of the environment, and by a process of reasoning. The Vaiseshika philosophy considers it essential to have a full knowledge of the world, and therefore begins at the bottom. Before a man proceeds to think of unknown regions, and can indulge in higher flights of philosophical thoughts, he naturally thinks of analysing his

environment or things around him. So the first step that the Indian philosopher thought of taking was an attempt to analyse the material world, in order to make it yield the knowledge he wanted. The Vedic period closed with knowledge of the One, who was the Supreme cause of all things, but the material order of things had to be comprehended, and armed with the conclusion of the Vedic period of a supreme God-head, the material world, in all its details, was sought to be understood, which constituted the earliest philosophy of India, the Vaiseshika philosophy. Along with the desire to ascertain the causal connection of things in the material world, the necessity is felt for thinking in a coherent manner, so that knowledge may be free from fallacies and the conclusions arrived at can be unhesitatingly accepted. The need of thinking coherently or logically must have been felt from the earliest times. The art of reasoning is essential for philosophical thoughts, and the Nyáya philosophy tried to expound it. If we put aside for a while the highest object which these two philosophies professed to achieve, namely, *Moksha* or Salvation, we find the Indian philosopher doing exactly what the philosophers in other lands have done, at the beginning, that is to say, engaged themselves in the task of thinking of ultimate things, in terms of the material world, and by a process of reasoning. When this stage is passed, and an idea of the world is formed with the help of reasoning, however crude it may be, the thinker becomes competent to further refine and develop his ideas regarding creation and man's place in it.

TWO GROUPS OF PHILOSOPHIES : ATHEISTIC AND THEISTIC

After the Vaiseshika system had completed the knowledge of the physics of the times, and the Nyáya system had supplied the process of reasoning for drawing correct con-

clusions, the Indian mind flowed through channels similar to those through which human mind has been taken, in other parts of the world. Materialism and Idealism, as two distinct philosophical stand-points, next appeared on the scene, intense material tendency ending in nihilism, and idealism leading ultimately to a conception of monism, which is unparalleled in the history of the philosophy of any other country. It is usual to divide the Indian systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the orthodox (*āstika*) and unorthodox (*nāstika*), according as the authority of the Vedas is or is not recognised. The Mimāṃsa, Vedānta, Sāṅkhyā, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are looked upon as orthodox systems, because they recognised the authority of the Vedas. The *nāstika* systems consist of the Chārvāka, the Buddhist and the Jaina systems, all of which do not recognise the authority of the Vedas. It has to be noted that the Sāṅkhya system, though it does not acknowledge the existence of God, is classed as an orthodox system. But in order to follow the evolution of philosophy, it becomes necessary to place the different systems in two groups, according as they are either theistic or atheistic. The Mimāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Yoga and Vedānta systems should be placed in one group, which should be called the theistic group, and the Sāṅkhya, Chārvāka, Buddhist and Jaina systems should be placed in another group, called the atheistic group. It will be admitted that this manner of grouping is both historical and natural. Materialism, like idealism, has a distinct attraction of its own, and as soon as early thinkers began to form definite and pronounced ideas about existence and man's place in it, they naturally divided themselves into these two classes. The consciousness of self, that is first awakened by an analysis of the material world, with the help of reason, creates, in the minds of giddy and superficial thinkers, a disposition to form an inflated idea of the individual self,

in complete disregard of the other elements in the creation, which ultimately ends in atheism and nihilism, while, in the case of deep thinkers, it sets them in quest of a higher self, to which the individual self may be assimilated, and accordingly leads to idealism. To try to reassert the authority of the Vedas, by maintaining a classification of philosophies, based on the acceptance or denial of the authority of the Vedas, when the period of the Upanishads opened by distinctly proclaiming its revolt against the ritualism of the Vedic period, is extremely unjustifiable.

THE SUTRA-WRITERS

I will take up first the atheistic group, consisting of the Sāṅkhya, Chārvāka, Buddhist and Jaina philosophies. In this group, the Sāṅkhya philosophy is the most important, and, as it is very systematic and appealing, it influenced in a great degree the rest of the Indian philosophies. The Yoga philosophy followed closely on the lines of the Sāṅkhya system, which greatly influenced the Buddhist and Jaina philosophies, and, lastly, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophy exercised immense practical influence over the development of the monistic philosophy of the Upanishads.

In making a proper estimate of the development of philosophy in India, it is once again necessary to remind the reader that the authors of the Sutras should not be taken as the originators of the ideas that are to be found in them. In the case of the *Purva Mimāṃsā* Sutras, attributed to Jaimini, or in the case of the Brahma Sutras, attributed to Bādarāyana, no such confusion is possible, but in the case of Sāṅkhya, Yoga and other Sutras, the disposition to think that the writers of the Sutras were the originators of the thoughts that are to be found in them, is not easy to check. For practical purposes, such an assumption does not lead to any great confusion, but in the matter of tracing

the development of philosophy, it puts a great obstacle in the way. The threads of the evolution will be entirely lost sight of, if what is found in the Sūtras are taken to have been first formulated at the time when the Sūtras were composed. If in the earlier Upanishads, detailed reference is not made to the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies, it is not because the elements of these philosophies, as can be gathered from the Sūtras, were not well known during the Upanishad period. When the sages of the Upanishad period had made up their minds to get at ultimate truths, not by pursuing any longer the path of sacrifices, which they had found to be barren and useless, they did so after going through a regular course of analytical study of the physical and mental sciences. But as their main theme in the Upanishads was the development of the A'tman doctrine, references to the previous stages of thoughts, covered by the other systems, were necessarily brief. It is far from my intention to say that the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems did not undergo changes, as time passed on, until the Sūtra period was reached, but what I want to impress upon the mind of the reader is that the elements of these philosophies were pretty well known in the Upanishad period.

THE SĀṆKHYA PHILOSOPHY

The Sāṅkhya philosophy is the mental or theoretical counterpart of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The material world had been analysed, the art of reasoning had been found, and the philosophers thereafter began fearlessly to build upon them, regardless of the conclusion that was finally arrived at. The philosophers of the Sāṅkhya school, by means of further analysis, found that *Purusha* and *Prakriti* were the ultimate factors, and that interaction between them produced the world and its transformations.

They did not find the necessity of introducing any external influence, such as God. It was taken for granted that *Prakriti* had a natural tendency to be disturbed by the *Purusha*. How the non-intelligent *Prakriti* could evolve such an orderly and harmonious universe and why it should be anxious to render its service to *Purusha* in gaining its liberation, might be matters which needed explanation, but the philosophers did not stop on that account to draw their conclusions. Even in modern times, such half-way conclusions are drawn and find most enthusiastic followers. The Sāṅkhya Philosophy at once fired the imagination of the class of rational thinkers, by its list of *Tattvas*, and though the Yoga philosophy afterwards tried to fill up an important gap by introducing God or Isvara, the rational class of thinkers continued to look upon the Sāṅkhya philosophy as complete in itself and considered the addition of Isvara, by the authors of Yoga philosophy, as quite superfluous.

We may stop to consider the reason why a purely materialistic philosophy appeals so much to persons of advanced intellect. A philosophy, which is more or less mystic in its nature, may draw towards it the minds of a class of specially sensitive thinkers, but will never satisfy those who want to take their stand on pure reason. Those who wanted to accept things after they were able to rationally explain them, were at once captivated by the Sāṅkhya mode of thinking. The absence of the Godhead did not trouble them. They inwardly thought, what the Buddhists afterwards preached from door to door, that in this world of unmitigated sufferings there was no room for a benevolent Creator, for if to such a being the authorship of the creation was to be ascribed, it could not be imagined why he did not relieve the miseries of the created beings. Who does not in his heart of hearts, now and then, question the existence of a benevolent Creator, though it may be dinned into his ears

that his miseries are the results of the sins of his own commission ?

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHÁRVÁKAS.

The followers of the Sánkhyā philosophy thought in a very sober manner, in spite of denying the existence of a Creator. Not so the Chárvákas, who took up some of the threads of argument of the Sánkhyā school, and wove them into a distinct philosophy of their own. Some hold that it was a stroke of policy on the part of Kapila not to have questioned the authority of the Vedas, lest the Sánkhyā philosophy, on account of its atheism, may be looked upon as an unorthodox system, but the Chárvákas, not only, like the Sánkhyā philosophers, said that there was no room for the conception of God, but openly flouted the authority of the Vedas. No value ought to be attached to the fable in the Chhándogya Upanishad, that Prajápati himself imparted *false* knowledge to the demons, for working out their destruction. Such knowledge was considered to be the right knowledge by a class of thinkers, however ridiculous it may appear to others. In the Chárváka system, the materialistic theory reduced itself to absurdity. It represents at the same time the extreme reaction produced in the minds of a class of people, by the current practices of the times, as the Chárvákas denounced the Vedic practices, and called the makers of the Vedas buffoons, knaves and demons.

THE BUDDHIST AND JAINA PHILOSOPHIES.

In the Buddhist and Jaina philosophies, the flippancy that is observed in the Chárváka philosophy vanishes altogether. Such deep questions as whether, in the beginning, Not-Being alone existed and Being was later on born from

it,¹ and whether a Soul exists or not,² are seriously mooted. As I am restricting myself here to the different systems of philosophies, in the manner and to the extent we find them stated in the earlier Upanishads, I do not consider it necessary to dwell upon the exact shape and form which the Buddhist, Jaina and other philosophies took in historical times. Neither it is necessary to do so for the purpose of explaining the broad lines on which the evolution of the philosophy in the Upanishad period proceeded. Beyond the mention of the existence of the Chárváka philosophy at one time, and its brief exposition, we have no evidence of that philosophy having been brought back to life at any time afterwards. The extreme development of the materialistic philosophy, which had its roots in the Sánkhyā system of thought, would seem to have met with a natural death. But it is not possible to bury materialism so soon. It sprang into new life in the Buddhist system and, shorn of its crude appurtenances, came to have a dazzling course of existence, claiming ultimately as its votaries a considerable portion of the inhabitants of the globe.

THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY.

While the materialistic philosophy was running its course, the idealistic philosophy of the land was undergoing a novel transformation. We call it novel, for the reason that nowhere else in the world a system of philosophy, similar to the Yoga philosophy of India, is to be found. Though the Neo-Platonic philosophy, at first at Alexandria and Rome and subsequently at Athens, tried to find out the ultimate principle, by means of ecstasy, mystical annihilation of self, and theurgy, nowhere save in India has the manner in which mind, and through it the material world,

¹ *Chhând.* VI, 2.1.

² *Katha* I, 1.20.

could be entirely subjugated to the will of man, and made to reveal the ultimate principle working in the creation, been so systematically treated, and to a large extent demonstrated.

At the time of the rise of the Yoga system, a stage had arrived in the development of the Indian philosophy, when no further progress could be made by merely looking outward, by an analysis of the material world. The Yoga system was undoubtedly developed out of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, but it followed at a long distance of time, during which interval, the purely materialistic philosophy had ended in nihilism and stagnation. The underlying idea of the Chārvāka philosophy which afterwards, in a more attractive garb, brought into existence the Buddhist and Jaina philosophies, far from deepening the contents of the Indian philosophy, had put it back by several stages. The monistic as well as the theistic believers found that by persisting in the course of analysis originated by the Sāṅkhya system, ever so many gaps were being brought to light that it was becoming increasingly difficult to bridge them over and solve the problem of existence. Science in these early days had made very feeble progress in the country. The great impetus to thought which is given by scientific research, was conspicuous by its absence. In any other country, during such a period of stagnation, the materialists would have, from one end of the country to the other, marched triumphantly and the land would have been in the grip of a class of materialists, no better than the Chārvākas themselves. But the genius of the people developed a new kind of philosophy in the Yoga system, in which they found a discipline, weapon or power, by means of which the battle of idealism was fought and won. Instead of looking any more outward, to the material world or, to the senses, for further enlightenment and guidance, the Indian philosopher decided to concentrate on the Self, the Ego, for solving the problem of existence.



In the Vedic period, the search for a final cause was carried on amidst things outside the Ego or the Self. From time to time, a different first cause of the creation had been found, but it had remained outside the Self. Even when all the great powers of the material world were found to have proceeded from one central power, the enquirer never thought of dragging it within himself. The first cause always remained outside of him. During the first part of the Upanishad period, although a reaction had set in against the Vedic practices, the ultimate principle still continued to remain outside the inner limits, so to say, of the Ego. But the quick mind of the Indian found that a state of ultimate vacuum did not find him in any better position than persistence in a reverent course of sacrifices. He accordingly turned to the Ego or inner-self for a solution of the problem. The Sāṅkhya philosophy had effected a separation between the Purusha and the Prakriti, had made Purusha independent, but after all a negative result had been gained. Passions had been quieted, nay, destroyed, but the net result of all this was practically nil. All the chords that bound the self with the not-self had been snapped, but a state of nothingness had been the only gain. By means of the Yoga philosophy, this state of things was sought to be remedied. The Purusha of the Sāṅkhya philosophy remained the main subject or central figure for consideration in the Yoga philosophy, but in a quite different manner. The distinctness, dignity and intrinsic worth of the Purusha of the Sāṅkhya philosophy were accepted, but it was considered necessary to further explore the Purusha to help the enquirer, if possible, in arriving at a positive result which, without destroying things, might arrange them in a better and more acceptable form. Those who laid the foundation of the Yoga philosophy were evidently very much impressed by the conclusion of the materialistic philosophy, that sufferings or miseries which

could not be escaped from had better be annihilated, but all of them proceeded in their enquiry with a firm belief in an ultimate cause, which they called God, and finally succeeded in establishing a relation between the Creator and the created that entirely recast the order of things and negatived the main conclusion of the existing materialistic philosophy for ever.

THE GOD OF THE YOGINS.

The nature of the God of the Yogins has come in for a large share of discussion. We do not consider it necessary to enter into all its phases. The God of the Yogins, as he is described in the Patañjali Sutras, would seem to be only a superior kind of Purusha. He is stated to be a Purusha whom desire, misery, actions and their result do not touch. We are, however, asked not to look upon him as the Creator of the universe. I have great doubts regarding the interpretation of the Sutras of Patañjali, even as they stand, in this manner. When it is said in the sutra, that knowledge of (or devotion to) God *also* leads to *Samádhi*, it is thought that thereby a subordinate place is assigned to the God of the Yogins, and that He is not the same God who can be the Creator of the universe. I do not think that is the inference which should be drawn from the sutra *Isvarapranidhánát bá*, for it will be found in the next sutra, *Tatra niratisayam sarvajñatwabijam*, it is said that in Him knowledge becomes infinite, which in others is in the form of a germ. The conclusion should therefore be, that the finite self or *purusha* is a minute spark of the Infinite *Purusha*, just as the knowledge of the finite *purusha* is merely a germ compared to the infinite knowledge of the Supreme *Purusha*:

Whatever alteration the conception of the God of the Yogins may have undergone during the Sutra period,

it is fairly certain that, in the Upanishad period, when the Yoga philosophy was first started and elaborated, God, in the sense in which he was then understood, found place in that system. It is otherwise difficult to think that the Yoga philosophy was a mere repetition of the Sāṅkhya philosophy with a surplusage of God, who was not the central controlling factor. As the main object of the Yoga philosophy, even during the Sūtra period, is to establish that perfect knowledge can be gained by concentrating upon the Self, Patañjali does not consider it necessary to enter into a minute description of the relation existing between the finite purusha and the Infinite Purusha, beyond mentioning the fact that the Supreme or Infinite Purusha exists as over-lord of the finite purushas, that he is the teacher of all teachers, and that the same result may be obtained by concentrating upon the Supreme Purusha, as may be obtained by concentrating upon the individual self or purusha. It is therefore not a fact, as Max Müller and other Orientalists are inclined to think, that the Supreme Purusha of the Sūtras has been put on the same level with the individual purushas. Even if it be conceded that it has been so done, it is susceptible of a different interpretation, *viz.*, that the individual purusha has been raised to the level of the Supreme Purusha, and not that the Supreme Purusha has been dragged down, and this may be treated as a forerunner of what is afterwards laid down in the A'tman philosophy. The writer of the Sūtras, by introducing the topic of the Supreme Purusha last, wants to make it quite clear that for the purpose of obtaining the results of concentration, the focussing of thoughts on the Supreme Purusha is not essentially necessary. The object of the Yoga philosophy was no doubt to build a new kind of theistic philosophy, as against the atheistic schools of thought that had become predominant, but as it wanted to do so by providing the

theistic enquirer with a discipline or power, by means of which his conception of the ultimate cause might be put upon a practical and firm basis, from which it could never be dislodged, it chiefly employed itself in setting out the process or method of that discipline, and did not consider it necessary either to minutely enter into a proof of the Supreme Isvara or his relation to creation, after the manner of the Nyáya philosophy. .

SCIENCE AND THE YOGA SYSTEM.

It is necessary to state clearly the angle of vision from which the Yoga philosophy should be approached. The scientific standpoint can never be left out of consideration, in estimating the value, and fixing the place, of the Yoga system in the development of the Indian philosophy. There is nothing which can be called supernatural, though there are many things which we do not yet fully comprehend. That every effect is brought about by a cause in the ordinary way cannot be doubted, though we cannot, in many cases, lay our hands upon the exact factor, which has acted as the cause. Leaving aside those narrations relating to the Yogins that have evoked laughter and ridicule from the European readers, if we confine ourselves to the results which follow from the practice of certain rules that govern the functions of the mind, we would wonder what Yoga in its practical aspect can achieve. Many of the feats that the Yogins used to perform have been scientifically accounted for, such as mesmerism, thought-reading, telepathy, etc. The only feature about such matters, which raises suspicion in the minds of rational thinkers, is that, instead of ascribing a natural cause to the effect that is produced, a mystical explanation is given of it, it being often the case that the person who has learnt the manner of doing a thing, has been taught

to do so, by a practical course of lessons, without being told, and oft-times being forbidden to enquire how the result is actually brought about. When a rational explanation is wanting, highly misleading explanations, in course of time, are apt to be invented, but for that reason the actual demonstration of a thing cannot be disbelieved. I am quite confident that, if investigations on scientific lines are carried out, many of the exercises which are mentioned in the chapter on *Kriyā-Yoga* will be rationally accounted for. More wonders lie in the womb of science than the staunchest believers in mysticism can ever conceive of. The pity is that in the country of the Yoga itself, even educated persons who have faith in practical Yoga, do not think of looking at it from the scientific standpoint, but attach a mystical significance to it which has only to be implicitly believed and cannot or need not be rationally explained.

YOGA, A HIGHLY PRACTICAL SYSTEM.

Before proceeding to consider the nature of the discipline, power or weapon, as I have called it, which Yoga philosophy supplied to the theistic enquirer, the standpoint from which the Indian philosophy should be approached, in order to be properly understood, should be made clear. The Oriental scholar would seem not to care much for the Indian standpoint which, however, happens to be most pertinent to the enquiry. He is well-armed with the philosophy either of Bacon or of Kant, and, if he finds himself interested in Indian philosophy, would prefer to employ the standard supplied either by Bacon or Kant, in order to work his way through. I daresay he feels himself quite at home while going through the Vaiseshika, Sāṅkhya, Buddhist, or even the Vedānta philosophy, which Samkara has made popular. But when

it comes to forming an adequate idea of the highest teachings of the Upanishads, as can be gathered from [the texts, and by properly understanding the link which connects them with the Yoga philosophy, he appears to lose his patience. I do not complain of his loss of patience. In this instance, want of industry is not the cause, for no enquirer can be more industrious than he, but want of sympathy, coupled with a dislike for what he is not familiar with and what at the same time he has been taught to look upon with distrust, is the main reason why he fails to get at the inmost thoughts of the Indian mind. Even a man of such broad outlook as Sir Oliver Lodge, referring to the subject of concentration, the main theme of the Yoga philosophy, which considerably helped the Indian philosopher in getting at the highest truth writes, "It is a most tiring and tiresome thing to stare at a letter, or a triangle, and to think of nothing else for the space of two or three minutes. Whether the term 'thinking' can properly be applied to such *barbarous*¹ concentration of mind as this I am not sure; its difficulty is of the nature of tediousness."² The great scientist, who is the main pillar of support of the group of investigators who are trying to find out the link between the dead and the living, is afraid of concentrating even for the brief space of a few minutes! How can then his countrymen properly understand the mental outlook, and the philosophy that is its outcome, of persons who with evident pleasure concentrate their thoughts upon a subject for hours at a stretch? The Orientalist may retort by saying that he does not consider it necessary to go into the so-called miracles or "irrational exaggerations," to use Max Müller's language, of the Yogins, in order to understand the spirit of Yoga system

1 The *italics* are mine.

2 *The Survival of Man*, London, 1909, p. 45.

or its relation to the Indian philosophy, as they can hardly furnish matters for philosophical consideration. He feels himself quite justified in going through only those portions of the Yoga system which, according to him, need be noticed by any reasonable man. Cannot the Indian philosopher say that a theoretical matter requires a theoretical mode of understanding, by means of scanning the words, making out their true import, and finding out if they satisfy the canons of logic, but in order to get at the truth of a practical, an eminently practical, thing like the Yoga system, going through a practical course is essential, just as a person should actually go through a course of physical exercises in order to find out whether it is really beneficial to the human system or not, and that, so long as that is not done, one should not say that he has formed a correct estimate of the system and boast of his view being rational? The standpoint from which the Yoga philosophy is looked at by the Indian is different from the standpoint of the Orientalist. The Orientalist is quite incompetent to give an opinion regarding the value and utility of the Yoga methods, since he has no practical experience of them, and the joining of words, however cleverly it may be done, when referring to this practical system, in order to laugh out the whole thing, can never be a substitute for going through an actual course of practice, necessary for disposing of its claim.

At the same time it is necessary to observe, and the fact cannot be enough stressed, that the claim of the *Yogin* cannot be allowed in its entirety. No branch of human investigation has up till now yielded the whole truth about any matter. Science cannot boast of having found the fundamental principles underlying all matters which it has been investigating for a long time past. The result of almost every human effort, however complete and thorough it may claim to be, is, in course of time, found to contain

only partial truths. But for that reason, whatever amount of truth an investigation has yielded, should not be disregarded. Investigations in all branches of knowledge have to be continuously pushed on, for finding out more truths. In the practical field of Yoga also, investigation will have to be vigorously and scientifically carried on, for the proportion of what has been achieved, compared to what is yet to be achieved, is very small. The disposition on the part of the Indian to think that every particle of truth regarding a matter, investigated into by the savants of his country in the past, has been discovered and there remains nothing more to be added, is very much to be lamented. Before the whole truth about the matter is found out and the results are subjected to proper tests, all manner of claims on behalf of the Yoga system cannot be entertained. When we find a brilliant Bengali scholar and a very able lawyer of his times, who has since renounced the world and become a *Sannyasin*, in his life-sketch of his spiritual preceptor, a great *Yogin*, narrating that his *Guru* had met God, and gives an account of the meeting, we may not be able to accept every word of what he says, but that cannot stand in the way of our accepting certain broad principles, and the results that flow from them, which are capable of practical confirmation, relating to the Yoga system.

THE LIMITS OF THE SYSTEM.

In old times, after the development of the Yoga system, every philosopher was a *Yogin*, though every *Yogin* was not a philosopher. No one could then claim recognition as a thinker of repute, if he had not submitted himself, in the first instance, to a course of discipline, which the Yoga system had laid down. This discipline consisted of several stages, and only a limited few could reach the

ultimate stage which the system contemplated. When it is remembered how very difficult it is to concentrate attention for a length of time upon matters of general interest, which lie outside of ourselves, the stupendous nature of the task which the *Yogin* was required to perform, by concentrating continuously upon the inner self, may be imagined, and the mere sitting in a certain posture, for any number of days, and even falling into a trance at times, would not indicate that concentration had been properly directed, and the wished for result obtained. Secondly, when I have explained the view I take of the entire Yoga system that, even when carried on right lines, it is no more than a powerful machinery put in the hands of a *Yogin*, it will be apparent why in this land of countless *Yogins*, though some might have achieved considerable success in completely mastering the processes, very few could profitably use them for extending the limits of human knowledge. The Yoga system, in my view, at its best, should be looked upon as able to supply only an instrument of the nature of a high-powered telescope, which the person who handles it must know to turn towards the right direction, in order to perceive things which cannot be seen by the naked eye. The knowledge of the right direction, it must be borne in mind, the Yoga system does not supply. A well-disciplined *Yogin* might reach just the fringe of the truth or end by seeing a vacuum, by turning this high-powered machine in a wrong direction, and this has been the case more often than otherwise. The Yoga system teaches only how to concentrate, but does not teach what to concentrate upon, for getting at the ultimate truth. The real truth and the whole truth about existence can certainly, by means of concentration, be more easily gained than by the ordinary mode of acquiring knowledge, but one must possess the ability to use it in the right manner. It is extremely childish to think that the highest truth lies

isolated in a corner, and one has only to concentrate deeply in order to find it out. The ultimate truth embraces within its limits such a bewildering mass of truths and facts, which even the best of human intellects, aided by such high-powered machine, as the Yoga system at present can supply, will not be able to adequately comprehend.

In order to follow more particularly the relation of the human intellect to the Yoga system, as indicated above, it is necessary to split up the whole thing into three separate parts : firstly, the Yoga-machine ; secondly, the knowledge of the direction in which it is to be worked in order to produce the right result; thirdly, the capacity to form the right conception of the region explored by the machine. The second and third factors are co-related, but still have their distinct spheres of action. A knowledge of the direction in which the Yoga-machine is to be turned may not be very difficult to obtain, but the third factor, the capacity of the mind, is the most important of the three factors, for even when the right direction may have been ascertained, the capacity to understand fully all that may be revealed by the high-powered machine may be wanting. The second factor may be looked upon as more or less a fixed factor, for the problems that require solution are more or less fixed, though they might not have been yet comprehensively or accurately formulated. But the first and the third factors cannot be considered as fixed quantities. They will always remain progressive. The instrument can be made more powerful, just as, in course of time, telescopes of higher power for scientific purposes are being invented. It cannot be contended that, as a machine, the last word about the Yoga-machine has been said. It certainly admits of far greater improvements, in the light of further investigations. With regard to the third factor, the capacity of the individual using the machine, since it primarily rests upon an organism, with

the healthier growth and expansion of the parts of that organism, the capacity of the individual is sure to increase, and no one would dispute the fact that human organism has reached its last stage of perfection.

It is necessary to dwell a little more upon the third factor in its relation to the general mode of acquiring knowledge, and then explain its relation to the Yoga-machine, in order to understand how, by the employment of the Yoga-machine, a quicker method of obtaining knowledge can be obtained, and that there is nothing mysterious about the whole thing.

The power of human reasoning and the environment which surrounds man have never been fixed quantities. The power of reasoning has gone on increasing and the environment has gone on changing, with the result that the capacity of the individual has been always on the increase. Man, from the remotest past, has been gazing upon the stars, the seas, and the face of the land, but in every succeeding generation he has been forming a different estimate of them. It is not enough that a man is brought right in front of the stars, he should also possess the capacity to understand all about them properly. Similarly, one may be brought face to face with a great truth, but he may not be able to properly grasp it, for it will depend upon the capacity he possesses to understand it. Therefore, by increasing the human capacity a larger range of truths may be discovered and that is how knowledge grows from day to day.

We may now consider the third factor in its relation to the first factor, the powerful machine which the Yoga system supplies. If the reader—I appeal here particularly to my Indian reader—will only divest the Yoga-machine, as I call it, of every vestige of mystery, it can be really looked upon as supplying a quicker method of acquiring knowledge than is possible by the ordinary methods employed. Just as the acquisition of knowledge has been accelerated by the

invention of many powerful scientific machines, a knowledge of the Yoga methods will place a powerful auxiliary in the hands of the investigator, to assist him in his work of research. Objection should not be raised on the ground that the method of enquiry is purely subjective. For the matter of that, every enquiry, at the beginning, assumes a subjective form, but as is done in the case of conclusions arrived at in other branches of knowledge, and particularly in experimental psychology, every step in the processes of the Yoga system should be put to practical test and its worth demonstrated.

When the Yoga system is looked at in the manner in which it has been treated above, it will be seen that the expectations raised by it can be well justified. For, what is Yoga after all ? It is nothing more than concentration, pure and simple. Why then has it scared away so many of the Orientalists, who have applied their minds to it, or why has it been so often made the subject-matter of jest and ridicule ? Unless one brings a prejudiced mind to bear upon it, there is absolutely no reason why the Yoga system should not be appreciated at its proper worth. There is no one who does not understand the value of concentration. In a flighty state of mind a man would take a very long time to understand a subject, but by deep concentration he will be able to penetrate into its depths within a very short space of time. In its purity and simplicity, shorn of the accumulations which in course of time have gathered round it and obscured its worth, Yoga, which is nothing more than concentration, properly understood and rightly applied, is sure to produce wonderful results. A Newton or a Marconi, an Edison or an Einstein, would tell you that. Take away from them the depth of concentration into which each had plunged himself, and you may be sure that they would not have been what they became. Every one of them had strayed into the methods which Yoga advocates, without knowing

to have done so. In the Yoga philosophy, concentration had been reduced to a system and made a great art of itself. I assert, without any fear of contradiction, that if the art of concentration, as developed in the Yoga system, had been regularly employed by them in furtherance of their objects, Newton, Marconi, Edison and Einstein would have achieved far greater success, in their respective fields, than they were actually able to achieve. Many of the great truths, in the different departments of knowledge, which have made the name of India famous throughout the world, were found out by its ancient sages, with the help of the Yoga method of concentration, without any scientific equipment, in the modern sense of the term. But this is not the place where more than a passing reference to the matter can be made. Yoga, as a system and an art, has not only been much misunderstood, but has remained exactly in the stage in which it was left by its ancient authors, the old Indian sages.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE YOGA SYSTEM

I have treated the Yoga system at some length on account of the prevailing misconception regarding it, and its great importance with relation to the last stage of thought reached in the Upanishad period. Before the rise of the Yoga system, the idea of Brahman, as well as that of A'tman, had been developed. The conception of the ultimate cause, after passing through many vicissitudes, had centred round Brahman, as the sole cause of creation. But the wave of materialism, which commenced with the promulgation of the Sāṅkhya system, tried to sweep away all theistic conclusions. The idea of Brahman had well nigh been destroyed, while A'tman or the Self, flourished in all its glory, as the be-all and end-all of everything. In such a dark moment, the theistic enquirer found the Yoga system to

be of immense help to him, in driving away the mists of doubt that had been created by the materialists, and clarifying the conception of the ultimate cause of the creation and its relation to the created. Without wasting his time any more in analysing the material world, he concentrated deeply upon his own Self or *A'tman*, in order to get at the highest truth, and he was not disappointed in his expectation. By means of intense concentration upon Self or *A'tman*, he was ultimately able to find out the greatest synthesis which has fallen to the lot of man to discover, the identity of *A'tman* and Brahman. The theistic enquirer found that Brahman was the sole reality and that *A'tman* was equivalent to Brahman. This marks the climax of thinking in the Upanishad period, and the highest teaching of the Upanishads is embodied in the great saying, *tat twam asi*, thou art that, and this was achieved with the help of the Yoga methods. In ancient times, when scientific investigations were in their infancy, and the experience of man was comparatively small, the Yoga system played a very important part in widening the sphere of human knowledge, and gave birth to a wonderful truth, which will remain as the highest truth for mankind for all ages.

CONCLUSION

We have now found how the theistic enquirer had been led, stage by stage, during the Upanishad period, from the simple notion of a creator to the highest monistic conception of the ultimate reality. He was not side-tracked by materialistic thoughts, which only served to intensify his desire to get at the real and ultimate truth. The different philosophies of the Upanishad period, the Vaisesika, the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, all severally and jointly helped to find out the sublime truths that Brahman was the sole reality and that *A'tman* was Brahman.

CHAPTER IV

THE EARLIER UPANISHADS

RÉSUMÉ

We have found that the earliest roots of the Upanishad philosophy can be traced back to the Rig-Veda, in such hymns as where the unknown God is addressed,¹ or the conception of unity is given expression to by saying that the sages call by many names that which is really one.² It has been pointed out that the ideas covered by these hymns must have evolved at a much later date than when hymns were being addressed to Agni, the Maruts, or the other gods. We have also seen how the idea of a supreme creator underwent modifications in the Upanishad period. In that period, which is conspicuous by its lack of faith in ritualism, previously practised, the idea of the One was ultimately deepened, but not before it had passed through varied struggles. The material world was thoroughly analysed and the idea of an external creator, at one time, was swept out, because it was considered unnecessary, till, from the outer world the search was transferred to the region of the inner self, and by concentration on the Self or A'tman, the ultimate reality was found. A considerable time must have elapsed before this ultimate conception was formed, just as, in the Rig-Veda period, centuries must have been taken to arrive at the idea of the creator being one, from the pluralistic conception of the world.

¹ R. V., 10. 121.

² R. V., 1. 164. 46.

In arriving at the conclusion that Brahman was the sole reality and A'tman was Brahman, the process employed was a psychological one, but in a sense quite different from that employed by Kant and other thinkers of the West. It has been pointed out that by means of intense concentration on the inner self, the identity of A'tman and Brahman was discovered. Though the A'tman philosophy is highly idealistic, it should not be thought that the material world has not its rightful place in it. All philosophies are bound to be in a sense idealistic, as it is through the consciousness of the self that the knowledge of reality is obtained, but the part played by the external world can never be overlooked. In arriving at the idealistic philosophy of the Upanishads, the external world was for a while left out of consideration, and thought was concentrated upon the Self, the essence, the innermost substratum of everything. In the intelligent Purusha, the essential factor had been found, and thought was concentrated upon the intelligent factor of the creation, and not upon the dull partner, the Prakriti, for getting at real knowledge. But a great error would be committed by thinking that the Purusha, when he rose from his act of concentration, did not find the external world forming a part of his conception of reality, whatever may be the duration or necessity of its existence.

THE READER HAS TO STEER BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

For a critical study of the philosophy of the Upanishads, it is very necessary, on the one hand, to keep clear of the interpretations offered by most of the Indian writers, and, on the other, to avoid being influenced by the modes of exposition adopted by the Oriental scholars. The nature of the contents of the Upanishads, the manner in which they were preserved for centuries, the absence of chronology, the inability to ascribe to any particular philosopher the

whole or part of any of the earlier Upanishads, make it easy for theorists to exploit them for their own purposes. In this work, the Indians only do not take the lead, the Oriental scholars share honours with them, with the difference that, while the object of almost all the Indian interpreters is theological, the object of the Orientalists is more or less philosophical.

SCYLLA : THE INDIAN THEOLOGIANS

From the Sutra writers to the race of commentators, who have applied their minds to the work of compilation or interpretation of the Upanishads, their main object has been theological, for India happens to be the only country in the world, where intimate connection between philosophy and religion has been maintained from the earliest times. Its theologians have never been able to resist the claim of philosophy to supply the basis on which the religious edifice should be raised. Every change in the philosophical standpoint has been followed by a change in the conception of religion. In the Vedic period, when a pluralistic conception of creation prevailed, a polytheistic religion, with a host of ritualistic practices, came into existence, but as soon as the pluralistic conception was replaced by a monistic conception, the standpoint of religion changed, and monotheism took the place of polytheism, though the numerous gods, who had once been worshipped, were not altogether banished. Religion, in the sense in which it is understood in modern times, by which a form of belief is ascribed to a particular founder, had not then come into existence. The thoughts of the philosophers of the times used to be converted into the tenets of religion. The earliest founders of the religions of India were its philosophers. To philosophy every theologian in India directed his mind for inspiration and support. Whether it was Bádaráyana or Jaimini, Samkara or Rámánuja, who

wanted to direct the religious thoughts of the people through a particular channel, he turned to the philosophy of the times for his guidance. Since in the Upanishads the latest thoughts of the philosophers of the land had been recorded, the theologians began to rely upon the Upanishads for their chapter and verse, and the Upanishads came to be recognised as Revelation. In no other country the contents of the Upanishads would have been looked upon as Revelation, for the theologians, one and all, irrespective of their minor differences, would have signally visited their wrath upon those thinkers who identified God with man, by treating such idea as utterly blasphemous.

CHARYBDIS : THE ORIENTALISTS

The critical reader has not only to rescue himself from the hands of the different classes of Indian theologians, who want to read into the Upanishads such ideas as would support their particular tenets, but he has to be equally careful in avoiding the meshes that have been woven for him by the Orientalists. He need not be much afraid of the class of Orientalists headed by Max Müller, but I warn him against such admirers as Schopenhauer and Deussen. In the case of Max Müller and his followers, the interpretations and criticisms proceed on such lines, and the appreciation whenever made, is so cautiously guarded, that an intelligent reader will not have much difficulty in forming his estimate about their expression of views. But in the case of the class of writers headed by Schopenhauer, the temptation to accept their standard of judgment is very great, as their admiration is very high and sincere, so far as it goes. I have stated above that the sincere admiration of Schopenhauer so much disturbed Max Müller that he became very anxious to proclaim that Schopenhauer was more effusive than accurate in his estimate of the philosophy of the Upanishads. An Indian would naturally feel

flattered by the admiration that is evoked by the philosophy of his country, but I for one would like to see admiration following a proper and intelligent understanding of the subject. I have great doubt in my mind whether by showering praises upon the philosophy of the Upanishads, the German writers were attempting to prove it great, or the philosophy of Kant greater, by finding for the latter support from the philosophy of India. Schopenhauer did not live to analyse the contents of the Upanishads in the systematic manner in which his followers after him have done, but it would seem that the estimate he was able to form of the philosophy of the Upanishads, from a brief survey of them, was great, because it appeared to support Kant and his school of thinkers. Deussen has followed the lines broadly indicated by Schopenhauer, in his analysis of the Upanishads, and is considered to have achieved considerable success, according to a class of thinkers, just as Samkara is taken by a class of thinkers to be the most worthy Indian exponent of the Upanishad philosophy. The difference between Samkara and Deussen lies only in the fact that the former was making use of the Upanishads for his theological dogmas, while the latter explored the Upanishads for finding support for the philosophical standpoint of his school. The views of the Indian writers and the Orientalists will be thoroughly examined, but in order to enable the reader to judge for himself how far our criticisms are justified, it becomes necessary, in the first instance, to place before him the leading texts of the earlier Upanishads.

THE AUTHORS OF THE UPANISHADS

Before going through the contents of the Upanishads, one would naturally wish to know something about the persons who were their authors. Unlike the case of modern philosophy, here a great disappointment

awaits us. Not only the views of different schools of philosophers are placed side by side, sometimes in the same Upanishad, but from a consideration of the names of persons with whom certain philosophical ideas have been associated, it is very difficult to say if they were the real authors. The names of Prajapati, Indra, Yama, and Varuna, like the names of Yājñavalkya, A'runi, Sándilya, and Sanat-kumára, are associated with the philosophical truths of the Upanishads. Thus the names of mythological gods are freely mixed up with the names of Indian sages of established reputation. The addition, in some cases, of the names of mythological gods to the names of Rishis or sages, is looked upon as a device for making the utterances more authoritative, and the disposition becomes natural to pass over the names of the gods and treat the sages as the real authors. I do not, however, intend to remain content with this process of elimination. If once it is allowed that the names of fictitious persons have been attached as authors, to command obedience for certain doctrines, it becomes difficult to say where the fiction ends and truth is to be found, in the matter of names. I entertain grave doubts about the correctness of the earliest list of the great Indian philosophers, consisting of such names as Yājñavalkya, A'runi and Sándilya. I would rather treat them as the great upholders of the Upanishad philosophy, who lived in later times, and, by means of their able expositions, spread its reputation. Considering the retiring disposition of the great philosophers, all of whom were great *Yogins*, and the tradition of the times, we may be pretty sure that the originators of the Upanishad doctrines were averse to joining their names openly with them, beyond teaching them to deserving pupils. Those who shone, like Yājñavalkya, in the courts of kings and engaged themselves in disputations for rewards, it may be safely asserted, were not the originators of the Upanishad philosophy, though they were no doubt its enthusiastic

exponents. We need not be sorry for our inability to associate the names of definite persons with the doctrines of the Upanishads, for, after all, in the domain of knowledge and truths, names and authorities do not so much count as the intrinsic value of what is said. A doctrine is great and commands reverence, not because it is associated with the name of an A'rūni or Yājñavalkya, but on account of its intrinsic worth. It is the nature of the ideas that reflects credit on its originators, not the name that lends credit to it.

1. BRIHADĀRANYAKA UPANISHAD

We will take up first the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, which is accepted as the oldest Upanishad, and confine our attention to those portions of it which are of philosophical value. In the second chapter, we are introduced to Bālāki, a very learned but proud Brāhmin, and Ajātasatru, the Kshatriya king of Kāsi. We find the Brāhmin Bālāki volunteering to communicate the knowledge of Brahman to the Kshatriya king. There cannot be any doubt that there existed in those times a large number of Kshatriya thinkers of great repute, and that some of them were more renowned than their Brāhmin contemporaries, and it would have been enough to draw attention to this fact in a decent manner, but it is nauseating to find the discussion of high philosophical truths beginning on one side with a swagger, and on the other, with a display of riches. It is hardly necessary to point out that the introductory portion of the discussion is a pure concoction, inserted for no very commendable purpose. However, the proud Brāhmin, on his volunteering to enlighten the king with the real truth about Brahman, is at once met by the bounty of the king, who promises to give him one thousand cows for his trouble. On and on the discussion proceeds, until the Kshatriya king corners the proud Brāhmin, by ultimately giving out that

all senses, all worlds, all *devas*, all beings come out from the Self, which is the true of the true, and though the senses are true, he (the Self) is the true of the true.¹ In the third Bráhmana, we are told, that there are two forms of Brahman, the material and immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the solid and the fluid, Sat (being) and tya (that), i.e., Satya or true.²

YÁJÑAVALKYA AND MAITREYI

Thereafter, we are introduced to Yájñavalkya, and the famous dialogue between him and his wife, Maitreyi, takes place. Yájñavalkya had two wives, one bearing the name of Maitreyi, and the other called Kátyáyani. Maitreyi undoubtedly was his pet wife, as Yájñavalkya himself acknowledges, on account of her learning. Kátyáyani had no pretence to learning, being an ordinary worldly-minded woman, and Yájñavalkya being afraid lest after his retirement into the forest, the two women might quarrel over worldly affairs, became anxious to settle them before his departure, and spoke to Maitreyi about the matter, which gave her the occasion to enter into the well-known dialogue with her husband. It is somewhat strange that Maitreyi, during her long companionship with her husband, had not thought of enquiring about the supreme truth relating to Brahman, but had reserved it till the last moment of her husband's retirement into the forest. The anecdotes of the Upanishads have often been prepared with a view to produce certain effects, which often fall wide of the mark.

Yájñavalkya, in answer to the question of his wife, if she could be immortal if the entire earth, full of riches, belonged to her, began to tell her at great length about the ultimate reality of things.³ He said that whoever looked

¹ *Brih.*, II, 2. 20.

² *Brih.*, II, 3. 1.

³ *Brih.*, II, 4. 12.

for Brahman elsewhere than in the Self, was entirely mistaken. All the classes, the worlds, the Devas, the creatures, everything else, were in the Self, from whom alone all these were breathed forth. Just as a lump of salt, after it is dissolved in water, could not be taken out of it again, but the taste of the water was everywhere saltish, so the great Being, without end and without limit, consisting of nothing else but knowledge, rose out of the elements and vanished again in them. When he departs, there is no more knowledge, for when there is duality, one sees the other, one hears the other, one tastes the other, one knows the other, but when the Self is all this, how should he see another, how should he hear another, how should he taste another, how should he salute another, how should he perceive another, how should he know another? How should he know him by whom he knows all this? How should he know the knower?

Thus ends the famous discourse of Yájñavalkya upon the doctrine of A'tman, in the first portion of Brihadá-ranyaka Upanishad. But before it comes to an end, very adroitly, all possible sacred *shástras* are connected with the Self or Brahman. Maitreyi is told by Yájñavalkya that the Great Being breathed forth the four Vedas, the Itihásas, the Puránas, the Vidyá, the Upanishads, Slokas, Sutras, Anuvyákhyánas (glosses) and Vyákhyánas (commentaries).¹ Yájñavalkya is made to bestow his attention and benediction upon everything; even the glosses and commentaries are not forgotten! After he had finished speaking to his wife, Yájñavalkya is said to have retired to the forest.

DADHYACH A'THARVANA : MADHU VIDYÁ

Thereafter the great sage Dadhyach A'tharvana, appears on the scene. He is not introduced with the help of an

¹ *Brih.*, II, 4, 10.

anecdote, but his sayings to the two Ásvins are quoted in *extenso*.¹ The dignity of his utterances would have been perfectly maintained, but for the introduction of the mythological Ásvins, and a *Rishi* who praises the heroism of the Ásvins for having fixed a horse's head on the sage Dadhyach A'tharvana. The sayings of this sage are treated as Madhu vidyá or the science of honey, communicated to the Ásvins, on account of the use of the word *madhu* (honey), for the development of the ideas.

Dadhyach A'tharvana said that the immortal person in mankind was the same as the Self, the Brahman, the All, that Self was the honey of all beings, as well as the lord of all beings, the king of beings. Just as all spokes were contained in the axle and in the felly of a wheel, all beings and every other thing were contained in the Self.

YÁJÑAVALKYA AND KING JANAKA

In the third chapter, the sage Yájñavalkya is again brought forward, in company with a number of apparently minor sages, whom the great sage vanquishes in no time. The Kshatriya king Janaka of the Videhas, for which reason he is called Janaka Vaideha, like the Kshatriya king Ajátasatru of Kási, starts the discussion, in the same anecdotal manner, with a display of his bounty. Such anecdotes, where the Bráhmins are drawn into the discussion of the most abstruse philosophical matters, by inducement of reward, neither reflects credit upon the Bráhmins, nor represents the actual state of facts, for it may be safely assumed that at least the wisest of Bráhmins were free from avarice and must have resented being baited in that manner. Whoever may have been responsible for weaving out these anecdotes would appear to have been bereft of all sense of proportion.

¹ *Brh.*, II, 5.

No one can find fault with the showering of a king's bounty upon a person who has displayed the highest acumen in handling a difficult problem, but to attract a great sage into a discussion of the ultimate problems of existence, by means of reward, is extremely revolting. The great sages, whose memory is highly revered, are made to look very small in the eyes of posterity.

King Janaka began the discourse by offering a thousand cows, to the horns of each of which ten *pádas* of gold were fastened, which might be driven away by the wisest of the Bráhmīns, who had assembled before him. At once the great sage Yájñavalkya entered the arena and asked his pupil to drive the cows home. The rest of the Bráhmīns became very angry and began questioning Yájñavalkya, but the latter silenced one and all with his ready answers. We will draw the attention of the reader only to those utterances of Yájñavalkya, which throw light upon the fundamental doctrine of A'tman.

SELF, THE PULLER WITHIN

In answer to Uddálaka A'rūni's question, if Yájñavalkya knows the puller (ruler) within, who pulls (rules) this world and the other world and all beings, the great sage, after referring to the air, the earth, the water, the fire, the sky, the heaven, the sun, the space, the moon and stars, the ether, the darkness (*tamas*), the light (*tejas*), which, according to Yájñavalkya, exhaust the list of gods (*adhidaivatam*), says that the Self who dwells within each and every one of them, whom these elements however did not know, though he was their bodies, is the puller (ruler) within, the immortal. Then referring to beings (*adhibhūtam*), Yájñavalkya says that he who dwells in all beings and within all beings, whom all beings do not know, whose body all beings are, and who pulls

(rules) all beings within, he is thy Self, the puller (ruler) within, the immortal. Lastly, Yájñavalkya says that he dwells in knowledge and within knowledge, whom knowledge does not know, whose body knowledge is, and who pulls (rules) knowledge, he is thy Self, the puller (ruler) within, the immortal. The puller sees, but remains unseen; the puller hears, but remains unheard; the puller perceives but remains unperceived; the puller knows but remains unknown; there is no other seer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other knower but he, and that puller is the Self.¹

THE LIGHT OF MAN

In the fourth chapter, Yájñavalkya is also found coming to the court of Janaka, on several occasions, but alone, as it would appear, and, in response to the king's enquiries, further elaborates the doctrine of A'tman. The discourse is begun by the king himself, who makes a sly enquiry into the object of Yájñavalkya's visit, whether it is for cattle or subtle questions, to which the great sage is made to reply that he has come for both. The discourse proceeds, and the king becomes so pleased with Yájñavalkya's replies, that he interposes, every now and then, by giving a thousand cows, with a bull as big as an elephant, or simply a thousand cows, till at last he descends from the throne and gives the great sage his kingdom, and himself as a slave.

In answer to the question of the king, 'what is the light of man,' Yájñavalkya says that the Self, who is within the heart, surrounded by the senses (pránas), is the person of light consisting of knowledge; he remains the same, wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving; during sleep in dream, he transcends the world and all the forms of death. Yájñavalkya calls the state of

¹ Brh., III, 7.

sleep as the third or intermediate state, between this and the other world, in which state the person is self-illuminated. This state of illumination is his true form, when he is free from desires, free from evil, free from fear. In that state also his wishes are fulfilled, in which the Self is his only wish, in which no wish is left, he being free from all sorrows. In that state, a father is not a father, a mother not a mother, the world not worlds, the gods not gods, the Vedas not Vedas. Then a thief is not a thief, a murderer not a murderer, a Chandála, not a Chandála, a Paulkasa not a Paulkasa (the son of a Sudra father and a Kshatriya mother), a Sramana not a Sramana (mendicant), a Tápasa not a Tápasa (Vánaprastha). He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.¹

KNOWLEDGE OF SELF, THE HIGHEST DESIRE

Lastly, Yājñavalkya, in this chapter, tells the king what happens to a man with desires and a man who does not desire. As a man is like this or that, according as he acts and according as he behaves, so will he be. A man of good acts will become good, a man of bad acts, bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds. As is a man's desire, so is his will; and as his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap. To whatever object a man's mind is attached, to that he goes steadfastly together with his deed; and having obtained the results of whatever deed he does on earth, he returns again from that world (which is the temporary reward of his deed) to the world of actions.

So much for the man who desires. But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, his vital

¹ *Brih.*, IV, 3.

parts do not depart elsewhere, being Brahman, he goes to Brahman.

GOOD AND EVIL WORKS

After a man has discovered the unknown Self, great and eternal, let him practise wisdom. He is that Great unborn Self, who consists of knowledge. In it there reposes the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works. He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. Bráhmaṇas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and he who knows him, becomes a Muni. Wishing for Brahman only, mendicants leave their homes. He therefore who knows all this, evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil; evil does not burn him, he burns all evil.

II. CHHÁNDOGYA UPANISHAD

The Chhándogya Upanishad which will now be taken up, along with Brihadáranyaka, forms the first group of the oldest Upanishads. Both of them are in prose. Some hold the view that in the Chhándogya Upanishad, one does not find the philosophical discussions reaching the high level attained in the Brihadáranyaka.¹ I do not subscribe to this view, but am of opinion, and the reader, when he has gone through the extracts from this Upanishad, would share the same view, that both are equally rich in their contents. It may be mentioned that Deussen holds the latter view.

In the first two chapters, the Chhándogya Upanishad reproduces the Bráhmaṇical practices, and for that reason they are considered as Bráhmaṇa, the remaining eight

¹ Ranade, *Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, p. 21.

chapters being treated as the Chhándogya Upanishad proper. Chhándogya belongs to the Sáma Veda. Its contribution to the development of the A'tman philosophy is very great. As one proceeds, it is found that this Upanishad, like the other Upanishads, contains repetitions of the same fundamental idea, but in everchanging forms, which reveal more fully and effectively what the fundamental doctrine was intended to mean and include. As will be found hereafter, this development of an idea assumes importance, on account of the fact that, much of the discussions which in later times arose and led to the formation of different schools of thought, clustered round the extent to which the fundamental idea can either be stretched, or the limits within which it is to be kept confined.

A'RUNI AND SVETAKETU

In the sixth chapter, we come across the notable dialogues between the father and son, A'runi and Svetaketu, the latter aged twenty-four. After the atmosphere of the court and the constant reference to bullocks and other kinds of wealth, the change into a homely form of talk between a father, who becomes the instructor, and a son, who reverently listens to the highest truths falling from the lips of his parent, becomes very agreeable as well as natural. Svetaketu has returned home after completing his education, and is naturally a little bit conceited, after the manner of young men who have just returned home, with their minds laden with information, which they have learnt for the first time. But the son stands confounded, when his father enquires if he has been instructed in that knowledge, by means of which, that which cannot be ordinarily heard becomes audible, that which cannot be ordinarily perceived is perceived, that which cannot be ordinarily known is known. Svetaketu wonderingly asks, what such instruction

can be. His father replies that it is that instruction by which from one clod of clay, all things made of clay could be known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all was clay. Svetaketu, with ill-concealed chagrin, yet very humbly, replies that he has not been told anything about such matters, because his venerable instructors, though well-versed in all the Vedas, do not know anything about them, and requests his father to impart that instruction to him.

THE SELF IS THE SUBTLE ESSENCE OF EVERYTHING AND
SVETAKETU IS THAT

A'runi then proceeds to say that in the beginning there was that only which is, one only, without a second. Some say that, in the beginning, there was only that which is not, one only, without a second and that from that which is not, that which is was born, but A'runi argues that such a thing, the birth of that which is, from that which is not is impossible, and, therefore, it must be taken without doubt that in the beginning there was only that which is one only without a second, and that the whole creation, including all living beings by and by grew out of that one. On being satisfied that he has convinced his son about the existence of one, which is the source of all things, A'runi goes on to say that which is the subtle essence, the root of everything, it is the true, it is the Self and Svetaketu is that.¹ A'runi then elaborates the idea with the help of the allegory of the sweet juices and the honey,² the allegory of the rivers and the sea,³ the allegory of the tree,⁴ the allegory of the Nyagrodha tree (holy fig-tree),⁵ the allegory of the salt and saline water,⁶ and ends by saying, as before, that everything

¹ *Chhând.*, VI, 8.7.

² *Ibid.*, VI, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, VI, 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VI, 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VI, 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, VI, 13.

that exists has its self in That, and it is the true, it is the Self and Svetaketu is that. After that Svetaketu was satisfied that he had been fully instructed in the highest and ultimate truth.

SANATKUMA'RA AND THE DOCTRINE OF A'TMAN

In the seventh chapter we are introduced to Nárada and Sanatkumára. Nárada had approached Sanatkumára for instruction. The first thing that Sanatkumára asks Nárada is to tell him what he knows, so that Sanatkumára may tell him what lies beyond. Nárada gives a long list of what he has studied, mentioning the Vedas and all existing sources of knowledge, but sorrowfully admits that he knows nothing of the Self, a knowledge of which, he has been told, overcomes grief, and requests Sanatkumára to instruct him in that knowledge. Like A'runi, Sanatkumára replies that whatever, the Vedas and everything else, Nárada has read, is only a name, and then step by step, leads him to a conception of spirit, saying that spirit is everything. Just as the spokes of a wheel hold to the nave, so everything holds to the spirit. The spirit moves by the spirit. It gives spirit to the spirit. Father is spirit, mother is spirit, brother is spirit, sister is spirit, tutor is spirit, Bráhmāna is spirit.¹ After having given Nárada an idea of what spirit is, Sanatkumára says that in reality he possesses the highest knowledge who declares the Highest Being to be the True, and in order that he may be able to so declare, he must do all his sacred duties,² after which he obtains bliss. Sanatkumára then gives Nárada an idea of bliss, by saying that the Infinite is bliss, and that there is no bliss in anything finite.³ Next an idea of the Infinite is given by saying that Infinite is below, above, behind, before, right and left, and that this Infinite is the I. I am below, I am above,

¹ *Chhând.*, VII, 15.

² *Ibid*, VII, 22.

³ *Ibid*, VII, 23.

I am behind, before, right and left. Thereafter follows the explanation of the Infinite as the Self. The Infinite is the Self, the Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left. He who loves the Self, takes pleasure in the Self, he becomes the lord and master in all the worlds. But those who think differently from this, live in perishable worlds and have other beings for their rulers.

THE REALISATION OF THE SELF

The eighth chapter gives practical hints for the realisation of the Self. I am inclined to think that the portion of this chapter, from the beginning till the mythical story of Prajapati, Indra and Virochana is reached, has not received much attention from interpolating hands. The reader is recommended to go through it in the original, in order to know what this mighty pit of Self can possibly contain. The body is considered as the city of Brahman, and the small lotus of the heart is the palace, inside which is the small ether, and the enquirer has to find out what is within this ether. The enquirer will ultimately find that within this ether are heaven and earth, fire and air, sun and moon, whatever is in the world, whatever has been or whatever will be. In the second khanda of the eighth chapter, the results of the concentration of the will, according to the desire of the person concentrating, are narrated. He who desires the world of the fathers, or the world of the mothers, or the world of the brothers, or the world of the sisters, or the world of the friends, or the world of the perfumes, or the world of food and drink, or the world of song and music, or the world of women, or whatever other object he might be attached to, or whatever else he desires, by his mere will he will get it.

In the third khanda, desires that are true are distinguished from the desires that are false. Brahman or the Self is alone true.

The sixth khanda contains the verse, which states that the heart contains one hundred and one arteries, out of which one only goes up to the crown of the head, following which a man reaches the immortal, while the others lead to different directions. This verse is also to be found in the Katha¹ and other Upanishads.

PRAJĀPATI, INDRA AND VIROCHANA

The remaining portion of this Upanishad contains the well-known story of Prajāpati, Indra and Virochana. Prajāpati once said, and he was heard both by the gods (Devas) and demons (Asuras), that he who had searched out the Self and understood it, would obtain all worlds and desires. Indra representing the gods, and Virochana representing the demons, approached Prajāpati for this knowledge of the Self, in the customary manner, holding fuel in their hands. After they had remained thirty-two years with Prajāpati, Prajāpati asked what they had come for. They disclosed their desire. Prajāpati told them that the person that could be seen in the eye was the Self and Brahman. Both Indra and Virochana enquired if the Self was he who was seen in the water and the mirror. Prajāpati replied in the affirmative. Indra and Virochana were asked to look for their reflections in a pan of water, once in their ordinary dress, and then with their best clothes on. Both were told that the reflections seen were the Self, the immortal and the fearless Brahman. Indra and Virochana went away satisfied. Prajāpati thought that if they followed that doctrine, both of them would perish. Virochana did not return, and amongst the Asuras, since then, the doctrine has been preached that the Self, that is the body alone, is to be worshipped and that he who worshipped that Self would gain

¹ Katha, II, 6, 16.

both worlds, this and next. Indra returned, after some time, as doubts had been raised in his mind regarding the body being the real Self. The body which was different at different times, and different in different circumstances, could it be the real Self? After being sent away several times by Prajapati, each time with a partial knowledge of the truth, Indra is ultimately told that in the ether of the heart, the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self, would be found.

In the fifth khanda, which consists of one verse only, it is said that he who after learning the Vedas, has settled in his own house, has done his duties, has begotten virtuous sons, has concentrated all his senses on the Self, and has never given pain to any creature, will reach the world of Brahman and never return.

III. THE KATHA UPANISHAD

The reader should not think that the Upanishads are being taken up in their chronological order. According to Deussen, the older Upanishads may be divided into three chronological groups, the first or earliest group containing only prose Upanishads, the Upanishads of the second group being all in verse, the third group containing, what he calls, the later prose Upanishads. I am afraid this division, like every other chronological division attempted, except in the case of the two earliest Upanishads, Brihadáranyaka and Chhándogya, about which there is no difference of opinion, and a few other Upanishads, such as Prasna, Maitri and Mándukya, which decidedly belong to a later date, cannot be accepted as strictly accurate. I have already said that the attempt to prepare a chronological list, with the help of any other standard save the standard of development, outlined above, will lead to no satisfactory result. Even the test of development of ideas, I must confess, is not

always a safe guide. In the Chhándogya Upanishad, admittedly one of the two oldest Upanishads, not only the later doctrine of A'tman, but the elements of the earlier Sánkhyā philosophy, are to be found side by side, while in the Brihadárányaka Upanishad, only the doctrine of A'tman is treated at length. I hold fast to the view that, before the Upanishads were reduced to the form in which they have reached us, all the stages of development, pointed out above, had been completed, and the materials were promiscuously arranged, without any attempt at chronological or ideological divisions.

YAMA AND NACHIKETAS

The Katha Upanishad belongs to the Black Yajur-Veda. The story of Nachiketas also occurs in the Bráhmaṇa of Taittiriya Yajurveda, where it is used for the purpose of explaining a certain sacrificial ceremony, by means of which death can be conquered. Yama, the God of Death, in the Bráhmaṇa, explains to the boy Nachiketas the secret of that sacrifice. In the Upanishad, we find Yama playing a different rôle, that of an instructor of the doctrine of Brahman. After the names of Vágasravasa and Nachiketas had been familiar in connection with sacrificial piety, they were used once again for propounding the doctrine of A'tman, which the God of Death was supposed to have also imparted.

Vágasravasa had given up everything at a sacrifice, for the purpose of getting the highest reward. His son, Nachiketas, who was a boy, enquired of his father, to whom he had been given. His father did not give any reply. He repeated his question. For the second time no reply came from the father. When the boy put the question for the third time, in a fit of anger, Vágasravasa said that he had been given to the God of Death.

Accordingly Nachiketas proceeded to the region where the God of Death dwelt, but at that time Yama was absent and Nachiketas was not given a fitting reception. Yama returned after three nights, and on finding a Bráhmāna guest in his house, who had not taken any food for three nights, being afraid of evil consequences, offered him three boons in order to make amends for this want of hospitality.

The first boon that Nachiketas, as a dutiful son, asked was that he might be reinstated in the good graces of his father, which was at once granted.

In the second boon, the sacrifice of fire, to which reference has been already made, is introduced, and the boy Nachiketas requests to be told by Yama all about what is known as Nachiketa sacrifice, which enables a person to conquer death and enter the world of heaven.

Nachiketas is then asked to choose his third boon. Nachiketas prays Yama to tell him what becomes of man, when he is dead. Some say, he is, others say, he is not. He wanted to know all about the matter from the God of Death, who was the most fit person to communicate the knowledge to him.

This question apparently staggers Yama, for he did not expect Nachiketas to put it to him, and in order to avoid answering it, asks Nachiketas to choose any other boon, such as, children, long life, wealth, fair maidens with chariots and musical instruments. Nachiketas replies that they are fleeting things, which he is not at all anxious to possess, and insists upon the God of Death to tell him what exists in that great Hereafter, in that world which is hidden from human sight.

SREYA AND PREYA

• Finding Nachiketas unbending in his desire to know what is beyond death, the God of Death ultimately yields and begins by pointing out the distinction between 'Sreya' and

'Preya,' that which is good and that which is pleasant. That which is good is desired by the wise man, that which is momentarily pleasant attracts fools only. Nachiketas must be looked upon as a wise man, who has cheerfully left fleeting pleasures behind for finding out the highest good, and Yama expresses his great delight to have him as an enquirer.

Then Yama imparts to Nachiketas the truth that the wise man who meditating on the Self (by means of Yoga), recognises the Ancient (the Eternal Being), who is difficult to be seen, who is hidden, and who pervades all things, leaves behind all joys and sorrows.

Nachiketas then asks Yama to tell him about that which is neither this nor that, neither effect nor cause, neither past nor future.

Yama initiates Nachiketas into the secret of the mystical word 'Om,' which means Brahman, and he who knows what that word means, what he desires, becomes his. The knowing self is not born, nor does it die. It has not sprung from anything, nor has anything sprung out of it. It is unborn, eternal, everlasting; it is not destroyed, though the body is destroyed. If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, both of them do not understand, for neither the one kills, nor is the other killed. The Self which is smaller than the small, greater than the great, is hidden in the heart of the living creatures. A person who is free from desires and sorrows, sees the glory of the Self, by controlling his senses.¹ Though sitting still, he walks far; though lying down, he goes everywhere. The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless within the

¹ In thus interpreting 'dhátuprasádát,' I have differed from its rendering into 'by the Grace of the Creator' (*Sacred Books of the East*, Part II, p. 11), which does not follow from the context. The question of 'Grace of God' does not arise, as knowledge of the Self necessarily follows, when the senses have been fully controlled.

changing bodies, as great and all-pervading, becomes free from grief. That Self cannot be gained by the teaching of the Vedas, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He alone knows to whom the Self chooses to impart the knowledge. But he who has not turned away from wickedness, who is not tranquil and subdued, and whose mind is not at rest can never obtain the Self by knowledge.

The rest of this Upanishad contains a repetition of the ideas stated above. The reader's attention is drawn, in view of what will be said later on, to such expressions as, 'there is one Ruler, the Self within all things, who makes the one form manifold,'¹ 'when he shines, all things shine after him, by his light everything is lighted,'² 'all worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.'³

Towards the close, it is stated that having received this knowledge from Death and also all the rules of Yoga, Nachiketas obtained Brahman, and that similar will be the case with any one else, who knows thus what relates to the Self.

IV. THE ISA' UPANISHAD

Isá Upanishad is looked upon by some as being older than many other Upanishads, Brihadáranyaka and Chhândogya Upanishads excepted. It is sometimes called Isávásya and forms the concluding chapter of the Samhitá of the Sukla or White Yajur-veda.

One great characteristic of this Upanishad, which has been pointed out by many, is the synthesis that it seeks to effect between works and knowledge. The necessity of works must be acknowledged, which is to be looked upon as a preparation for the receiving of the highest knowledge. If by this is meant that this Upanishad, within its small compass, as it consists only of eighteen verses, considers it

¹ *Katha*, II, 5, 12.

² *Katha*, II, 5, 15.

³ *Katha*, II, 6, 1.

necessary to lay stress upon works, which it describes as *not-knowledge*, there can be no reason to differ from such a view. But if it is sought to be implied that in this Upanishad, for the first time, works have been considered as preparatory to knowledge, it must be said that this is not a fact. A class of writers are very much inclined to hold that in the Upanishads works have no place, only pure knowledge is inculcated by them, that their teachings end in quietism, and, therefore, there is no room for ethics in the Upanishads. As the subject of ethics will be treated at length hereafter, it need only be said here that under the head of *duties*, every Upanishad has emphasised the necessity of *works*.

THE SELF IS NOT AN ABSTRACT ABSOLUTE

For another reason this Upanishad is to be considered as very important. The A'tman doctrine is very clearly stated, leaving no room for doubt that the ultimate reality is to be arrived at, not by a process of elimination, until an abstract Absolute, unknowable and unthinkable, is left, but by a synthesis of everything known and knowable.

From the absence of legends or anecdotes in this Upanishad, the reader may be led to think that a stage had been reached, when the disposition had grown not to utilise them for explaining truths. He will, however, be disappointed when he goes through the remaining Upanishads. The early human mind clings to authority for an exposition of truth with such reverence that it can seldom let a truth speak for itself.

The One (Self), though never stirring is swifter than thought.¹ It moves, and it moves not, it is far, it is likewise near. It is inside of all this, and it is outside of all this.² He who sees all things in the Self and the Self in all

¹ *Isd.*, 4.

² *Isd.*, 5.

things, he does not hate any one.¹ When the wise man finds the Self in all things, what delusion or sorrow can there be to him who sees that unity.²

KNOWLEDGE AND NOT-KNOWLEDGE

Those who worship not-knowledge, enter into blind darkness ; those who delight in real knowledge, enter into greater darkness.³ It is said that one thing results from knowledge and another from not-knowledge. He who knows knowledge and not-knowledge at the same time, overcomes death through not-knowledge and attains immortality through knowledge.⁴ He who knows the cause and destruction at the same time, overcomes death by destruction, and obtains immortality through the cause.⁵

The attention of the reader is drawn to the last verse of this Upanishad, which runs to the following effect : Agni (God of Fire), lead us on to good path ; O God, thou knowest all things (including our deeds), keep us away from crooked sin ; we offer thee our profound salutations. We have here an echo of the hymns prevalent in Vedic times. It is needless to say that such a verse ill-fits with the spirit of the whole Upanishad, and may be treated as a subsequent addition.

V. THE KENA UPANISHAD

Kena Upanishad, like Isá Upanishad, derives its name from its first word Kena. It also goes by the name of Talavakára Upanishad, as it belongs to the Sákhá of the Talavakáras (Sāma-veda). It is divided into four small parts, the first two are in verse ; the last two, which contains the anecdote of the Brahman and the Devas, are in prose.

Unlike Isá Upanishad, Kena Upanishad does not always say, what it has to say, in an unambiguous manner. In

¹ Isá, 6. ² Isá, 7. ³ Isá, 9. ⁴ Isá, 11. ⁵ Isá, 14.

the first portion of the first khanda, everything is traced back to Brahman, as the one ultimate reality, Brahman being the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, the breath of the breath. The eye does not go there, the speech does not go there, the mind does not go there. We do not know it ; neither can any one teach it.

It is then stated that people do not know the real Brahman, but adore that which has form. In emphatic language, idol worship is deprecated and called false worship.

The trouble arises when we come to the second khanda or part. I seriously question the propriety of one verse being put into the mouth of a person, to be called 'Teacher,' and another in the mouth of a person, to be called 'Pupil.' The manner in which all the verses of the first two parts of this Upanishad are composed, does not at all justify such an arrangement, unless a commentator is inclined to pick out some verses to be ascribed to a teacher, and some to a pupil, with the object of giving preference to one class of ideas over another. This has been done by Samkara, and Max Müller has followed him. The first verse of the second khanda is ascribed to the teacher, and the second verse to the pupil, both by Samkara and Max Müller, and the remaining verses, three to five, are ascribed by Samkara to Sruti or Revelation. It does not appear from the translation of Max Müller, to whom he ascribes the last three verses.

I am of opinion that the third verse of this khanda is a subsequent addition, considered necessary in view of the spirit of the utterances in the first khanda, and for the purpose of minimising the idea contained in the second verse of this khanda. Samkara, therefore, considered it necessary to put the second verse in the mouth of the pupil, and the third is treated as being given in answer to what the pupil has said in the second verse.

THE MEANING OF 'TO KNOW AND NOT TO KNOW'

As I consider it very important to come to a clear conclusion, as far as possible, regarding the view held in this Upanishad about the knowability or otherwise of Brahman, I give a free translation of the five verses of this khanda, which cannot be objected to by a follower of either Samkara or Max Müller.

1. If you think you know Brahman well, then surely you know but little, for what you have known of the gods is also little.¹ So it is necessary for you to enquire further into Brahman.

2. I do not think I know it well, nor do I know that I do not know it. Those amongst us who understand the meaning of 'to know and not to know,' understand it.

3. He who thinks he knows Brahman, does not know it; he who thinks he does not know Brahman, knows it. Brahman is unknown to the wise and known to the ignorant.

4. Brahman is known to those who know it to be the knower of all ideas, and they who know this obtain immortality. By the knowledge of the Self, power and immortality are obtained.

5. If a man knows Brahman in this life, he gains what is true, but great destruction or harm ensues if he does not know it in this life. The wise who have realised Brahman in all things become immortal when they have departed from this world.

If we leave aside the third verse of this khanda, all the other verses fall into order and develop one consistent idea, that Brahman can only be partially known. This would constitute the knowledge, so far as it is possible to be gained

¹ Max Müller is of opinion that the portion of the verse, 'what you have known of the gods is also little,' was subsequently inserted.
—*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. I, p. 148.

by a human being, and would at once be admitted as the most correct view of the whole matter, and strictly in accordance with the professed teachings of the Upanishads, that a complete knowledge of Brahman is not possible on the part of a human being. The third verse, if it be allowed to remain, and ascribed to Sruti or Revelation, as has been done by Samkara, at once contradicts what is said in the other verses, for it has been distinctly stated in the fifth verse that Brahman can be known. Samkara's object is obvious, as he is anxious to establish an abstract unknowable Brahman.

Those who think that the object of the first khanda is to establish that Brahman cannot be known are greatly mistaken. When it is said that eyes do not go there, nor speech, nor mind, it is only meant that we cannot understand it, if we attempt to do so by means of the ordinary senses. This is made clear by reference to the idol-worshippers, who follow the lead of the ordinary senses, in order to know Brahman. Brahman, who is the highest synthesis, not only of all things that exist but of all things that may possibly exist, can only be known, when a man has freed himself from the senses, and this is made quite clear by the concluding lines of the second verse of this khanda.

While the first khanda states that Brahman cannot be known by the ordinary senses, the second khanda goes on to state the nature of the knowledge of Brahman, when it is obtained.

THE LEGEND OF BRAHMAN AND THE GODS

The last two khandas of the Kena Upanishad contain the legend of Brahman and the Devas. It was Brahman who had won for the Devas the victory over the Asuras. The Devas, who were much elated by the victory, thought that they had gained it through their own might. Brahman considered it necessary to take the conceit out of them.

Accordingly, Brahman appeared before them, but the Devas were unable to recognise him. As, after Indra, Agni ranks as the foremost among the gods, the Devas requested Agni, the God of Fire, to approach the *Yaksha* and to find out who he was.

With a full consciousness of his might, Agni approached Brahman, and Brahman enquired who he was. Agni replied that he was known as Agni or Játavedas (all-knowing).

Brahman enquired about the power that Agni possessed. Agni proudly said that he could burn everything that existed on earth.

Brahman put a straw before him and asked him to burn it ; but in spite of all his might, Agni could not burn it. Thereafter Agni returned to the Devas and said that he could not find out who the being was.

Váyu, or the God of Air, was then asked by the gods to approach the *Yaksha* and to find out who he was. Váyu, like Agni, approached Brahman, with great confidence, of whom Brahman also enquired who he was, and the power he possessed.

Váyu replied that he was Váyu and Mátarisvan (one who moved in the sky) and that he could carry everything that existed on the earth.

Brahman as before put a straw before Váyu, and asked him to carry it, which he could not, though he exerted his utmost. So Váyu also returned to the Devas and told them that he was unable to find out who the *Yaksha* was.

The Devas next asked Indra (Maghaban) to find out the identity of the *Yaksha*. As soon as Indra approached Brahman, the latter vanished. Samkara, with his usual ingenuity, interprets this to mean that Brahman did so in order to thoroughly discredit the claim of Indra to Isvarship, and that he did not, therefore, even condescend to exchange a few words with Indra, as he had done with Agni and Váyu !

After Brahman had vanished, Indra came across Umá, the daughter of Himavat (and wife of Siva), of whom he enquired about the identity of the *Yaksha*. She told Indra that the *Yaksha* was no other Being than Brahman himself, and that the object of his visit was to make them understand whence they derived their respective powers, and who had really won the battle against the Devas.

VI. THE AITAREYA UPANISHAD

The Aitareya Upanishad forms a part of the Aitareya A'raryaka of the Rig-veda. The Aitareya A'raryaka consists of five A'raryakas. The Aitareya Upanishad, properly so called, is restricted to a portion of the second A'raryaka, namely, to its fourth, fifth and sixth Adhyáyas. The reputed author of this Upanishad is said to be Mahidása, whose name is found in the Chhándogya Upanishad. It is also stated that the name Aitareya, assigned to this Upanishad, is derived from Itará, who was the mother of Mahida'sa. All this may be taken for whatever they may be worth, in view of the legends that have been woven to account for the authorship of many of the sacred books.

The first part of this Upanishad consists of three khandas ; the second and third parts have one khanda each.

We need not be detained over the first part, which gives an account of the creation of the world. In the beginning there was the Self, one only, who thought of creating the worlds, and accordingly created them.

The second part contains the doctrine of re-incarnation, which need not be gone into, as similar theories contained in the other Upanishads have been passed over.

In the third part, which alone contains matters of philosophical interest, the standpoint of idealism is briefly, though very clearly and boldly, stated. Everything is reduced ultimately to knowledge or reason, on which depends

all existence, which is then identified with the Self or Brahman. Self, consisting of knowledge, is Brahman. The world is led by knowledge (the Self) ; knowledge is its cause ; knowledge is Brahman.

VII. THE TAITTIRIYA UPANISHAD : THE BLISSFUL BRAHMAN

The Taittiriya Upanishad belongs to black Yajur-veda and is a part of Taittiriya A'ranyaka. It consists of three parts or *vallis*. The first *valli* is called the *Sikshá valli* ; the second, the *Brahmánanda valli* ; the third, the *Bhrigu valli*.

The Siksha' valli contains practical hints for realising Brahman, and enjoins the saying of truth, doing of duty, and whatever else that is useful. Penance, learning and practising the Veda, and leading the life of a householder, are pointed out as necessary.

The second valli, besides for the first time referring to what is known as the doctrine of the five sheaths, describes the nature of bliss which follows knowledge of Brahman. One hundred times of human bliss is equal to the bliss of human Gandharva ; one hundred times the bliss of human Gandharva is the measure of bliss which a divine Gandharva enjoys ; one hundred times the bliss of divine Gandharva is equal to the bliss of the Fathers ; one hundred times the bliss of the Fathers is equal to the bliss of the Devas, amongst whom the bliss of Indra is more intense than the bliss enjoyed by the other Devas ; one hundred times the bliss of Indra is equal to the bliss of Brihaspati ; one hundred times the bliss of Brihaspati is equal to the bliss of Praja'pati ; one hundred times the bliss of Praja'pati is equal to the bliss of Brahman, and likewise of a great sage who is free from desires.

The attention of the reader is particularly drawn to the ninth or last Anuva'ka of the second valli, which, freely translated, runs thus : He who knows the bliss of Brahman need not be afraid of anything ; he need not distress himself with either the thought, why did he not do what is good, nor with the thought, why did he do what is bad. He who knows these two, that is, good and bad, frees himself.

In the third valli, the doctrine of the five sheaths is further developed. This is done with the help of a dialogue between Bhrigu Va'runi and his father Varuna. Under the direction of his father, and with the help of penance, Bhrigu first found food or matter as Brahman, then he found breath or life as Brahman, then mind or manas as Brahman, then understanding or Vijñána as Brahman, and lastly perceived bliss as Brahman.

VIII. THE SVETÁSVATARA UPANISHAD

The Svetásvatara Upanishad belongs to the Black Yajurveda and is looked upon by many as one of the most important Upanishads. It is said that Sveta'svatara told it only to the most worthy among the hermits. Samkara thought fit to make it the subject of a special commentary. It is said to have derived its name from its author, Svetásvatara, which literally means white mule.

It is not necessary to enter into the discussion, which has been continuously raised, regarding its sectarian character, as it is said to have been written expressly for the benefit of Saivism, which the use of such names as Hara, Rudra and Siva indicates. From the standpoint of philosophy, it is quite immaterial what name is given to the ultimate reality, so long as it can be clearly understood to indicate what it means, though from the point of view of theology it may lead to differences. Neither is it necessary to enter into the controversy, whether this Upanishad is an Upanishad of the Sánkhya

system of philosophy, on account of a portion of its contents being later on elaborately developed into the Sāṅkhya Sūtras. It has been already pointed out that, interspersed among the Upanishads, will be found the germs of the several philosophies, placed side by side, without any heed paid either to their time of appearance or mutual connection. The same Upanishad contains not only the highest teaching of the Upanishads, the doctrine of A'tman, but at the same time comfortably accommodates by its side ideas which in later times developed into such a distinct system as Buddhism. The main task of the critical reader is to disentangle the main theme from the mass of disconnected matters which have been willingly or otherwise allowed to gather round it. Lastly, it is not necessary to quarrel with any one who intends to derive comfort by finding in this Upanishad the germs of the Bhakti doctrine, which enjoins reliance on the favour of the deity worshipped. Not only do I agree with Max Müller that the last verse of this Upanishad, where highest devotion for God as well as for one's Guru is enjoined, is an addition, but I go much further and hold the view that there is no room for devotion, when the doctrine of A'tman has been fully grasped. The additions, wherever they have been made, are so very palpable, that once the fundamental doctrine, and the stages through which it has passed, is clearly understood, the reader will himself be able to detect them.

In the beginning of the first chapter, the enquiry is made in plain language : Is Brahman the cause, whence are we born, whereby do we live, and whither do we go ? Should time or nature, or necessity, or chance, or the elements be considered as the cause, or he who is called the person, *vijñānātmā* ? Could the problems of philosophy have been more clearly stated ? Not only is the idealistic, but the different materialistic standpoints are clearly embodied in the enquiries.

Just as the questions are pointed, comes the answer in unequivocal language. The power belonging to God is hidden in his own qualities. He is One, who directs all those causes, time, self, and the rest.¹ In that big Brahma-wheel, in which all things live and rest, the human soul moves about, so long as it thinks that it is different from the mover; when it is blessed by him, it attains immortality.² In the Highest Brahman, there is the triad (the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the ruler).³ The Highest Brahman is the safe support, it is imperishable. The Brahma-students, when they have known what is within this, are devoted and merged in the Brahman, free from birth.⁴

THE LORD AND THE INDIVIDUAL ARE THE FORMS OF THE INFINITE SELF

Samkara and those who accept his interpretation hold the view that the individual soul and the lord or ruler are phenomenal only, and belong to the unreal world. Let the reader judge for himself if this view can be maintained, when it has been distinctly stated that it is the Infinite Self that is appearing in these forms.⁵ In the Highest Reality, Brahman, there is no room for anything that can be called unreal. Everything that arises out of the Highest Reality, bears upon it the stamp of highest reality. In the fourth chapter, this is made abundantly clear, by tracing everything back to Brahman, the one ultimate reality. Everything lives, moves and has its being in the One, and nothing can therefore be unreal.

¹ *Svetâs.*, I, 3.

² *Svetâs.*, I, 6.

³ *Svetâs.*, I, 12.

⁴ *Svetâs.*, I, 9.

⁵ *Svetâs.*, I, 9.

The second chapter contains the rules of Yoga, by means of which the great sages, after controlling the senses, are able to concentrate on the Self, for obtaining the Highest knowledge.

RUDRA

The third chapter, like the first, further elaborates the Idea of Brahman, to whom the name of Rudra is given. He is one, there is no second. He exists behind all persons. He creates all the worlds, preserves them, and rolls them up at the end.¹ The person or the Inner Self, not bigger than a thumb, lives in the heart of man and is revealed by the heart and by meditation. They who know him become immortal.² His hands and feet are everywhere, eyes and head are everywhere, he pervades everything in the world.³ The Self, smaller than small, greater than great, is hidden in the heart of the creature. A man who has left all sorrows behind, sees the Lord, who is free from desires, by the grace of the Lord.⁴

BRAHMAN AND CREATION

The fourth chapter traces back everything that exists to Brahman. The one, formless Being,⁵ with a hidden purpose, by means of his power, creates many forms; from whom all this comes in the beginning and to whom it returns in the end.⁶ It is he who is Agni (Fire), who is A'ditya

¹ *Svetâs.*, III, 2.

² *Svetâs.*, III, 13.

³ *Svetâs.*, III, 16.

⁴ *Svetâs.*, III, 20.

⁵ The rendering of 'ja ekobarno' into 'the sun, without any colour' (*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, p. 249) is extraordinary and does not follow from the context.

⁶ *Svetâs.*, IV, 1.

(Sun), who is Váyu (Wind), who is Chandramas (Moon), who is the starry firmament, who is Brahma, who is water, and who is Prajapati.¹ Thou art woman, thou art man, thou art youth, thou art maiden, thou as an old man walkest with the aid of a stick, thou art born with thy face turned in all directions.² Thou art the blue fly, thou art the green bird with red eyes, thou art the cloud, the season and the sea. Thou art without beginning, thou pervadest everything, thou from whom all the world are born.³

MÁYÁ

This chapter is important for the reason that in it is found, for the first time, mention of 'máya.' The verse which contains it, runs thus: Know Prakriti to be 'máya,' and the Great Lord to be the Máyin. The whole world is pervaded with what are his members.

The fifth chapter is devoted to an analysis of the three *gunas*, and here we come across the name of Kapila,⁴ which has given rise to the discussion whether Kapila of this Upanishad is to be identified with Kapila, the writer of the Sánkhyā Sūtras. In the next chapter mention is made of Sánkhyā and Yoga philosophies.⁵

The sixth and the last chapter is looked upon as a non-sectarian chapter. The idea of one God, the ultimate reality, is once again developed, but no longer associated with any name, such as Rudra or Siva. The twenty-first verse contains the name of the reputed author, Svetāsvatara. The twenty-second verse mentions the word 'Vedānta' for the first time.

¹ *Svetāś.*, IV, 2.

² *Svetāś.*, IV, 3.

³ *Svetāś.*, IV, 4.

⁴ *Svetāś.*, V, 2.

⁵ *Svetāś.*, VI, 13.

IX. THE KAUSHITAKI UPANISHAD

The Kaushitaki Upanishad belongs to the Rig-veda and may be called the Upanishad of the Bráhmaṇa of the Kaushitakins.¹ It consists of four chapters.

Similar to the descriptions in the Brihadáranyaka, Chhándogya and other Upanishads, the first chapter of this Upanishad contains description of the path of Gods (devayána) and the path of the fathers (pitriyána).

The second chapter contains the collected sayings of the sages Kaushitaki, Paiṅgya, Pratardana (the son of Divodása, king of Kási) and Sushkabhrīṅgára. Kaushitaki says that Prána (breath) is Brahman,² Paiṅgya also says that Prána (breath) is Brahman, Sushkabhrīṅgára also holds the view that Uktha (a Vedic hymn), which has been identified with Prána, is Brahman.³ Pratardana explains what is meant by restraint (Samyama).⁴ Then follows a description of the three kinds of meditation of the all-conquering (Sarvajit) Kaushitaki.⁵ There is very little of philosophical value in his utterances.

INDRA AND PRATARDANA

In the third chapter we find the sage Pratardana reaching the abode of Indra by means of fighting and strength. Evidently Indra is pleased with the display of valour on the part of the sage and permits him to ask a boon. Pratardana requests Indra to choose the boon for him, which he deems most beneficial for man.

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. I, p, xeviii.

² *Kaushi.*, II, 1.

³ *Kaushi.*, II, 6.

⁴ *Kaushi.*, II, 5.

⁵ *Kaushi.*, II, 7.

Indra replies that the boon must be chosen by the taker himself. As Pratardana insists upon Indra choosing the boon for him, Indra has to give way and begins saying what is most beneficial for man, but not before he has dilated upon his exploits, such as the slaying of the three-headed son of Tvashtri, killing the people of Prahláda in heaven, the people of Puloma in the sky, and the people of Kálanga on earth. Indra identifies Prána with A'tman and says that Prána is blissful and immortal, that he does not increase by a good action or decrease by a bad action. It is he who makes a man do virtuous deeds, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, and it is he who makes a man do bad deeds, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds. He is the guardian of the world, the king of the world, the lord of the universe, and one should know him as his Self.¹

The last chapter contains a repetition of the story of Báláki and Ajátasatru, which is found in the Brihad-áranyaka Upanishad.

X. THE MUNDAKA UPANISHAD

Mundaka Upanishad belongs to Atharva-veda. Mundaka is taken to mean razor, which implies that as a razor removes hair, so this Upanishad removes the errors of mind. It consists of three chapters, each of which is called a Mundaka, each Mundaka being subdivided into two khandas. This Upanishad is very often quoted. It boldly says that works can never constitute knowledge.

In the first Mundaka, Saunaka, the great householder, is found approaching Aṅgiras, whom he respectfully asks to tell him what is that which, if it is known, everything else becomes known.

¹ Kaushi., III, 8.

THE LOWER AND THE HIGHER KNOWLEDGE

Angiras informs Saunaka that there are two kinds of knowledge, one is called higher and the other lower. The lower knowledge consists of the four Vedas, Sikshá, Kalpa, Vyákarana, Nirukta (etymology), Chhandas (metre) and Jyotisha; while the higher knowledge is that by which the indestructible One is known.

In the second khanda of this Mundaka, it is distinctly said that fools considering sacrifice and good works to be the best thing, know of no higher good, and enjoying their reward in heaven, gained by good works, enter again this world or a lower one.¹ Nothing that is eternal can be gained by what is not eternal (deeds).² Only a person whose thoughts are not troubled by any desires, and who has obtained perfect peace, can obtain from a wise teacher the knowledge of Brahman, through which he knows the eternal and the true Person.³

In the first khanda of the second Mundaka, it is stated that from that divine Person everything has been born, including the elements, Devas, the senses, the seas, the mountains and the rivers.

The second khanda contains the beautiful verses, where the devotee is asked to use the Upanishad as the bow, as the great weapon, with which to hit the mark, which is the indestructible.⁴ Om is the bow, the Self is the arrow, the Brahman is the mark. It is to be hit by a man with a tranquil heart, and then as the arrow becomes one with the mark, he will become one with Brahman.

In the third verse of the second khanda of the third Mundaka, it is said that the Self cannot be gained

¹ *Mund.*, I, 2, 10.

² *Mund.*, I, 2, 12.

³ *Mund.*, I, 2, 13.

⁴ *Mund.*, II, 2, 3.

by the Veda, nor by intellect, nor by a knowledge of the scriptures. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own.

It has been already said that fools know no higher good than sacrifices and good works, and that nothing can be gained by good works, but in the last two verses of this Upanishad, a compromise is sought to be effected by saying that the science of Brahman should be communicated to a person who has performed all acts, is versed in the Vedas, has offered certain libations, and by whom the rite of holding the fire on the head has been duly performed. A man who has not performed the rites should not read this Upanishad. The reader is left to draw his own conclusion as to whether these two verses originally formed a part of this Upanishad.

XI. THE PRASNA UPANISHAD

The Prasna Upanishad belongs to the Atharva-veda and consists of six chapters, each chapter containing a Prasna or question, with its answer. This Upanishad is a comparatively modern one, which can be made out from the method of its systematic treatment.

The First Chapter opens with six sages, namely, Bháradvája, Satyakáma, Gárgya, A'svaláyana, Vaidarbhi and Kátyáyana, approaching the venerable Pippaláda for a knowledge of the Highest Brahman.

The first question is put by Kátyáyana, who asks Pippaláda from where the creatures are born. The sage, in reply, gives a mythological account of the creation of the universe.

In the Second Chapter, the second question is put by Vaidarbhi, who wants to know how many gods or powers keep what has thus been created, and who is the best of them. Pippaláda replies that the powers are ether, air,

fire, water, earth, speech, mind, eye, and ear ; every one of them contending that he supported the body. Thereafter Prána said that he alone supported it. The other powers were not prepared to believe him, but when it was found that as he (Prána) went out, all others went out, and that as he returned, all others returned, Prána was acknowledged to be the chief power.

Accordingly, in the Third Chapter, the third question is put by A'svaláyana, who becomes eager to know whence Prána is born, how it goes out, and everything else relating to Prána, to all of which enquiries Pippaláda gives a ready answer, and says that there are one hundred and one arteries, each of which has a hundred branches, and each of these branches has seventy-two thousand sub-branches.

By means of the fourth question, in the Fourth Chapter, Gárgya solicits for the knowledge of the senses that sleep in the human body, those that remain awake, the power that dreams, that which feels happiness and that on which all depend. The Self is pointed out as the person who alone sees, hears, smells, tastes, perceives, thinks, acts, and whose essence is knowledge, who is supreme and indestructible.

In the Fifth Chapter, the fifth question is put by Satyakáma, who is desirous of knowing what one would obtain by meditating on the syllable Om throughout life. The reply is given that by means of the syllable Om, the wise man arrives at that which is calm, free from decay, free from death, free from fear.

The last question in the last chapter is put by Bháradvája, who wants to know if Pippaláda knows the person of sixteen parts. To which the great sage replies that he is the person to be found within the body, he in whom these sixteen parts grow, in whom these parts rest, like spokes in the nave of a wheel.

XII. THE MAITRI UPANISHAD

The Maitri Upanishad belongs to Black Yajur-veda. It is also called Maitráyana Upanishad, on account of its belonging to the Sákhá of the Maitráyanas. The simple name of Maitri which is attached to this Upanishad appears to have been derived from the name of Saint Maitri, who in the Second Chapter gives an account of the Self.

This Upanishad consists of seven chapters, of which the last two may be treated as subsequent additions, while the Fifth Chapter does not contain anything of philosophical importance, the main portion being devoted to a hymn of praise. The first four chapters of this Upanishad will only be considered here.

In this Upanishad, on account of the presence of Bauddha doctrines, and the use of the name of Sákáyanya, as teacher of king Brihadratha, it has been observed by Max Müller that "the Upanishads are to my mind the germs of Buddhism,"¹ and this view has been accepted by a recent writer on Indian Philosophy.² A full discussion of this matter is reserved for the next chapter.

SA'KA'YANYA AND BRIHADRATHA

In the First Chapter, king Brihadratha, who had gone to the forest, after establishing his son in his sovereignty, at the end of one thousand days, comes across Saint Sákáyanya, who possessed the knowledge of Self. The saint was pleased to ask the king to choose a boon. The king requested the sage to impart to him the knowledge of Self. A repetition of the reply that was given by Yama to

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, p. li.

² Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, London, 1923, pp. 470-71.

Nachiketas when the latter chose his third boon, comes from the saint. The saint tells the king that the knowledge of Self is very difficult to obtain, and that the king had better choose other pleasures. The king, touching the saint's feet with his head, says, What is the use of the enjoyment of pleasures, when he who has fed on them is seen to return again and again to this world ?

Saint Sákáyanya was very much pleased with the reply of the king, whom he then told all about the doctrine of Self, as he had learnt it from the Saint Maitri. The Self, which is very small, indivisible, incomprehensible, dwells in part in the body. The body is made intelligent by the Self, the intelligent, and he becomes its driver.¹ This Self, seeming to be filled with desires and seeming to be overcome by bright or dark fruits of action, wanders about in everybody. He is pure, firm, stable, undefiled, unmoved, free from desire, remains a spectator, resting in himself. Having concealed himself in the cloak of the three qualities he appears as the enjoyer of *rta* (good works).²

SELF : ELEMENTAL AND TRUE

The Third Chapter contains an account of the Bhutámá or the elemental Self, who overcome by bright and dark fruits of action, enters on a good or bad birth, as distinguished from the great Self, who is described in the Second Chapter. The five Tanmátrás (sound, touch, form, taste, smell) are called Bhuta, the five gross elements (Mahá-bhutas) are also called Bhuta. The aggregate of all these is called Sarira, body. Lastly, he who dwells in the body is called Bhutátmá, the elemental Self. He who acts is the elemental Self ; he who causes to act by means of the

¹ *Maitri*, II, 5.

² *Maitri*, II, 6.

organ is the inner man. The inner man is not overcome, but the elemental Self is overcome, because it has united itself with the element.

The Fourth Chapter contains the process by means of which the elemental Self, after leaving the elemental body, obtains union with the true Self. The remedy for the elemental Self consists of acquirement of the knowledge of the Vedas, performance of one's duty, therefore conformity on the part of each man to the order to which he happens to belong. By knowledge, by penance, and by meditation Brahman is gained. Ultimately freed from these things by which he was filled and overcome, he obtains union with the Self.

XIII. THE MA'NDUKYA UPANISHAD.

The last of the group, treated as the earlier Upanishads, is the Mándukya, which contains only twelve verses. It belongs to the Atharva-veda. It is very doubtful if this Upanishad was known either to Bádaráyana or Samkara.¹ It discusses the four states of consciousness, namely, waking, dreaming, sleeping, and lastly, a state of consciousness, which is undefinable, inconceivable and indescribable.

According to this Upanishad, the syllable Om is everything. Om is the Self. The Self is Brahman. This same Self has four aspects, as stated above.

Vaisvánara, the controller of the waking state, being conscious of external objects, enjoys the gross objects.

Taijasa, the controller of the dreaming state, conscious of internal objects, enjoys the subtle objects.

Profound sleep, in which the sleeper does not dream, and which is controlled by Prajñá, is the third state, which is full of bliss.

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 26.

The real Self is to be known in the fourth state, in which it is neither conscious of internal objects, nor of external objects. This state cannot be defined, conceived, described, because it is beyond the five classes of sensible objects. The fourth state, Om, the blissful, without second, is the real Self. He enters the Self who knows this.

CHAPTER V

FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE UPANISHADS

VEDIC RITES IN THE UPANISHADS

The period of the Upanishads, for obvious reasons, has to be distinguished from the period of the Rig-veda, though the practices and ways of thinking of the Vedic period lingered on. It should not be thought that the people, who had for a long time performed the Vedic rites, and had put implicit reliance on the efficacy of sacrifices, would all on a sudden lose their faith in them, and unreservedly subscribe to the new mode of thinking laid down in the Upanishads. It was only in a free-thinking country like India that the teachings of the Upanishads could find recognition as Revelation, but it would have been very surprising if the bulk of the people were to cease to act and think as they were doing in the past, and follow the lead of the progressive minority. The reader has found, from the quotations given, that in some of the Upanishads, the rituals of the Vedic period have been directed to be performed. The ingenious explanation is sometimes given that the teachings of the Upanishads are of a supplementary character and were not intended to supersede the Vedic practices. Such quotations, where those who follow the Vedic practices have been reviled and compared to dogs, have been purposely omitted, but the reader must have seen that those who worship the gods of the Vedas have been unreservedly called fools. There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever for such an explanation. It cannot be doubted that the injunctions to follow the Vedic rites, which are found scattered in the pages of the

Upanishads, have been subsequently smuggled in. Once the sanctity of the Upanishads had been proclaimed, all sorts of things, including even ways and means as to how a woman may be made to yield to the desires of a lover, how to do away with a wife's lover whom the husband hates, and how to prevent the birth of a son, found their way into the Upanishads.¹ Need we then wonder if Gough, and others of his way of thinking, felt repelled by some of the contents of the Upanishads ? ²

BUDDHISM AND UPANISHAD PHILOSOPHY

The different systems of philosophy, which we have found to constitute the different stages in the evolution of the philosophy of the Upanishads, stand well-explained, but a great deal of misconception seems to prevail about the relation of the Buddhist system of philosophy to the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads, and what is far more important, about the real character of the doctrines themselves. Max Müller observes, " The Upanishads are to my mind the germs of Buddhism, while Buddhism is in many respects the doctrine of the Upanishads carried out to its last consequences, and, what is important, employed as the foundation of a new social system. In doctrine the highest goal of Vedānta, the knowledge of the True Self, is no more than the Samyaksambodhi ; in practice the Sannyāsin is the Bhikshu, the friar only emancipated alike from the tedious discipline of the Bráhmanic student, the duties of the Bráhmanic householder, and the yoke of the useless penances imposed on the dweller in the forest. The spiritual freedom of the Sannyāsin becomes in Buddhism the common property of the Sangha, the Fraternity, and that Fraternity

¹ *Brihad.*, VI, 4.

² Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, London, 1903, p. 116.

is alike open to the young and the old, to the Bráhmaṇ and the Sudra, to the rich and the poor, to the wise and the foolish. In fact there is no break between the India of the Veda and the India of the Tripitaka but there is a historical continuity between the two, and the connecting link between extremes that seem widely separated must be sought in the Upanishads.”¹

That Max Müller would think in this manner need not cause any surprise, though the full import of his remarks may not be realised by the ordinary reader. What seems strange is that a modern Indian writer of great repute should have subscribed to the view held by Max Müller and adopted the reasons advanced by the latter. “The only metaphysics that can justify Buddha’s ethical discipline is the metaphysics underlying the Upanishads. Buddhism is only a later phase of the general movement of thought of which the Upanishads are the earlier. ‘Many of the doctrines of the Upanishads are no doubt pure Buddhism, or rather Buddhism is in many points the consistent carrying out of the principle laid down in the Upanishads.’ Buddha did not look upon himself as an innovator, but only a restorer of the ancient way, *i.e.*, the way of the Upanishads. Both Buddhism and Upanishads repudiate the authority of the Vedas, so far as their philosophy is concerned. * * * The tendency to deny the substantial reality of the individual is common to both. The feeling that this life is suffering, and the life hereafter is that for which we sigh, is accepted by both. They expect us to get rid of life’s fitful fever. * * * That the absolute reality is incomprehensible by intellect is admitted by both. It was Buddha’s mission to accept the idealism of the Upanishads at its best, and make it available for the daily needs of mankind. Historical Buddhism

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, pp. li-lli.

means the spread of the Upanishad doctrines among the people."¹

While we are engaged in the difficult task of purifying the Upanishads, so as to get at the exact results achieved during the Upanishad period, we are confronted with views and remarks that threaten to push us back and make all our efforts hopeless. We have been repeatedly told that the philosophers of the Upanishad period fearlessly attacked the ritualism of the Vedic period, but scarcely any effort has been made to extricate the real philosophy of the Upanishads from the mass of thoughts and practices of the Vedic period which have found shelter in the Upanishads. A considerable section of the people might have been following the ritualism of the Vedas, but it cannot be doubted that the Upanishad thinkers, though their number may have been small, kept themselves rigidly aloof from such practices, and the texts of the Upanishads were the last place where the hymns in praise of the Vedic rites would have been sung. We have been told that the Upanishads contain not only the A'tman doctrine, but the germs as well of the other Indian systems, still no serious effort has been made to separate the doctrine of A'tman, the fundamental doctrine of the Upanishads, from the other philosophies which flourished during the Upanishad period. But it is one thing to say that the Upanishads contain the germs of the Buddhist philosophy, like those of other philosophies, and an altogether different thing to say that Buddhism is only the consistent carrying out of the fundamental doctrine laid down in the Upanishads. If our contention is right, it will have to be said that, far from making an attempt to rescue the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads from prevailing misconceptions, such views only go to show that the doctrines have not been properly grasped.

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, London, 1923, pp. 470-71.

Let us consider first what the view of Max Müller above quoted really amounts to. It means that the philosophers of the Upanishad period were labouring hard to produce what later on budded out as the philosophy of the Buddhist, and that the climax of the Upanishad philosophy is reached in the Buddhist Nirvána, and that all this search for the ultimate reality, and the establishing of the identity of A'tman and Brahman, lead only to an intellectual vacuum, and that therefore the net results of the A'tman and Buddhist philosophies are one and the same.

To do justice to the Indian writer, whose view has been above quoted, it is necessary to quote him further, in order to show that the element, which he found lacking in the Upanishads, was later on found by him in the Bhagavadgítá. "The Gítá is an application of the Upanishad ideal to the new situations which arose at the time of the Mahábhárata. In adapting the idealism of the Upanishads to a theistically minded people, it attempts to derive a religion from the Upanishad philosophy. It shews that the reflective spiritual idealism of the Upanishad has room for the living warm religion of personal devotion. The absolute of the Upanishads is revealed as the fulfilment of the reflective and the emotional demands of human nature. This change of emphasis from the speculative to the practical, from the philosophical to the religious, is also to be found in the later Upanishads, where we have the saviour responding to the cry of faith. The Gítá attempts a spiritual synthesis which could support life and conduct on the basis of the Upanishad truth, which it carries into the life-blood of the Indian people."¹ According to this writer, "The central defect of Buddha's teaching is that in his ethical earnestness, he took up and magnified one-half of the truth and made it look

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. London, 1923, pp. 530-31.

as if it were the whole. His distaste for metaphysic prevented him from seeing that the partial truth had a necessary complement and rested on principles which carried it beyond its self-imposed limits."¹ In the light of these quotations, we can well understand how the absence of the much needed theistic element in the Upanishad doctrine induced the writer to put it on the same level with Buddhism.

UPANISHAD PHILOSOPHY MISCONCEIVED

Never before the apt use of the word 'upanishad,' meaning secret teaching, has been brought home to us. The fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads, if not properly grasped, are sure to lead to endless confusion. The two great commentators, Samkara and Rámánuja, on account of their theological bias, failed to comprehend adequately the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads, and it is no wonder that the writers quoted above, who have followed the footsteps of Samkara, missed also the real meaning of the fundamental doctrines. No commentator tickles the fancy of a person so much as Samkara does, and no one wants to sink low in the estimation of others by not giving preference to Samkara's commentaries as masterpieces, which only can, it is supposed, throw light on the hidden truths of the Upanishads. The reader himself would come to the same conclusion, to which the writers quoted above have come, if he were to rely solely on the explanations and criticisms offered by Samkara.²

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, 1923, p. 471.

² "Samkara and his followers borrowed much of the dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the *Śūnya* of Nágárjūna. It is difficult to distinguish between pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of Samkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijñánaváda Buddhism can hardly be

In 1884, when Max Müller gave out his view as given above regarding the Upanishads, many of the startling discoveries of the twentieth century had not been made. One can well understand the difficulty of a philosophical writer of those times to conceive the ultimate reality, in terms of the Being, preached by the Upanishads. But one fails to understand why in these days the ultimate reality of the Upanishads cannot be conceived on the lines of the ultimate reality of modern science which pervades and is the essence of everything. It will be really strange, if the ultimate reality is to stand discredited, and considered as evanescent or non-existent, because it has not been reduced to something very palpable to the human senses, or identified with a familiar human notion. By many the living warm personal touch of the One of philosophy is felt necessary to make the heart respond, and to them the philosophy of the Upanishads would appear to be vacuous, as there is no room in it for the play of the feelings and sentiments, to which they are accustomed. But if the value of a philosophy has to be judged by such sentimental tests, one had better relinquish the path of philosophy, which the more one pursues the more one finds bestrewed with things with which one is not familiar, but which nevertheless are the determining elements in the ultimate reality. Sentiments will have to be remodelled, just as thoughts and ideas will have to be reshaped, and if one is not able to see or judge of the future, except in terms of the past or the present, let him not peer into the realm of

over-estimated. There seems to be much truth in the accusation against Samkara by Vijñāna Bhikṣu and others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to think that Samkara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Sunyavāda Buddhism with the Upanishad notion of the permanence of the self superadded.—Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 493-94.

future, which constitutes the main domain of philosophy. Just as a young man looks upon the thoughts of his boyhood and is astonished that he should have been at one time so much swayed by the feelings of that age, just as an adult reviews the thoughts of his youthful days and wonders that he should have attached such exaggerated importance to the feelings and sentiments that were uppermost in his mind once, so there would come a time when adult humanity would look upon the sentiments of the present times and the current value attached to things as extremely childish. The object of the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads was to inaugurate such an age for humanity, but it was too premature at the time when they were first uttered. Many could then, as even now, admire the giddy heights to which they are taken, but very few can really be at home in the region into which they are taken, every bit of which is unfamiliar to them. I admit that the great truth was perceived intuitively. "At times the human intellect is able to grasp far-reaching conclusions, the processes leading to which it is unable to follow, much less to explain. The stage of explanation follows with the subsequent development of the materials of experience. Intuition, in this sense, may be taken to be the quick act of individual perception, which a keen intellect can form, although the full materials of experience are wanting. As in the case of the metaphysical thinker, it happens also in the case of the religious Seer and the discoverer of great scientific truths. Their thoughts do not stand divorced from facts, they only travel ahead of them."¹ Intuition, therefore, as I understand it, is not synonymous with mysticism.²

¹ Author's *Theory of Unreality*, Calcutta, 1922, p. 33.

² I have already made it plain that I do not acknowledge the existence of any method that may be called mystical. Everything is brought about in the natural way—there is nothing which can be called



FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE UPANISHADS

In order to show that the tenets of Buddhism are entirely different from the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads, we should first state and explain the main doctrines of the Upanishads. It is needless to say that for that purpose the texts of the earlier Upanishads, from which extensive quotations have already been made, will be solely relied upon, and should be found to be quite sufficient. I do not at all agree with Max Müller's exposition of the fundamental doctrines, for which he entirely depends upon Samkara—"In one half verse I shall tell you what has been taught in thousands of volumes : Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else."¹ I would substitute for it my reading of the doctrines, and, after the manner of Max Müller, say, "In one half verse I shall tell my reader what has been clearly taught in the Upanishads : Brahman is true, the world is true, the soul, like everything else, is Brahman and nothing else."

super-natural. I have tried to explain Yoga as a natural method, by which knowledge of things can be more speedily acquired than by the ordinary processes of the senses. As a scientific process, it is no doubt somewhat difficult to handle, but similar is the case with all other psychological phenomena, which are sought to be reduced into a scientific form. I, therefore, differ from a writer, for whom I have great regard, when he looks upon the methods of Yoga as mystical methods (Ranade's *Survey of Constructive Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, p. 325). All that can be said in the present state of investigation is that we should patiently wait for the time, when enterprising lovers of knowledge are able to convert into a regular science the Yoga methods of concentration. If India, geographically, were situate somewhere in Europe, we may be quite sure that, by this time the Yoga system would have attracted a larger share of attention from knowledge-seekers than it has been yet able to do.

¹ Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1916, p. 122.

I have always wondered how persons, when dealing with philosophical or theological questions, will succumb to the temptation of twisting the import of ordinary ideas, which they never think of doing in connection with other matters. If it is once admitted that Brahman is the one ultimate reality, I fail to understand how there can be room left for developing the idea that something *exists*, but yet is not true. I can well conceive that when separate and distinct forces or powers are at work, different results may follow. In the case of a world which is conceived as partly governed by a beneficent and partly by a malevolent power, or in the case of a world one part of which is conceived as composed of materials of one kind, and the other of materials of a different kind, the two different parts may present things of a different nature. But if once it is conceded that one cause is working throughout the world, the entire world must partake of the nature of that cause. There is enough room for the development of variety, even when a sole cause is working in the world, but how can a portion of the world be true and a portion false, or how can some ideas be inherently true and some inherently false, when everything is brought about by one and the same cause, which is true? We can certainly conceive of development of ideas, of ideas undergoing changes, and of the existence of different points of view, as for example, a thing seen from a distance presents an impression different from that presented by the same thing when observed at close quarters, or a thing observed by a boy does not carry the same impression as it does when seen by a grown-up person. But how can it be said that the entire creation, or a portion of it, is false, when it is distinctly stated that there is one true cause for everything that exists? Diversity is not falsity, nor is ignorance falsity. 'Is' cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be 'is not,' nor can 'is not' by any ingenuity construed as 'is.'

IS THE WORLD TRUE OR FALSE ?

It may be said that whether it logically follows or not, if we find it distinctly stated in the Upanishads that Brahman is true, and that the world is false, such statements will have to be taken for whatever they may be worth. To a candid statement of this nature, by way of reply, an equally candid question may be put. What do you mean by saying that the world is false ? Do you mean that it exists, but is at the same time false, or false, because it exists not ? If you say it is false because it exists not, the proof of it becomes very easy, as in the case of anything that does not exist. As it is easy to prove when a man does not exist, it ought, in the same manner, be easy to prove that the external world does not exist. That alternative is easily settled, but it should be borne in mind that it does not admit of what is understood by *relative* existence, for what is false, because it exists not, does not admit of *relative* existence. To make out a case of *relative* existence of the world, we shall have to fall back upon the other alternative, that though it may seem to exist, yet it is really false. In order to make the issue still more clear, it must have to be further stated, whether the falsity in question is subjective or objective. A thing is said to be false in a subjective sense, when, owing to a defect in the individual intellect, a thing is considered to exist although it does not exist. A thing, on the other hand, is said to be objectively false, when the falsity is due not to individual incapacity, but on account of defect in the common human machinery, called intellect. The falsity in the latter case then resolves into the case of a thing which has no existence, but masquerades as a thing that has. We shall accordingly proceed to find out in what sense, if any, the world is considered to be false in the Upanishads.

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO
THE BRIHADĀ'RANYAKA UPANISHAD

In the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, we have been told that the Brahman has two forms, the material and the immaterial. Everything except air and sky is material, is mortal, is solid, is definite.¹ Yājñavalkya says to his wife Maitreyi that all the worlds, the creatures, everything, including the Vedas, came out of the Self, the Brahman.² Next we find Yājñavalkya saying, in answer to the question put by Uddālaka A'rūni, as to who is the puller of this world, the other world, and all other beings, that the Self, the Brahman, is the puller (ruler) of the air, the earth, the water, the fire, the sky, the heaven, and everything else.

Let us stop for a moment to consider the nature of the world as explained in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, the antiquity of which is not disputed by any one. Do we find it stated here that the world is a mirage, a fiction, the mere shadow of something else, or do we not find it distinctly stated in language which does not admit of any ambiguity whatsoever, that the world, like everything else, came out of the Self, the Brahman? We hope no one will have the boldness to say that the Self or the Brahman, here spoken of, is only relatively true, and that, therefore, the world and everything else that came from the Self or Brahman, are only relatively true. It cannot for a moment be doubted that the world is as true as Brahman itself. It came out of Brahman, the true of the true, and is true, for truth comes out of truth and not falsity out of truth. Neither does it permit of the offering of an ingenuous explanation, that the Self or Brahman, which is truth itself, was in a joking humour, and drew some imaginary cards out of his pocket, in order to pass them as real, like what we may find a magician doing. In all that has been said there is absolutely no room

¹ *Brhhd.*, II, 3, 1-2.

² *Ibid.*, II, 4.

for the speculation that the world is a sham world. Certainly the world has its value in the scale of things. It has its assigned position, and has to keep to that. It cannot claim to be what it is not. As water cannot be considered solid, so long as it is in the fluid state, the distinction between water, when it is fluid, and water, when it turns solid, has to be maintained. Though, ultimately, everything may be rolled back into the Self or Brahman, from out of which they have come, so long as they have assigned places, in the order of things, they have distinct existence. Neither does the change that a thing is capable of undergoing, make a thing untrue. To-day it is a seed, to-morrow, a full-grown tree, the next day, a piece of wood, but for that reason, neither the seed, nor the tree, nor the wood, is to be looked upon as untrue. Every moment of the existence of a thing, whatever may be its shape or form, or duration, is a true moment, because it has the stamp of ultimate truth, Brahman, upon it. Also to say that, since everything is only a manifestation of Brahman, who is the sole reality, the manifestations cannot be real, is equally absurd. Take for instance, the manifestations of the will of an individual. One day a person feels very much attracted by a thing, which he makes up his mind to eat, and eats accordingly. What he eats, suppose, does not agree with him. Another day, when he sees the same thing which had once very great attraction for him, he silently passes by, without bestowing any notice upon it. Should it be said, on account of his changed state of mind, that his fondness for the thing on the first day had no existence, because it passed away the next day? The material world is also changing, we are living in the midst of an ever-changing world. A person would not be able to recognise a place, say in London or Calcutta, where he has lived the best part of his life, if he were to re-visit it, after its topography has changed, on account of extensive improvements made. Will it therefore

be said that those features of the place which have ceased to exist, did not exist at one time? Every moment of time, even when rapidly replaced by other moments, every feature of the world, even when replaced by numerous other features, must be looked upon as true.

Lastly, the world cannot be said to be false if any person, in his ardent desire to arrive at his ultimate destination, leaves it behind. 'Yājñavalkya had led the best portion of his life in the courts of kings, and in the company of his two wives, Maitreyi and Kātyāyāni. Towards the close of his life, he made up his mind to retire to the forests, and accordingly parted from his wives. Should it, therefore, be said that the householder's life is false and the forest life is true, or that kings, courts, discussion in the company of learned men, are all false? Yet we are being told, at every turn, because we cannot, or like not to, make the world our permanent habitation, the world is false! Because one wishes for a state of existence, which he looks upon as the highest, all the states of existence he has passed through cannot be called chimerical or illusory. There may be any number of worlds, distinct and different from this world, which may prove more attractive than this world of ours, but for that reason we cannot say that this world has no existence. The pleasures that a person may have once taken delight in, the kind of life that a person may have once pleasantly led, the world that he may have doted upon, all these cannot be said to be false, because he has changed his point of view. If a man does not want to remain for ever encased in one kind of ideas, and changes it for ideas of a different kind, which he has come to find far better than the ideas which he once dearly cherished, should it be said that he has passed from unreality to reality? Yet, at every turn, we are being told, in course of the interpretation of the texts of the Upanishads, that because a man finds infinite bliss in the contemplation of Brahman,

the ideas relating to everything else, including the world, in which he had been so long living, thinking, and developing his ideas, are false ! Nowhere in the earlier Upanishads shall we find such puerile assertions made. An individual passes through several stages, in his search for ultimate truth, and because he finds his rest in the ultimate stage, the other stages, which had acted as the ladder, by means of which the last stage was reached, cannot be called false. But, no, a class of writers would not allow us to draw that conclusion. Since Samkara, the most destructive of all commentators, whom they blindly follow, says that the world, the work of Máya, is illusion, therefore, it must be so, in spite of all proofs from the Upanishads, which Samkara was only interpreting, to the contrary. Accepting the interpretation of Samkara, without trying to find out, if the texts of the Upanishads support Samkara, Max Müller came to hold the view that " Evolution of the Brahman, or Parináma, is heterodox, illusion or Vivarta is orthodox Vedánta. Brahman is a conception involving such complete perfection that with it evolution, or a tendency towards higher perfection, is impossible. If therefore there is change, that change can only be illusion, and can never claim the same reality as Brahman. To put it metaphysically, the world according to the orthodox Vedántin, does not proceed from Brahman, as a tree from a germ, but as a mirage from the rays of the sun. The world is, as we express it, phenomenal only, but whatever objective reality there is in it, is Brahman." ¹ It is very strange that Max Müller, who had taken the pains of translating the earlier Upanishads, should have failed to notice the stages of evolution in the texts of the Upanishads, by following Samkara so blindly. Or, should we say, that he followed Samkara, because, like Samkara, he

¹ Max Müller, *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, p. xxxvii.



wanted to establish that the Upanishads had no positive value or result to boast of ?

THE WORLD AS IT IS CONCEIVED IN THE CHHA'NDOGYA
UPANISHAD

We would now turn our attention to the Chhándogya Upanishad, the second oldest Upanishad, and see how the world has been conceived there. We find A'runi telling his son, Svetaketu, that in the beginning, there was that only which is, and out of that, fire came forth. Thereafter that fire sent forth water, and water sent forth earth. Thereafter that Being, which had produced fire, water and earth, entered into them, and gradually everything else, including the world as we find it, came into existence.¹ Without attempting to justify the mode of evolution sketched out in this Upanishad, no doubt can be entertained about the fact that the world came out by a process of growth, from Brahman, the ultimate reality. We do not find here any magician coming forward and waving his wand in order to produce the world, the greatest of illusions. Though we find stated later on that the Infinite is the bliss, and that there is no bliss in the Finite,² that he who loves the Self, takes pleasure in the Self, becomes the master in all these worlds, and that those who think differently, live in perishable worlds,³ that does not go to make the world false. The individual gradually comes to know what to prize most, and if he has, in his journey onward, come to have a poor opinion of the world in which we live, he should not for that reason look upon it as false.

¹ *Chhánd.*, VI, 2-5.

² *Chhánd.*, VII, 23.

³ *Chhánd.*, VII, 25.

ISA' AND SVETA'SVATARA UPANISHADS' VIEWS OF
THE WORLD

When we come to the Isá Upanishad, the One, the Self, the Brahman, is distinctly identified with all things, those that move as well as those that do not move, that is to say, even the inert matter is also Brahman.¹ The gross matter is also of the same nature as that of the ultimate reality, and it is said that he who sees all things in the Self, including, without doubt, this world, and the Self in all things, does not labour under any delusion.² Far from asking us to look upon this world as a huge illusion, it is clearly said in this Upanishad that all delusion disappears as soon as man finds out that everything is permeated by the ultimate reality, the Brahman.

Though the Svetásvatara Upanishad, for the first time, mentions the word 'Máyá,' we need not be afraid of approaching it in order to ascertain the nature of the world contemplated by it, whether the world is an illusion or has reality in its composition. It unequivocally says that Brahman is fire, sun, wind, moon, the starry firmament, water, the thunder-cloud, the seasons, the seas, etc., and it is that from which all the worlds are born.³ If after these explicit statements, we find it stated later on that Prakriti or Nature is Máyá, and the great Lord is Máyin, we can have no hesitation in construing that by 'Máyá' is meant 'art,' and by 'Máyin' is meant 'Maker.' As the doctrine of Máyá is discussed in the next chapter, we would not go into that subject here any further, but would only recall the broad principle which should be applied to statements of this nature, and to which we have already adverted.

¹ *Isá*, 5.

² *Isá*, 6-7.

³ *Svetásv.*, IV.

The broad principle that one should keep in mind when reading the Upanishads is that, once an idea has been made perfectly clear, by being stressed times without number, any attempt made thereafter to replace it by a contradictory or incongruous idea, should be looked upon as the work of the interpolator and accordingly treated with contempt. This is very necessary when we remember, firstly, that the Upanishads had been preserved for a long time in the memory of persons ; secondly, that several kinds of philosophy, some of which are different from one another as poles asunder, are comfortably accommodated in the same Upanishad ; and, thirdly, that the hand of the interpolator has not spared even the oldest Upanishads. We do not take notice of the numerous Upanishads that sprang into existence afterwards, the sole object of which was to find for the views contained in them recognition under the cover of the name of 'upanishad.' If, in an ordinary debating society, after a resolution of one kind has been entertained, a contradictory resolution brought forward in the guise of an amendment is thrown out by the president, and the main resolution is allowed to be discussed on its merits, much more does it become necessary, in the case of discussions on solemn subjects, solemnly carried on, to rule out incongruous ideas, when once certain ideas have been unambiguously accepted and established. If, therefore, after having been clearly and repeatedly affirmed that the world is real, and has proceeded from Brahman, the ultimate reality, it is afterwards sought, by means of a subterfuge, to make it unreal by attributing its existence to a thing which has no real existence, the reader ought to treat with contempt such an attempt as the work of an interpolator.

THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN

After having found that the world contemplated in the earliest Upanishads is a real world, and not illusion, let us

proceed to consider what are exactly the contents of Brahman, or A'tman, which has been identified with Brahman, and whether Brahman or A'tman is a fugitive or a negative thing, about which no conception can be formed, or whether it can be understood partially, though not in its entirety. The attention of the reader has been already drawn to the views of those who hold that the Brahman of the Upanishads has no substantial reality, and it was therefore the precursor of Buddhistic thoughts, which made explicit what was implicit in the Upanishads. We will once more find it to be a case of adoption of a particular kind of interpretation, for establishing a pre-conceived theory. Just as in the case of finding out the reality or otherwise of the world, Samkara was absolutely relied upon, and thereafter every word found in the Upanishads relating to the world was taken to mean, 'bereft of any substance,' so also in the case of the interpretation of Brahman, Samkara is accepted as the infallible guide by a class of writers, and Brahman is found to be an abstract thing, about which no conception can be formed. It has therefore to be seen, from an examination of the texts of the Upanishads, how far Samkara and those who have followed his interpretation, are justified in forming such a conception of Brahman.

YÁJÑAVALKYA'S VIEW

In the Brihadáranyaka Upanishad, when the doctrine of the Self is being explained by Yájñavalkya to his wife Maitreyi, with the help of the metaphors of the drum, the conch-shell, the lute, the lighted fire, the sea and the saltish water, let us see what is sought to be imparted.¹ Yájñavalkya says that as the sounds of a drum, when beaten,

¹ *Brihad.*, II, 4.

cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized, when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum ; as the sounds of the conch-shell, when blown, cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized, when the shell is seized or the blower of the shell ; as the sounds of a lute when played, cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized, when the lute is seized or the player of the lute ; as clouds of smoke proceed by themselves out of a lighted fire kindled with a damp fuel, thus, verily, O Maitreyi, has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rig-veda, Yajur-veda, Sáma-veda, etc., from whom alone all these were breathed forth ; as all waters find their centre in the sea, all touches in the skin, all tastes in the tongue, all smells in the nose, all colours in the eye, all sounds in the ear, all percepts in the mind, all knowledge in the heart, all actions in the hands, all movements in the feet, all the Vedas in the speech; as a lump of salt, when thrown into water, becomes dissolved into water, and could not be taken out again, but wherever we taste it is salt, thus verily, O Maitreyi, does this Great Being unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements and vanish in them ; when he has departed, there is no more knowledge, I say, O Maitreyi. Yájñavalkya had just before said to his wife, Maitreyi, "The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked : when we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self, everything is known."

THE MANY EXIST IN THE ONE

In the above discourse on the nature of Brahman, we find it very clearly stated that knowledge cannot be said to be complete, if we confine our attention only to the manifestations and leave out of consideration that which is their cause. The manifestations exist, because at their back

there is that one cause. Real knowledge is not possible if, regardless of their cause, only the effects are taken into consideration. Though the manifestations are of endless variety, the ultimate cause is One. Let the reader now judge for himself if the Self or Brahman is a mere abstract name, or is overflowing with contents. Does not each and every manifestation go to make up the contents of the Self or Brahman ? It will be childish to pin down the Self or Brahman to those things only which we human beings know or about which we can form some idea, for the Self or Brahman contains innumerable things regarding which we have no knowledge or idea either. But there is no doubt left in the mind of the reader that the Self or Brahman is *at the least* what we know or are capable of knowing. A superficial commentator will say that because the Self or Brahman is the essence of everything, he is something that is abstract, a name only. If a thing of vast magnitude were condensed into a thing of very small dimension, hardly perceptible to the eye, if the world were ultimately dissolved into those elements, out of which it was thought to have arisen, according to the old scientific idea, or into the one primordial thing, according to the modern scientists, will it be said that the ultimate state, into which things may be reduced, has no existence, is only a name? Nothing could be more absurd. That ultimate state has within it, as its contents, all things that have merged in it. It is only a change of form, and does not mean the absence of any single particle of the numerous things which had at one time existed. It is potentially full of numerous concrete things, into which it spreads itself, whenever necessary. What Yájñavalkya is trying to impress upon his wife is that the cause of everything in the world, including our individual selves, is Brahman, and when everything is traced back to Brahman, knowledge is said to be complete. Far from saying that the Self or Brahman is

devoid of reality, it is being sought to be established that it is *at the least* rich with the contents of everything that we perceive or know.

KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN : STAGES OF DUALITY AND ONENESS

One thing more remains in connection with the present discourse of Yājñavalkya, to which I would like to draw the reader's particular attention. After Yājñavalkya has finished in the manner, quoted above, his wife, Maitreyi, a worthy wife of a worthy husband, says to him, "Sir, thou hast bewildered me." Yājñavalkya replies by pointing out that he has said nothing which is bewildering, for when there is as it were duality, then one sees the other, one smells the other, one hears the other, one salutes the other, one perceives the other, one knows the other ; but when the Self only is all this, how should he smell another, how should he see another, how should he hear another, how should he salute another, how should he perceive another, how should he know another?

From the above saying of Yājñavalkya, some have come to the conclusion that Brahman cannot be comprehended. Let us consider what Yājñavalkya has actually said. Does he say that the Self or Brahman cannot be known, that it is incomprehensible? Certainly not. All that Yājñavalkya says is that in the stage of oneness, when duality has ceased to exist, when the individual and Brahman are found to be one and the same thing, no question of knowing arises, because the knower and that which is to be known have coalesced. In the stage of duality, the question of knower and that which is to be known can only arise, but in the stage of oneness, it will be absurd to say that there are a knower and something

else that is to be known. The difference between 'thou' and 'that' has disappeared, the One alone remains. Human knowledge ordinarily consists of a knower and a thing to be known, the subject and the object. In that stage of knowledge, when the subject and object are found to have coalesced, that is to say, when everything is found to be in the One and the One in everything, the distinction between the knower and that which is known does not arise, for it is found not to exist. Of this ultimate stage we can certainly form some idea, and it is not therefore altogether incapable of comprehension. Is there any individual in existence, who can say that he knows everything, and that he is Brahman or knowledge itself, which would necessarily imply the vanishing of distinction between subject and object, the knower and what is to be known? Who does not admit that we have not yet been able to know a fraction of all that exists? But to argue therefore that we do not know the things we actually know, is certainly ridiculous. It is a fact that our knowledge is partial, but to say that we have not even a partial knowledge of the whole truth, is to say something which is not true. Talking in fanciful or hyperbolical language may be very entertaining, but it does not help one to get at the truth. One element of truth in Yājñavalkya's discourse is that so long as a person is in the stage of duality, he cannot fully realise the stage of oneness, though he can form some idea of it, just as Yājñavalkya had done. The other element of truth in it is that the stage of duality, which precedes the stage of oneness, is also real, for it is out of the One that many had sprung. Yājñavalkya significantly adds that this is enough for wisdom, by which is to be understood ordinary human wisdom. We should accordingly understand Yājñavalkya not to have said that Brahman is altogether unknown or unknowable, but that we can, in our present state of development, have only a partial knowledge of him. But

as every one of us is a potential Brahman, it is only a question of time when we will have perfect knowledge like Brahman, or become knowledge itself, when 'thou' will become 'that.'

If the interpretation that we have put upon Yājñavalkya's saying were not the only interpretation possible, what was the necessity of his dragging Brahman and identifying it with everything that we see and know, including the husband, wife, son, creatures, etc.? If all that we know or perceive are clearly outside the limits of Brahman, it could have been very simply and straightforwardly stated that there is not the slightest connection between Brahman and those things, that Brahman is something totally different from anything that we know, and for that reason Brahman is unknown and unknowable.

The reader has already found from the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and king Janaka, narrated in the fourth chapter of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, that in the stage of oneness, that is to say, when duality no longer exists, a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother, the thief is not a thief, the murderer is not a murderer.

THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER UPANISHADS

Not only in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, but in all the earlier Upanishads, the nature and contents of Brahman, to the extent they can be known by man, are explicitly stated.

In the Chhândogya Upanishad, we find A'runi telling his son Svetaketu that everything that exists has its self in that, and it is the true, it is the Self and Svetaketu is that.

In the Katha Upanishad, it is distinctly stated that there is one ruler, the Self within all things, who makes the one

form manifold, when he shines, all things shine after him, and all worlds are contained in it.¹

In the Kena Upanishad, although at one place it is stated that we do not know Brahman and cannot teach it, it is at the same time stated to be the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind. Next, it is distinctly said, "I don't think I know it well, nor do I know that I do not know it. Those amongst us who understand the meaning of 'to know and not to know,' understand it." We have already pointed out in the last chapter that this is the most reasonable view of the nature of Brahman for us to take. It is practically repeating what Yājñavalkya has said in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, and which we have discussed above. To say that we do not or cannot know Brahman at all, is using language which admits of no ambiguity, as it clearly states that no knowledge whatsoever is possible of Brahman. But can it be said that the same idea is conveyed, when a whole host of things, or everything that is known to exist, is traced back to Brahman? After doing so, can it be said that Brahman cannot be taught or known? The tracing of everything that exists in this world ultimately to Brahman, or the statement that Brahman is the essence of everything, has been so often repeated in the Upanishads, and in such detail, that it cannot for a moment be doubted that it is one of the essential teachings of the Upanishads. If any one had attempted to remove these clear statements from the Upanishads, it would not have been possible for him to do so, for in that case it would have been necessary to remove the major portions of the earlier Upanishads. But it was a far easier task to smuggle into the Upanishads, at places, short statements in prose or verse, to the effect that Brahman cannot be known. As against innumerable places, where it has been distinctly stated how the highest

¹ *Katha*, II, 5 & 6.

knowledge, which is the knowledge of Brahman, can be obtained—and teachers have come forward to teach it and pupils have reverently approached for that knowledge—we will find in isolated places it being curtly added that we cannot know him. We have already pointed out, how in the Upanishads, the views of the different systems of philosophy are to be found, lying side by side. We find the doctrine of Being brushing its shoulders against the doctrine of Not-Being (of the Buddhists) in one and the same Upanishad.¹ We also find the doctrine of the denial of the Soul (held by the Buddhists) flourishing along with the view that the Soul, after the death of man, exists.²

BRAHMAN AS THE SOLE REALITY

It is necessary to make it clear here, what is meant by saying that Brahman is the sole reality. Because Brahman is the sole reality, it is not thereby implied that there are things outside of Brahman, which are unreal. No greater error can be committed by a reader of the Upanishads than by thinking that a cleavage of this kind exists or is even contemplated. There is no such thing as unreal ; everything is real, since all are moments in the all-comprehensive reality of Brahman. All the earlier Upanishads make it perfectly clear that nothing does or can exist outside of Brahman. Within the all-comprehensive Self or Brahman, everything will be found to exist ; in other words, everything is part and parcel of Brahman and partakes of his reality. Yājñavalkya says to his wife, Maitreyi, in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, that not only this world, but all the worlds proceed from the Self or Brahman. In answer to Uddālaka A'runi also, Yājñavalkya says that the Self is the puller or ruler of the

¹ *Chhând.*, VI, 2, 1.

² *Katha*, I, 1, 20.

sky, the heaven, the sun, the stars and the gods. In the second adhyāya of the Katha Upanishad it is stated that the Self is to be found in all things. In the Isá Upanishad this is also made perfectly clear. In the Svetásvatara Upanishad, it has been stated that everything proceeds from Brahman. Everything dwells in Brahman, and, *therefore*, Brahman is said to be the sole reality.

PLURALISM AND QUALIFIED MONISM

Samkara contents himself with shewing that the Upanishads establish the reality of only the Self or Brahman, and that the world and everything else, except this abstract Brahman, are unreal. But there are others who differ from his view that the world and the individual are unreal. Some of them maintain that the individual soul though real is quite distinct from the universal soul. They belong to what is known as the dualistic school of philosophy, and their chief representative is Mádhava. The individual souls are looked upon as the servants, and the universal soul the overlord. There can be no merging of the individual soul in the absolute soul ; in the last stage, the individual soul only approaches the universal soul, and participates in his glory. There is still another school of interpreters headed by Rámánuja, which though it agrees with the numerical pluralism of Mádhava, differs from it by maintaining a qualified monism. There is no doubt one Absolute only, but it consists of three entities : the ultimate absolute, the individual soul, and nature, the two latter being also eternal like the first entity, the ultimate Absolute, which is not only the soul of souls, but is also the soul of nature. According to Mádhava, in the last stage, the individual participates only in the glory of the universal soul, but according to Rámánuja, the individual soul, though it merges in the Absolute, still retains its individuality, and is not, so to say, absorbed by the Absolute.

It will have to be seen how far Mádhava and Rámánuja were justified in holding their views which, it is needless to say they contend, have the full support of the Upanishads. It is not necessary to go into the details of the doctrines of the two schools, represented by Mádhava and Rámánuja. It would be sufficient for our purpose to find out whether there is authority in the Upanishads for what they assert, in opposition to the Advaita school, that the individual remains for ever an individual and never merges in the Brahman or Absolute, so as to lose all traces of its distinct existence. As both Mádhava and Rámánuja, unlike Samkara, maintain that the world and the individual soul are real, the only thing that requires examination is the nature of the relation that exists between the individual soul and the universal soul.

According to these two schools of interpreters of the Upanishad doctrines, it is admitted that there is a stage, when the distinction between the individual and the Absolute has to be acknowledged, the main point of difference being what happens to the individual soul afterwards. That the individual soul does not enjoy from the beginning perfect reality, which belongs to Brahman alone, is admitted by these schools, but not by the school of Samkara, which is pledged to the view of abstract reality of Brahman, and would not concede anything of the nature of substantial reality to the world and the individual soul. About the existence, real or otherwise, of the individual soul, for some time, there is no dispute, and, as a matter of fact, the Upanishad doctrines were considered necessary for the purpose of enlightening the individual about his exact nature.

THE DUALISTIC VIEW OF MÁDHAVA

The dualistic view of Mádhava need not detain us long. The distinct nature of the individual soul is not

only not supported by the Upanishads but is quite contrary to their teachings. Every Upanishad has made it abundantly clear that out of the One the many have come, and into the One the many ultimately go back. Whether one looks to the Brihadárányaka or the Chhándogya Upanishad, or to any of the other Upanishads, the same idea is expressed, which precludes the possibility of essential difference between the individual and the universal souls. The effect cannot be separate from the cause, and even if the universal soul be called the soul of souls, it is difficult to conceive how the ultimate nature of the individual soul could be different. When it is stated, as we have seen from the quotations given, that Brahman dwells in everything and is the heart of everything, there can be no difference *ultimately* between the individual soul and the universal soul. No one disputes the existence of difference for a short or long while, but the perpetuation of this difference for all time, between the individual and Brahman, is nowhere to be found in the Upanishads. It is going back to the philosophy of the Rig-veda, where a distinction between the Creator and the created is rigidly maintained, but in the Upanishads the equivalence of the individual and Brahman is unmistakably proclaimed. Two disparate things can never be equal. We would not tire the reader by a repetition of the texts already quoted, which distinctly state the real nature of the individual soul. Apart from the existence of the universal soul, the individual has no separate existence, which makes it impossible to hold that the nature of the individual soul can be essentially different from the nature of the universal soul, as contended for by Mádhava.

QUALIFIED MONISM OF RÁMÁNUJA

Though whatever has been said against the theory of Mádhava applies with equal force against Rámánuja, the

subtlety that has been employed by the latter in not disowning monism altogether, calls for a separate reply. It must be said that Mádhava is more straightforward and unambiguous than Rámánuja, who reveals a lack of courage in not accepting the ultimate conclusion, which his premises lead him to. If Rámánuja would go so far as to admit the merging of the individual soul in the universal soul, it becomes absurd to maintain that in the ultimate stage the distinction would persist. Mádhava would not admit this merging or ultimate assimilation, but would only allow the individual soul to come very close to the universal soul, and one can follow his argument that this state of separateness arises from the essential distinction between the individual and the universal souls. Whether this state of separateness finds support from the Upanishads is another thing, but he is consistent all throughout. It becomes very difficult, however, to follow Rámánuja, who would admit monism, admit merging or assimilation, but would still perpetuate the separateness of the individual. In the story related in the Kena Upanishad, Brahman meets the gods after their victory over the Asuras. It is made clear there that every particle of power which Agni, Váyú or Indra possesses, is derived from Brahman. When Brahman withdraws his power, everyone of them becomes powerless. Existence apart from Brahman is difficult to conceive, according to the Upanishads. And what do we find when we come to form an idea about the origin of the creation? What will be found afterwards can be best understood by examining what was there at the beginning. We find in the beginning there was One, and that is what A'runi tells his son Svetaketu, in the sixth chapter of the Chhándogya Upanishad. If the individual soul had a permanent separate existence, from the very beginning, that was the place where mention of that fact should have been made. It is very easy to establish the separateness of the individual,

after the creation had been started. The ether was separate, the air was separate, the water was separate, and so also the individual was separate. If the force of Rámánuja's argument is to be admitted, then whatever is once found separate from other things, should have to be kept eternally separate and distinct, like the individual. The proper test is not the stage of many, which is admitted by all, but the stages that precede and follow the stage of many.

SVETA'SVATARA UPANISHAD DOES NOT SUPPORT
RA'MA'NUJA

It is said that Rámánuja finds ample authority for making the Jiva (individual) and the Prakriti (nature) eternal, from the verses in the Svetásvatara Upanishad, where it is stated that there are three unborn or ultimate things, namely, the knowing Isvara or God, the not-knowing Jiva or the individual, and the Prakriti or nature,¹ and that Brahman is threefold, namely, the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the ruler.² These verses are to be found in the first adhyáya or chapter of Svetásvatara Upanishad, and should not be read separate from one another. The first adhyáya consists of sixteen verses. The nature of the individual and its relation to God, will have to be gathered from the abovementioned two verses, which are ninth and twelfth respectively of that adhyáya, when these are read along with the verses that precede and follow them. In the first verse the enquiry is made, is Brahman the cause, whence are we born, whereby do we live, and whither do we go? In the second verse, the enquiry is repeated, should time or nature, or necessity or chance, or the Purusha (individual self) be the cause? The same verse contains the answer, that neither the individual

¹ *Svetásva.*, I, 9,

² *Ibid*, I, 12.

self nor nature, both of which are powerless, nor the union of both, could be the cause, but the cause is something else. In the third verse, it is then distinctly stated that the sole power is God, who is one, and who superintends all things such as time, self, and the rest. In the fourth verse, God is compared to a wheel, having felly, tires, spokes, etc. In the fifth verse God is compared to a stream, whose water divides itself into different courses. In the sixth verse, it is stated that in the vast Brahma-wheel, in which all things live and rest, the bird flutters about, so long as he thinks that *the self in him is different from the mover*, that is, Brahman. When he has been blessed by him or when he has discovered his own true self in Brahman, then he gains immortality. In the seventh verse, it is said that, what is however to be praised in the Upanishads is the Highest Brahman, and in it there exists the triad (the subject, the object, and the mover or ruler or Brahman). The Highest Brahman is the safe support, on knowing whom and *merging in whom* a person becomes free from birth. Lastly, we come to the fifteenth and sixteenth verses of that adhyāya, where it is said that, as oil in seeds, as butter in cream, as water in river-beds, as fire in wood, so is the Self to be seized within the self, which pervades everything, as butter is contained in the milk, and that is the Brahman that is taught in the Upanishad.

The reader will now find out the sense in which the word 'ultimate' or 'unborn' has been used with reference to the individual self and nature, in this Upanishad. Though Svetāśvatara Upanishad has been assigned a place among the earlier Upanishads, it is comparatively modern, compared with such Upanishads as Brihadāranyaka, Chhândogya, Isá, Kēna, Katha, Aitareya and Taittiriya Upanishads. Svetāśvatara Upanishad is looked upon by many as a sectarian Upanishad, as in it we find Brahman identified with Hara or Rudra or Siva, a mythological deity. In it we find

that incorporated in Brahman, who is the Highest, there is a personal God, called Lord or Isvara. Whatever be the object with which a personal God is introduced in this Upanishad, that the triad—the Lord, the individual self, and nature,—has sprung from Brahman or Self, is made clear in the seventh verse, and the fifteenth and sixteenth verses make it perfectly clear that the Self or Brahman is the essence of the individual souls and of everything else, in which all things merge. The final conclusion, in spite of the introduction of a personal God, is that Brahman is the ultimate reality, which pervades or is the essence of everything existing, and this is also the conclusion of the other Upanishads. The effort of Rámánuja to perpetuate the individual is of no avail and the verses which he is said to rely upon for his authority do not support him. If we refer to the fourth adhyáya of this Upanishad, we will find that Rámánuja's position is entirely unsupportable, as we find stated in the first verse of that adhyáya that, in the beginning there was One, and, in the end everything is rolled up into One.

REAL BASIS OF PLURALISM AND QUALIFIED MONISM

If the Upanishads do not provide the materials, on which the theories held by Mádhava and Rámánuja have been raised, what else could be the basis of their theories? Also the question will have to be answered, why we find a mythological deity identified with Brahman in the Svetásvatara Upanishad? It is an admitted fact that the real Upanishad period had ended long before the Sutra-writers and the commentators came into existence. After the age of original and independent thinking had passed away, the age of compilation and commentation commenced. As is the case with every effort to understand a thing that is vast and deep, the doctrines of the Upanishads began to be

explained from different points of view, which roughly represented the different classes of intellect that existed in the community. The different commentators became the spokesmen of the different sections of the community, who did not agree in their interpretation of the texts of the Upanishads, which led to the establishment of the different schools, sharply distinguished from one another on fundamental points. We accordingly find Samkara explaining the doctrines of the Upanishads from the point of view of the section of the community represented by him, while Rámánuja and Mádhava explained the same texts from different points of view, which were favoured by the sections they represented. In whatever light we may treat Samkara's interpretation of the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads, on account of his introduction of the theory of Máyá, it must be said of him that he never pulled the Upanishads down to a lower level of thought. In the next chapter, when discussing the doctrine of Máyá, we will try to find out the reason that may have induced Samkara to take the help of this theory, but it must be acknowledged that in spite of his converting the Brahman into an ice-cold self-sufficient Being, he never pandered to the cry of the populace, who failed to appreciate the high level of thought which the teachings of the Upanishads represented. This was not the case with Rámánuja. While Samkara represented a portion of the upper-class intellect of India of his time, Rámánuja represented the middle-class intellect. Samkara's steps did not falter because he had to ascend an altitude which was as high as it was steep, though when he reached it, he viewed the surroundings from his own standpoint. Rámánuja had not the courage to ascend the height, but he remained at a lower level, gazed from there, and drew the conclusion which a man standing on such a level could draw. He could not divest himself of the popular ideas, to which he had been wedded, and he is therefore acclaimed

as the commentator who had not overlooked the claims of the human heart. Ordinary human heart formed the basis of the interpretation of Rámánuja, but the reader has seen that the authors of the Upanishads did not set much store by it. Because ordinary human feelings could not be a safe guide in the difficult task of finding out ultimate truths, the Rishis of the Upanishads tried to transcend them, for finding out what existed beyond the fleeting desires and emotions of the individual, and the effort was crowned with unprecedented success. But to the vast majority of the people, who are swayed by ordinary emotions, hopes and fears, the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads proved to be a kind of sealed knowledge, which they could not grasp, though its sublimity and authority were not questioned by them. Efforts were accordingly made by them, and Rámánuja became their chief spokesman, to bring the Upanishad doctrines down to their level of understanding, since they could not raise themselves to the high level on which those doctrines stood. So we find Rámánuja engaged in the task of laying hold of stray passages from a comparatively modern Upanishad and interpreting them in a manner which satisfied the popular demand for a personal God. We have seen that in the last stage of the Rig-veda period, the idea of a single personal Creator, to whom all the other gods were subordinate, had been formulated. Rámánuja's effort was virtually directed towards bringing back the personal god of a past age, who enthused and cheered the human heart more than the conception of Brahman that is to be found in the Upanishads.

So, once again, with the help of the Upanishads, the worshipper was given his former place, the deity was installed in his old sanctuary, the human heart began to throb and pulsate as of old, and the old round of things was brought back. The Rishis of the Upanishad period had

tried their best to make it clear that the Self in man was no other than Brahman himself, but the vast majority of the people, whose spokesmen were Rámánuja and Mádhava, refused to be identified with divinity, and preferred to dwell on the lower plane, to which they were accustomed. In so far as Rámánuja and Mádhava did not explode the world as Samkara did, the reader should not commit the error of thinking that they were following anything other than the dictate of the human heart, which looks upon the world as real, for though it may be the abode of griefs and miseries, which overpower the individual, it is still the place where are to be found the joys to which the individual would like to cling. The age was unprepared to receive the profound truths which the Upanishads contained.

THE BLISS OF BRAHMAN

One more aspect of the Self or Brahman remains to be considered. Those who belong to the school of Samkara are never tired of saying that the Self or Brahman is unattached, that he does not suffer, because he is unfettered, that he has no feelings, because feelings belong to a lower order of existence. From the Self or Brahman, who is immaculate and devoid of feelings, the last vestige of emotions should be chased away. It has to be seen, how far this contention of Samkara is borne out by the Upanishads.

First of all the probable nature of the feelings of Brahman, if he has any, has to be considered. It has been stated that he is knowledge itself, that all knowledge proceeds from him, and that the knowledge of Brahman is the only true knowledge. Ignorance, or want of knowledge, is the primary cause of all miseries. On account of ignorance, man is unable to find out what should make him happy, and he is therefore unable to direct his desire to the

right path. Most of his desires are left unfulfilled, either because they cannot be fulfilled, or he does not know how to satisfy them. All human misery is due to unfulfilled desires. In the case of Brahman, ignorance or want of knowledge being out of the question, what can be his feelings, if he has any ? No desire can go astray, none can remain unfulfilled in the case of a Being who is all knowledge. The feelings of such a Being will be one of continuous bliss, due to the fulfilment of every desire. In the case of such a Being, the question of suffering cannot arise, neither the question of attachment, in the sense that we understand it. It is absurd to contend that Brahman is devoid of feelings, because we do not find in him the feelings we are accustomed to find in man. The state of feelings that exists in the stage of duality, the attachment which alone is possible in that stage, should not be dragged into the stage of oneness. The only feeling that is possible in that state, is a feeling of unqualified bliss, perpetual and infinite in its character. Accordingly, we find the sage Sanatkumar telling Nárada, in the Chhándogya Upanishad, that the infinite is bliss, and there is no bliss in anything finite.¹ In the second valli of the Taittiriya Upanishad, we find a detailed description of the nature of bliss, which follows a knowledge of Brahman, and the computation of that bliss, by which one moment of the bliss of Brahman is found to be equal to a hundred moments of the bliss of Prajápati, and that he who knows the bliss of Brahman need not be afraid of anything. In the Kaushitaki Upanishad, Indra tells the sage Pratardana, after identifying Prána with A'tman, how it is full of bliss.² The Self or Brahman is full of bliss or overflowing

¹ *Chhand.*, VII, 23.

² *Kaushi.*, III, 8.



with bliss, because bliss is the inseparable companion of knowledge.

THE DESCRIPTION OF BRAHMAN IS OF A
POSITIVE CHARACTER

Since it is impossible to deny that Brahman is being, thought, and bliss (*sachchidānanda*), it is sought to be maintained that these descriptions of Brahman are merely of a negative character and that the unknowableness of Brahman still holds good. "We have seen how the descriptions of Brahman as being, thought and bliss (*sac'-c'id-ānanda*) which are common in the later Vedānta, are founded on the ancient Upanishads.*** But no definite conclusion is by this means reached on those lines as to the nature of Brahman. For the being, which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience, but is rather, as we saw, in an empirical sense a not-being. The descriptions of Brahman as the knowing subject within us are usually accompanied by the assertion that this knowing subject, 'the knower of knowing' remains himself unknowable, the intention being merely to deny thereby of Brahman all objective existence. The bliss also, which is described as the essence of Brahman, is not such a bliss as we know or experience, but is only such as holds sway in deep dreamless sleep, when the distinction between subject and object and therefore consciousness has ceased. Accordingly all these definitions of Brahman as being, thought or bliss, are in essence only negative. * * * Therefore as the final result and main dogma of the Upanishad teaching the conclusion is reached, as far as his peculiar and essential being is concerned, Brahman is absolutely unknowable.'"¹

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, pp. 146-47.

For a class of thinkers who maintain the view that reality or noumena is unknowable, whether it be the external world or the ultimate being, the above view may be taken to be an admission of the knowableness of Brahman, so far as it can be elicited from them. The words, 'being,' 'thought' and 'bliss,' which have been used, are words the meaning of which can scarcely be misunderstood, and since no one thinks of asserting that Brahman in his perfect state of being, thought and bliss, can be fully apprehended, and since a human being must make use of such words only with which he is familiar, it is astonishing that words which have *positive* meaning should be considered to carry only a *negative* idea, when applied to Brahman. The authors of the Upanishads have frankly said that speech fails when *all* that is denoted by Brahman is sought to be given expression to. When the infinite is tried to be grasped by a finite mind that kind of feeling is inevitable, but it can never be said for that reason that no idea of the infinite is thereby formed, *for the infinite is not the negation of the finite, but is the endless continuation of the finite.* By attributing to Brahman those characteristics about which we have distinct ideas, the possibility of not understanding Brahman altogether has been shut out. That the Brahman is at the least what the finite mind conceives it to be, there cannot be any doubt, though what it is in all its fullness and grandeur, remains unknown to us in our present state of knowledge. By acknowledging this lack of knowledge the absence of what knowledge we have is not denied. There are many things in the universe we do not know, there are points of view regarding the world which we cannot take, because we still do not know the universe in all its details, but to say that we have absolutely no knowledge of the universe is not true. So it is not true that Brahman is absolutely unknowable.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads may be summed up as follows : the Self in man is Brahman; nothing but Brahman exists, because everything exists in Brahman, and Brahman is therefore the one ultimate reality ; the world is real ; it cannot be unreal, because it emanated from Brahman, the True of the true ; that the object of the Upanishads is to impart the right knowledge, by means of which A'tman would be found identical with Brahman ; lastly, Brahman is full of bliss, feelings not being contraband for Brahman. The reader will now be able to find for himself that *there is not the slightest resemblance between Buddhism and the doctrines of the A'tman philosophy.*

CHAPTER VI

THE DOCTRINE OF MA'YA'

THE ORIENTALISTS' PLEA FOR SAMKARA

The most vexed question, in connection with the philosophy of the Upanishads, is the theory of Máya, which has been as stoutly supported as it has been opposed by commentators. The subject, as the reader will find, could have been easily dealt with, were it not for the fact that writers have approached it with more or less pre-conceived ideas. The fact that in India itself there is a very large volume of opinion, which does not accept the theory of Máya, is often neglected by the Orientalists, and this has not a little added to the existing confusion. The importance of the subject requires a separate and detailed treatment. I hold the view that with the refutation or acceptance of this theory, one would find his estimate of the Upanishad philosophy either considerably enhanced or lowered.

The acceptance or rejection of the theory of Máya will certainly rest upon a consideration of the texts of the Upanishads, and it is therefore surprising to find Orientalists holding a contrary view. "In themselves, and apart from traditionary interpretation, the Sutras or aphorisms are a minimum of *memoria technica*, and nearly unintelligible. * * * Let it be noted that Sankarácharya is the greatest of the prescriptive expositors of the Sutras and the Vedánta. The Indian systems were handed down in a regular line of succession, an unbroken series of exponents. They are to be learned from an authorised expositor, a recognised successor of the primitive teachers. Sankarácharya is in possession, with his doctrine of illusion. The burden of proof lies with those who assert that the tenet of Máya is an

innovation on the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads." ¹ One can admire the legal sagacity which pervades the view that possession is nine points of the law, often employed in the sphere of politics in modern times, but it sadly lacks in philosophical insight, necessary for understanding a system of philosophy which has evoked more admiration than any other system of thought existing in the world. Stripped verbiage, it means that he who has made the loudest noise by his sensational mode of interpretation, should be looked upon as an authoritative expositor of the Sutras, by which is meant the Sutras of Vyása. According to this view, the ultimate truth regarding the matter is to be gathered from the Brahma-sutras, which is "nearly unintelligible," read in the light of Samkara's interpretation, and not from the texts of the Upanishads. Since Samkara holds the view that the Sutras of the Vedánta are a string on which the gems of the Vedánta are strung, and the Vedánta is a systematic exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads, the texts of the Upanishads stand relieved of their importance and the Sutras of Vyása and the gloss of the commentators flourish in their place! ¹ The 'primitive' texts that had brought into existence a whole host of interpreters drop out of the scene, leaving the interpreters in undisputed possession of the field! Never would one come across a more laboured *apologia* for a commentator whom a writer has chosen to follow. And what is the object of bestowing overwhelming praises on a commentator who has made himself conspicuous by preaching the theory of Máyá? It is to proclaim loudly that the new theosophy is no more spiritual than the old observance of the prescriptive *sacra*, that is to say, the philosophy of the Upanishads is as devoid of worth as are the Vedic rites which preceded it. "They

¹ Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, London, 1903, pp. 239-40.

are the work of a rude age, a deteriorated race, and a barbarous and unprogressive community." ¹

THEORY OF MA'YA' AND THE SCHOOL OF KANT

The above-quoted writer, with great shrewdness, found out that by laying stress upon the theory of Máya, and by establishing it to be the essence of the philosophy of the Upanishads, it could be easily demonstrated that the Indian thinkers were only a set of dreamers, blind to the actualities of existence, and devoid of appreciation for what is good and true in life. This is not the case with another class of Orientalists, whose appreciation of the philosophy of the Upanishads is genuine, but who have at the same time a purpose of their own to serve. They belong to the school of Kant and hold the view that the world of experience is only phenomena, it being not possible for man to have any idea of noumena, though Schopenhauer improved upon the philosophy of Kant, and found in the will the thing-in-itself. "When Kant in his enquiry into the capability of the human intellect drew the conclusion that the entire universe, as we know it, is only appearance, he said nothing absolutely new, but only in more intelligible demonstrated form uttered a truth which in less intelligible shape had been in existence long before him, which indeed as intuitive half-unconscious knowledge had from the very beginning formed the basis of all philosophy. For if the objects of the universe were not, as Kant asserted, mere phenomena, but exactly as they appear to our consciousness in space and time had a real existence apart from that consciousness and in themselves, then an empirical discussion and enquiry into nature would lead to final and sufficient conclusions respecting the essence of things. * * * This is the case in

¹ Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, London, 1903, p. 268.

Greek philosophy, when Parmenides asserts the empirical reality to be mere show, or Plato to be mere shadows of the true reality ; and in Indian philosophy, when the Upanishads teach that the universe is not the *átman*, the proper "self" of things, but a mere *máyá*, a deception, an illusion, and that the empirical knowledge of it yields no *vidyá*, no true knowledge, but remains entangled in *avidyá* or ignorance." ¹

The reader will now find the chief reason why the latter class of Orientalists, headed by Schopenhauer, have such high admiration for the Upanishad philosophy, when read in the light of Samkara's theory of *Máyá*. In doing so they find one more evidence in support of the cardinal thought of their school, that the world of experience is merely phenomena. They welcome the doctrine of *Máyá* whole-heartedly and emphatically observe, "that the older the texts of the Upanishads are, the more uncompromisingly and expressly do they maintain this illusory character of the world of experience." ² They do not take delight in twisting the texts, more than is necessary for this purpose, nor do they make use of language which is characteristic of the class of writers to which Gough belongs. In the choicest of languages, they give expression to their unbounded appreciation of the value of the Upanishad philosophy, in other respects. "If we strip this thought of the various forms, figurative to the highest degree and not seldom extravagant, under which it appears in the Vedánta texts, and fix our attention upon it solely in its philosophical simplicity as the identity of God and the Soul, the Brahman and the *átman*, it will be found to possess a significance reaching far beyond the Upanishads, their time and country ; nay we claim for

¹ Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, pp. 226-28.

² *Ibid*, p. 229.

it an inestimable value for the whole race of mankind. We are unable to look into the future, we do not know what revelations and discoveries are in store for the restlessly enquiring human spirit ; but one thing we may assert with confidence,—whatever new and unwonted paths the philosophy of the future may strike out, the principle will remain permanently unshaken, and from it no deviation can possibly take place. If ever a general solution is reached of the great riddle, which presents itself to the philosopher in the nature of things all the more clearly the further our knowledge extends, the key can only be found where alone the secret of nature lies open to us from within, that is to say, in our innermost self. It was here that for the first time the original thinkers of the Upanishads, to their immortal honour, found it when they recognised our átman, our inmost individual being, as the Brahman, the inmost being of universal nature and of all her phenomena.”¹

For clarity of thinking, breadth of vision, and depth of philosophical insight, the view above expressed, so far as it relates not only to the philosophy of the Upanishads, but also philosophy in general, stands unrivalled. The first great element of truth it contains, an exposition of which one would in vain try to find in the writings of the Orientalists in general, is that the greatest achievement of the Upanishad philosophy for all time is the identity of man and God, which it, for the first time, boldly proclaimed. Most of the writers, who espouse some faith or other, find it very difficult, for practical reasons, to lay stress upon and appreciate this aspect of the great Upanishad truth. The second great element of truth, which applies to philosophy in general, and which I have already stressed in another form at the end of the first chapter, is that we do not know

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, pp. 39-40.

what revelations and discoveries are in store for us in the future, and therefore every philosopher should not dogmatically assert but speak with restraint, when giving out his views regarding the ultimate nature of reality. For religious persons, who espouse fixed tenets and dogmas, it might be very difficult to subscribe to the truth this view contains, but in the case of seekers of truth, who are entirely guided by facts, this should be the starting point of philosophy. Philosophy to be worth its name should be a living philosophy and go hand in hand with science. If it does not, philosophy becomes a mockery. A religion may be a mockery and still hold out its pretensions, so anomalous has its position become, ever since it ceased to be linked with philosophy, but the mockery of a philosophy which has lost its touch with the advancing truths of science is the most grotesque of all spectacles.

MA'YA' MILITATES AGAINST THE TRUTH OF THE UPANISHAD PHILOSOPHY

But what I am afraid of is the collateral effect which the above enthusiastic appreciation of the Upanishad philosophy will produce on the minds of the readers in general, and the Indian reader in particular. Carried away by enthusiasm, which the view awakens in the mind of the reader, he may be tempted to subscribe to it in its entirety, that is to say, accept at the same time what it asserts regarding the unknowability of reality and Brahman, influenced by the belief that the acceptance of the falsity of the world of experience, which the doctrine of Mâyâ advocates, is after all not so disturbing, as it may seem to be. But it can at once be shewn that the connection between the doctrine of the unreality of experience, and the truth that A'tman is equivalent to Brahman, is so intimate, that the truth of the former implies the falsity of the latter, and that, as a

necessary consequence, both cannot at the same time be true. If the world of experience is false, the Self becomes illusive, and the ideas relating to it also become of an illusory character. Lest there be misconception about the nature of the Self and the ultimate conclusions that are drawn, the Self is identified with the highest reality, that is to say, Brahman. The authors of the Upanishad philosophy, after establishing the great truth that A'tman is Brahman, felt themselves perfectly satisfied that they had disproved for ever the idea that the world could be false, though the current views regarding it stood in need of readjustment. But if it be once granted that the world of experience is false, because man cannot know noumena or reality, the assertion of the highest truth, that the Self is identical with Brahman, receives a very rude shaking. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of the doctrine that the world is false is but one step removed from the declaration of the falsity of the conception of ultimate reality, which the Upanishads proclaim. The philosophers of the Upanishads were so very conscious of this position that lest there may be any mistake, they attributed to the world of experience the highest reality, the reality of Brahman. When they identified everything that exists, or may possibly exist, whether it is full of life or inert, with Brahman, they wanted to establish beyond a shadow of doubt that whatever exists is real, though in the light of the Upanishad truths, a revaluation of things became necessary. The inability to apprehend reality, so far as our ordinary experience is concerned, establishes at the same time our inability to grasp the truth regarding ultimate reality, and therefore, the declaration of the great truth that A'tman is equal to Brahman, is placed upon a very insecure basis. The acceptance of the doctrine of Máya, in fact, destroys the reality of the great Upanishad doctrine.

THE ORDER OF INVESTIGATION

Both the classes of writers have, in order to find support for their preconceived ideas, relied implicitly upon the glosses of Samkara. The authority of Samkara has been exploited, but never for a while reference is made to Rámánuja, who is no less an authority than Samkara as an interpreter of the Sutrás of Vyása. For the purpose of ascertaining the truth regarding the theory of Máýá, chronologically, one has to approach first the Rig-veda, and find out if there is any indication of it there, then he has to go through the texts of the Upanishads, next through the Brahma Sutras, and afterwards he has to examine the manner in which Gaudapáda, who is sometimes stated to be the teacher of Samkara, but is more often recognised as the teacher of Govinda, who was the teacher of Samkara, has dealt with the subject, and last of all, the remarks of Samkara on the subject have to be considered by him. We will accordingly follow this order and try to ascertain first what is found in the texts relating to the subject and consider afterwards how far the glosses or interpretations of Gaudapáda and Samkara can be justified.

VEDIC HYMNS : HYMN OF DIRGHATAMAS

It is said that the hymn in the Rig-veda, authorship of which is ascribed to Dirghatamas, i.e., Long Darkness, contains the germ of the doctrine of Máýá. In Rig-veda, I, 164,46, it is said that the poets give many names to that which is only one (*Ekam sad vipráh vahudhá vadanti*), they call it Agni, Yama, Mátarisvan. It is said that thereby it is implied "that plurality depends solely upon words (a mere matter of words, as it is said later), and that unity alone is real." ¹ The same writer contends that when it is

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 229.

said that the One was only there, besides which there was no other;¹ that there was the One, inserted into the everlasting nave, in which all living beings are fixed;² that the entire universe is the *purusha* alone, both that which was and that which endures for the future;³—in every one of these hymns, what afterwards became the doctrine of Máya was clearly implied. I will ask the reader, to whom undoubtedly a fair share of common sense may be conceded, to forget for the time being the existence of the Upanishads, the existence of such persons as Gaudapáda, Samkara and Rámánuja, and also the commentaries they wrote, for admittedly they came into existence long after these hymns were composed. Could these simple hymns, the meaning of which can never be mistaken, have kept concealed underneath them the doctrine of Máya? What does the first hymn say? God is one, though he may be worshipped as Agni or Yama or Mátarisvan. One after another, all the elements had been deified and were looked upon as controlling the destinies of the world and man. Then came a time when the idea dawned upon the thinkers that God was really one, and that the elements which were being worshipped as gods were not really gods, because they derived all their powers from the same Being, who must be treated as the real God. These elements, as manifestations of the supreme power, were all real, and still remain real, but the ignorance of men had led them to think that they were distinct powers. The supreme power, and the elements into which it is split up, were, and still are, real, only their relations stand adjusted in the light of new knowledge. One fails to understand where is the loophole, through which the doctrine of Máya can

¹ *Rig-veda*, X, 129, 2.

² *Ibid*, X, 82, 6.

³ *Ibid*, X, 90, 2.

be dragged in. The second hymn is still more simple : there is one God, who has no other rival. Whenever the idea of one Godhead has arisen in the minds of thinkers, such a statement has invariably followed. We know that the great prophet Mohammed, founder of the Mahomedan religion, proclaimed that there was one God and that he had no rival, and forbade his followers to worship any one other than Alláh, who was one. Some enterprising writer may say that in the sacred book, Korán, where this is stated, is to be found a facsimile copy of the doctrine of Máyá lying hidden ! Take now the last two hymns, where unity in the midst of diversity is sought to be found out. Is there a philosopher of any note, from the most remote times up till now, who has not tried to express this idea of unity, in the midst of diversity, with which the world is full ? Most philosophers have tried to comprehend the entire creation as a unity, in their own way. Will they be charged with having up their sleeves the doctrine of Máyá for that reason, or should not such utterances be construed in a natural manner, as an attempt to arrange the manifold of creation in a systematic manner, and to understand them as parts of one whole ? Only a man, who is writing in the nineteenth century and is surcharged with the doctrine of illusion or Máyá, and who is anxious to establish that the Indian thinkers in the remote past were thinking exactly like him, would read into these simple words of the hymns the far-fetched ideas of modern times. It is a sad specimen of advocacy and it is to be wondered that in a serious discussion of the present nature any distinguished writer should think of advancing such amazing arguments in support of his contention.

THE NA'SADIYA HYMN

Another writer, who is of opinion that in the Rig-veda the doctrine of Máyá can be traced, quotes Rig-veda, X,

129, the Násadiya hymn, as an instance. There the *rishi* says, it was not entity, nor was it non-entity,¹ and the writer holds the view that Sáyana's interpretation of the hymn conclusively shows that the principle of Máya is here referred to. Why the writer, a learned man himself, with abundance of common sense, did not himself interpret it, but should rely upon a commentator, who lived in the fourteenth century A.D.,² long after Samkara had travelled over the whole of India and made people familiar with his doctrine of Máya, is more than one can understand. The writer has given his independent views on so many matters and so often, one is surprised to find him yield all at once to Sáyana in the interpretation of this particular passage. The portion of the hymn (Rig-veda, X, 129, D) referred to runs thus :

1. There was then neither what is nor what is not, there was no sky, nor the heaven which is beyond. What covered ? Where was it, and in whose shelter ? Was the water the deep abyss (in which it lay) ?

2. There was no death, hence there was nothing immortal. There was no light (distinction) between night and day. That One breathed by itself without breath, other than it there has been nothing.

With regard to this hymn, Max Müller observes, "There are several passages in this hymn which, in spite of much labour spent on them by eminent scholars, remain as obscure now as they were to me in 1859. The poet himself is evidently not quite clear in his own mind, and he is

¹ Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, London, 1903, p. 240.

² According to Burnell, Mádhava and Sáyana are only different names of the same person, a Telugu Brahmin, who in A.D. 1331 became head of the monastery at Cṛngerī, died while holding that position in 1380, and wrote all the commentaries himself.—Kaegi, *The Rig-veda*, p. 106.

constantly oscillating between a personal and impersonal or rather superpersonal cause from which the universe emanated."¹ We do not find any lurking suspicion in the mind of Max Müller that such a principle as *Máyá* was in contemplation in this hymn. Gough remarks, "Sáyana tells us that the *Násadiyasukta* describes the state of things between two æons, the state technically known as *pralayāvasthá*. An earlier world has been withdrawn into the world-fiction *Máyá*, out of which it sprang, and the later world is not yet proceeding into being. In this state of dissolution, says Sáyana, the world-fiction is not a non-entity ; it is not a piece of nonsense, a purely chimerical thing, like the horns of a hare, for the world cannot emanate out of any such sheer absurdity. On the other hand, it is not an entity, it is not a reality like the one and only Self.* * * Real existence is denied not of the impersonal self, but of *Máyá*. Such is the traditional interpretation of the first verse of the *Násadiyasukta*. It is a natural interpretation, and if we, with our thoughts fashioned for us by purely irrelevant antecedents, try to find out another for ourselves, we are pretty sure to invent a fiction. The *Násadiyasukta* seems then to be the earliest announcement of the external co-existence of a spiritual principle of reality and an unspiritual principle of unreality."²

Sáyana's name is familiar to every one as a commentator of the Vedas. It is also well known that he adopts the naturalistic interpretation of the gods of the hymns and that he also interprets the hymns in the spirit of the later Brahminic religion.³ When Sáyana wrote his commentaries on the Vedas, the doctrine of *Máyá* had been existing as a full-fledged theory, and had been extensively applied

¹ Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, 1916, p. 49.

² Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, London, 1903, p. 241.

³ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, London, 1923, Vol. I, p. 68.

by a class of interpreters. The question now resolves into the simple fact, whether in trying to find out the meaning of a text we should proceed to gather it from what it obviously means, in the light of its environment—by which is meant the chain of ideas which surrounds the idea, the meaning of which we are trying to grasp—or should we project into our interpretation the ideas which developed long afterwards and became the subject-matter of heated controversy? Like every other commentator, Sáyana represents a particular school of thought. It is an admitted fact that when the Násadiya hymn was composed, the theory started by Śamkara, which Sáyana applies, had not come into existence. Why should we take the help of the spokesman of a particular school in understanding a verse, when the meaning of it, in the light of the chain of ideas existing at the date when the hymn was composed, is obvious enough? Scattered amongst numerous passages, addressed to the devas or gods of nature, we find indications of the desire to find out the ultimate unity or essence of things. The infant Aryan mind had long remained immersed in the worship of elements of nature, but then came a time, when it was doubted if the right path had been trodden by worshipping them. Fast on the heels of such a doubt appeared the idea of 'Tad Ekam,' that is to say, there is one being only, out of which the manifold arose. After having established this great truth, the grown-up Aryan mind became impatient to find out what was at the beginning, before the One had split itself into the many. When the manifold or many had not commenced to run their course, what could be the form of the One? Then burst out from the eager enquiring mind the thought which is embodied in the Násadiya hymn. Existence as we know it was not to be found then, but the potentiality for everything that came into existence was there. The obvious meaning of the portion of the sentence,—“There was neither what

is nor what is not,"—is that at that time there did not exist what was afterwards found manifest in the shape of this universe, but it should not be thought, for that reason, that there was nothing or total absence of everything, for the One contained, in that stage, within itself, everything in a highly potential form. This is made quite clear by what follows. There was then no sky, no heaven, no death, no immortality, no day and night, but the One breathed by itself without breath. The third verse makes it still more clear, where it is said that there was darkness in the beginning, and that there was also the 'germ' of all that came into existence afterwards. The fourth verse entirely throws overboard Sáyana and his admirers, where it is said that love overcame the One in the beginning, which, if it means anything, means that the universe proceeded out of love. Where is the opportune gap through which the doctrine of Máya may find entrance? Gough has extracted an isolated expression from a portion of a verse, out of several verses of which a hymn is composed, and has brought it forward as evidence of the existence of the theory of Máya, with the help of Sáyana's interpretation. Even Deussen, one of the chief modern exponents of the doctrine of unreality, did not find the doctrine of Máya lying hidden in the first verse of this hymn, though he used a portion of the second verse, that there was One besides which there was no other, in support of his contention, and we have already explained it to mean that the ultimate reality is one, without a rival.

BRIHADA'RAYAKA UPANISHAD : THE MYTH OF MA'YA'

It will thus be seen that there is no suggestion in the Vedic hymns regarding the existence of a power called Máya, which is entirely a creation of a much later period. We will now proceed to examine the Upanishads in order to

find out what indications, if any, they contain of the doctrine of Máya. It has been pointed out that "the famous passage in the Brihadáranyaka, in which a devotee is praying to God to carry him from Not-being to Being, from Darkness to Light, from Death to Immortality, merely voices the sentiment of the spiritual aspirant who wishes to rid himself of the power of Evil over him," and the trace of the doctrine of Máya is here to be distinctly found, for, "unreality is here compared to Not-being, to Darkness or to Death."¹ In order that the reader may be able to follow whether the passages referred to are capable of bearing the interpretation sought to be put upon them, the context in which they appear should be quoted. In the twenty-seventh verse of the third Bráhmāna of the first chapter of the Brihadáranyaka Upanishad, the devotee is found to be praying in the following manner: "Lead me from the unreal to the real! Lead me from darkness to light! Lead me from death to immortality." The devotee then proceeds to give reason for the expression of his desire expressed above: "Lead me from the unreal to the real, the unreal is verily death, the real immortality. He therefore says 'Lead me from death to immortality, make me immortal.' When the devotee says, 'Lead me from death to immortality,' there is nothing there, as it were, hidden."

If the above prayer of the devotee were severed from its context, and inserted in a Christian prayer book, or put into the mouth of a devout Christian, no one would think that the prayer is unbecoming on the part of a Christian. On the other hand, it will be remarked that the prayer is most befitting, since he prays to God to take him from darkness to light, to take him away from the unrealities or empty show, by which he is surrounded in this world, to

¹ Ranade, *Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, pp. 225-26.

the region of reality, where God dwells. Every one is familiar with this kind of prayer, and it would be extremely surprising if any one were told that by so praying the Christian was asking to be released from the grip of Máya, of whom the Hindus are so much afraid. Why should unreality, darkness and death refer exclusively to Máya and to nothing else? Every moment of his life a man finds he is miscalculating, misjudging, taking things to be real which are not real, pinning his faith to ideas which afterwards are found to be unreal or false, that he is unable to distinguish the real from unreal, and, therefore, pants for more light or guidance. Similarly the devotee in the Upanishads would naturally pray to be taken through the right path, because the path trodden before had been found by him to be false. The wrong path, the unreal path, the false path, is likened to death, whereas the right path has been likened to immortality.

‘AS IF THERE WAS A DUALITY’

It has been stated by the same writer, and also by Deussen,¹ that the famous passage in the Brihadáranyaka Upanishad, “as if there was a duality,” implies that there is no duality, and this semblance, an as-it-were, an appearance, is to be identified with Máya. The passage occurs in the concluding portion of the dialogue between Yájñavalkya and his wife, Maitreyi, and has been already quoted. “For where there is as it were duality, there one sees the other, one smells the other, etc.” The ‘so-called’ stage of duality is considered by the writers to be the work of Máya. What is the significance of “as it were” in the context? That there are two stages, the stage of oneness and the stage of duality, Yájñavalkya has plainly told his wife. In the

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 232.

stage of duality, Yājñavalkya has said that there is a distinction between the knower and the person known, but in the stage of oneness, the distinction vanishes, and the knower and the known are found to be one and the same person. The stage of duality, therefore, is not the ultimate stage, but the stage of oneness is. This stage of duality is considered, as it were, that is to say mistakenly, the ultimate form of reality, but it is not. By using the expression, 'as it were,' before 'duality,' Yājñavalkya was impressing upon his wife that the ultimate reality was not dual, that the stage of duality was a passing stage, the stage of ultimate reality being the stage of oneness. Yājñavalkya had made perfectly clear to Maitreyi that wife, husband, and sons were dear because of the Self. The stage of duality certainly exists, but it should be rightly appraised, and should not be taken as the permanent or ultimate stage. If the stage of duality were permanent, as according to Mādhava it is, or, as according to Rāmānuja it to a certain extent is, Yājñavalkya, the great philosopher that he was, would not have added the expression 'as it were' to duality. There is no reason whatsoever why the obviously clear sense in which the expression 'as it were' is used should be taken to indirectly mean the work of Māyā, which does not follow from the context. Many things exist that are not permanent, but they should not, on that account, be called illusory which is, however, the sense in which Māyā is used. The stage of duality, according to Yājñavalkya, is a passing stage, and by 'as it were' he intended to convey the sense of impermanence and not illusion. If wherever such expressions as, 'as it were,' 'as if,' are found, they are to be construed as indicating the presence of Māyā, it would be simply impossible to use them in any other sense. The apparition of Māyā was not haunting Yājñavalkya, he was only engaged in making a distinction between what is permanent and what is impermanent.

Deussen quotes from the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad several other passages which, according to him, consistently support the doctrine of Máya and the phenomenal character of the universe. All these passages are connected with the name of Yájñavalkya, the famous philosopher. "In the átman as the knowing subject space with all its contents is interwoven (Brih., 3.8.11 ; 4.4.17) ; all the heavenly regions are its organs (Brih., 4.2.4) ; the universe of names, forms and works, ' although it is threefold is one, that is the átman' ; he is the immortal, which is concealed by the empirical reality (Brih., 1.6.3) ; he is the reality of reality ; from him spring forth the fire, all the vital spirits, all worlds, all gods, all living creatures (Brih., 2.1.20) ; in him there are fixed, like spokes in the nave of a wheel (Brih., 2.5.15) ; he oversteps in sleep this universe and the forms of death (Brih., 4.3.7) ; 'as it were' he plans and moves (Brih., 4.3.7) ; only ' as it were ' doth another exist (Brih., 4.3.31) ; he stands as spectator alone without a second (Brih., 4.3.32) ; there is no plurality (Brih., 4.4.19).''¹

IN A'TMAN SPACE WITH ALL ITS CONTENTS IS INTERWOVEN

The greatest mistake that can be committed by one who is anxious to find out texts in support of a theory he advocates, is to work back from the present to the remote past, and to seek to connect the latter with the former, when the right procedure, for understanding old minds and texts, should be to leave the present severely alone, and work down from the past, and, with scrupulous exactitude, try to see if it can be connected with the present. When we find, in the forefront of the oldest Upanishad, distinctly stated that

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, pp. 231-32.

the One or Brahman alone existed, out of which everything else which go to compose the universe came out,¹ what would the passage quoted by Deussen, in support of the doctrine of Máya, "in the átman as the knowing subject space with all its contents is interwoven," mean? It plainly means that in átman, which is full of consciousness and knowledge, space, with everything in it, remain as its parts; in other words, space, with all its contents, is the outcome of the One or Brahman, that being the inevitable conclusion which follows from the fundamental idea that out of the One the manifold sprang up. If, then, it is said that "all the heavenly regions are its organs" what would be the natural meaning? Can it mean anything but that the regions of heaven are its limbs? If a thing is divided into parts, and separate names are given to the parts to distinguish them from one another, can it be said that those parts are phenomenal? If this be the kind of interpretation which a writer would put upon words and phrases, his conclusions cannot but be absurd. Or suppose, out of one material, clay, numerous things are manufactured, and thus distinct articles of clay come into existence, can it be said that all these articles of clay are illusory or non-existent? Let us take another example. Electron is the name given to the fundamental element in the creation, according to the current scientific view. This electron exists as the fundamental element in everything in the universe, that is to say, everything in the universe can be finally reduced to particles of this element, electron. Does it follow from this that the water, the air, the fire, the ether, the different kinds of life, and all other things that are to be found in this universe have no existence? On the other hand, should it not be said that each and every one of them has the same reality, the reality which dwells in the electron? If that were

¹ *Brih.*, 1,2.

not the case, the ultimate will have to be conceived as an isolated, abstract, shrunken and shrivelled entity, devoid of any power to manifest itself into myriads of beings and things, which it certainly is capable of doing. If some of the thinkers of the present day have taken a fancy to the idea that the parts or articles made out of a thing must be looked upon as unreality, what right have they to ascribe to the oldest thinkers the same fantastic way of looking at things ?

UNIVERSE OF NAMES, FORMS AND WORKS

The same idea is innocently repeated when it is said that the universe of names, forms and works, although it is threefold is one, that is the *âtman*. Different things may have different forms and names, but they may have in them the same underlying essence. When the philosopher proceeds to say, he is the immortal, which is concealed by the (empirical) reality, he is the reality of reality, should it not be taken to mean that the ultimate is indestructible, while the other things have only a limited span of existence ? One thing may live for a day, another for a year, another for a century, and another for ever. If things, given only a limited span of life, proceed from the One, which endures for ever, should it be said that they are unreal ? If a man blows a conch-shell, or strikes a drum, or plays on a lute, and sounds come from them, because the sounds are not everlasting, should they be called unreal or illusory ? If the person after playing on the lute for a while, decides not to play on it any more, or the person who was beating the drum, falls into a different humour and makes up his mind not to touch the drum ever afterwards, or the blower of the conch-shell becomes furious because the conch-shell would not give the exact modulation he wants, and throws it on the ground and breaks it into pieces, should it be said that

the sounds, since they are not repeated, must be looked upon as illusory ? A reality may be of short duration or it may be permanent, but because it has a short duration it cannot be said to be unreal.

The same idea is found in the expressions "from him sprang forth, as sparks from the fire, all the vital spirits, all gods, all living creatures ;" "in him they are all fixed, like spokes in the nave of a wheel." All the manifold are being traced to the One, from which they come. "He oversteps in sleep this universe, and the forms of death," when referred to an individual, means that a person, in a particular condition, is able to transcend the present and is able to have a vision of the future, or the infinite, or that which is the ultimate essence of everything. This may not be believed, which is a different thing altogether, but it is a matter of common experience that certain persons can foresee events, or the turn that events may take, which cannot be perceived by ordinary persons. Because a person can transcend the present, the present does not become phenomenal or devoid of substance.

AS IF THINKING, AS IF MOVING

The expression, "as it were" he plans and moves, occurs in Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, in course of the dialogue between Janaka Vaideha and Yājñavalkya, and cannot be properly understood separated from the context. The king asks the philosopher, when the sun has set, and the fire has gone out, what is then the light of man ? Yājñavalkya replies that sound is his light, for having sound alone for his light, man sits, moves about, does his work and returns. The king next asks, when that sound is hushed, what is the light of man ? Yājñavalkya replies that the Self indeed is his light ; for having the Self alone as his light, man sits, moves about, does his work

and returns. The king then asks, who is the Self? In reply Yájñavalkya says that He, who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pránas (senses), the person of light, consisting of knowledge, remaining the same, wanders along the two worlds, *as if thinking, as if moving*.

Yájñavalkya, by his last reply to the king means that when even the sound fails to act as the guide of man, the Self within becomes his guide, by which he means the inmost Self, which is common to all individuals, as distinguished from the individual selves. That inmost Self is the person of light, and is all knowledge, and he it is who supplies the light and knowledge to the individual. Being all light and knowledge he does not lack in anything, but since he has entered into the individual body, he, for the time being, partakes of the nature of the individual and *appears to be* wandering along the worlds, *appears to be* thinking and moving. One fails to understand why this plain idea should be suspected of keeping within it concealed the idea of Máýá. The stage of duality is certainly different from the stage of oneness or Brahman. It is by gaining knowledge that this identity of the individual and Brahman is established. So long as this identity has not been realised by the individual self, the inmost Self, which is inseparable from the individual, being, as it is, the very essence of the individual, is taken, along with the individual self, to be journeying to and fro, to be thinking and moving. Strictly speaking, he cannot be said to be moving, or journeying from one place to another, since all space dwells in him ; neither can he be said to be thinking or making an effort to know anything, because out of him springs all knowledge. But in the stage of duality, he appears to be moving and thinking, and that is why Yájñavalkya says that he is, *as if moving, as if thinking*. This does not derogate from the real character of the Self, for the stage of duality is the Self's own creation. He is himself passing through a process

of his own making. Out of the fulness of his desire, he has willed it to be so, that is to say, He, the Infinite, has willed to express himself through finite individuals, and behaves for the moment like finite persons, though his ultimate nature remains undisturbed. That nothing more than this is meant will be quite apparent from what Yājñavalkya says immediately afterwards. On being born that person, assuming his body, becomes united with all evils; when he departs and dies, he leaves all evils behind. By 'evil' here, limitation is to be understood. So long as he chooses to remain encased in a human body, he partakes of the natural limitations of the human body, but when the stage of individuality, that is to say, the stage of duality passes off, he is himself once again. The individual, here on earth, has a foretaste of the stage of oneness, when he falls asleep.¹ In that state of sleep, the individual becomes self-illuminated. He then finds out that there are no blessings, no happiness, no joys, but he himself sends forth blessings, happiness and joys: there are no tanks there, no lakes, no rivers, but he himself sends forth tanks, lakes and rivers. He is indeed the maker. In other words, when the stage of duality passes off, and the stage of oneness prevails, he finds himself to be the maker of everything, since everything springs out of him. It is only a case of distinction of one stage from another, not that of reality from unreality. The Upanishad philosophy can never be properly understood if the reader fails to distinguish between the two stages, the stages of duality and oneness, which the philosophers always keep in view when making their observations.

HE STANDS AS SPECTATOR ALONE, WITHOUT A SECOND

The first sentence of Brih., 4,3,32 has been translated by Deussen in the following manner: he stands as spectator

¹ Brih., 4,3,10.

alone and without a second. Max Müller translates it as 'An ocean is that one seer, without any duality.'¹ Taking the passage as translated by Deussen, along with the other passages quoted by him, what does it really mean? We have more than once stated above what it can mean. In the stage of oneness, there is no differentiation, no plurality. Would Deussen like us to infer from this that the stage of duality is illusion? As a follower of Kant and Schopenhauer, he may please himself by drawing that inference, but to a student of the Upanishads, who finds everything existing in the stage of duality ascribed to Brahman, and therefore invested with the reality of Brahman, it means something different. The stage of duality is also real, though it is not permanent. The ultimate stage is the stage of oneness, the beginning and end of all things, and it has accordingly been called the 'reality of reality,' the intermediate stage being no less real, so long as it lasts. From the One we come down unmistakably, by easy stages, to the many, from the manifold we go back, with equal certainty, to the One. In the first of the two processes, neither Max Müller nor Deussen will find evolution, though it is repeatedly stated in several Upanishads that from the One everything came out in due course. The manner of evolution may not be scientific, but we need not mind the lack of scientific precision with which the idea may have been clothed in the Upanishads, our only concern is the idea of evolution itself. According to the view reiterated in the Upanishads, nothing is or can be unreal, because everything has its root in Brahman, the highest reality. The labours of the Upanishad thinkers have been directed not towards making the world unreal, but towards finding out what the Highest reality is. Unflinchingly they proceed, until they find the highest reality, the reality of reality.

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, p. 171.

Because they did not stop in their progress till they had reached the Highest reality, the superficial reader is apt to commit the serious blunder that everything they leave behind in their progress towards the Highest is devoid of reality.

ISOPANISHAD : THE TRUTH IS VEILED IN THIS UNIVERSE

After the manner of Deussen, the Indian writer, to whom reference has been already made, has got his collection of passages from the Upanishads which, according to him, very satisfactorily show that the conception that underlies Máya is already present there. We only refer to those passages which require any notice. "The Isopanishad tells us that truth is veiled in this universe by a vessel of gold, and it invokes the grace of God to lift up the golden vessel and allow the truth to be seen (Isá, 15). * * We have thus the conception of a veil which prevents truth from being seen at the first glance." ¹ The mention of a 'veil' or 'covering' has very much impressed the imagination of the writer. But do we not say, almost at every stage of thinking, that the truth about a matter has to be found out by a closer inspection, and not by a superficial observation of things ? There are ever so many dazzling things waiting to tempt a man, dazzling in their outward appearance, but bereft of real substance or truth. A man has to dive deep into a thing, and not rivet his attention to the outward cover, however glittering it may be. Truth does not often lie on the surface, it is to be found hidden underneath. Why should an ordinary caution of this kind be twisted to supply an indication of the conception of Máya ?

¹ Ranade, *Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, p. 225.

KATHOPANISHAD : BLIND MAN FOLLOWING THE BLIND,
IN SEARCH OF REALITY

The same writer quotes Kathopanishad for another piece of evidence, in support of his contention. "We have another image in the Kathopanishad of how people living in ignorance, and thinking themselves wise, move about wandering, like blind men following the blind, in search of reality. * * We have the conception of blindfoldness, and we are told that we deliberately shut our eyes to the truth before us (Katha, 1,2,4, 5)."¹ The reader recollects the story of Yama and Nachiketas, narrated in the Kathopanishad. There Yama praises Nachiketas for his earnest desire to know the highest truth without being led astray by pleasures. According to Yama, the desire to be influenced by pleasures leads to ignorance, while the desire to know the highest truth, the highest good, is the sign of wisdom. Before he commences to tell Nachiketas what the highest truth is, he observes that there are too many fools who dwelling in darkness, wise in their conceit and puffed with vain knowledge, go round and round, staggering to and fro, like blind men led by the blind. It is a matter of common experience that there exist many conceited fools who have not understood what the truth is, but still pretend to teach others, like blind men leading the blind. Is it necessary to squeeze an ordinary fact of experience like this to provide Samkara, a highly gifted and extraordinarily clever person, with a hint relating to the doctrine of Máya?

MUNDAKA UPANISHAD : THE KNOT OF IGNORANCE

"Ignorance is compared in the Mundakopanishad to a knot which a man has to untie before he gets possession of

¹ Ranade, *Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, p. 225.

the Self in the recess of his own heart (Mund., 2, 1, 10). The Chhándogya Upanishad tells us how knowledge is power, and ignorance impotence (Chhánd., 1, 1, 10).''¹ After the idea conveyed by the use of such words as 'veil' and 'cover,' we are told, the existence of ignorance, which is here alluded to, is to be taken to contain within it the germ of Máya. As if the stage of ignorance is not what every man, in his desire to acquire knowledge, is most anxious to get over! If the object of gaining knowledge is not to drive away one's ignorance, what else can it be? Every one is familiar with the saying that knowledge is power and an ignorant person is like a weak fool. It will be really wonderful, because a man has been directed to remove the prevailing misconceptions from his mind, in order to be able to form an idea of the Self, which lies within his heart, that the presence of Máya is thereby indicated. It is not an easy task to remove every vestige of misconception or ignorance, and the difficult nature of the task has been figuratively expressed by referring to a knot.

UNCERTAINTIES OF THIS WORLD : A COVER OF UNTRUTH HIDES THE ULTIMATE TRUTH

The passage in the Kathopanishad, which says that sages never find reality and certainty in the unrealities and uncertainties of this world (Katha, 2, 4, 2) and the passage in the Chhándogya Upanishad which says that a cover of untruth hides the ultimate truth from us (Chhánd., 8,3,1-3) are also relied upon by the same writer as indications of the notion of Máya. The quotation from the Katha Upanishad carries a very simple meaning. It says that children run after outward pleasures and fall into the snare of

¹ Ranade, *Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, pp. 225-26.

widespread death ; wise men only, knowing the nature of what is immortal, do not look for anything stable here among things unstable. That is to say, those who are ignorant like children, are easily captivated by the hollow pleasures of this world and thus fall into the net of death, which is widespread ; only those who are wise do not look for permanent happiness here but yearn for a better world and thus become immortal. It is a commonplace idea that the world in which we live is not the best of worlds, since it is full of disagreeable surprises. Because man is unable to cope with the innumerable surprises that are sprung upon him in this life, in the shape of disappointment, untimely death, and so forth, he is not enamoured of this earthly existence. Not a single person will be found in this world who is not unhappy because of calculations crossed and uncertainties dogging him at every step. Naturally a man loves to think of another place where all these uncertainties do not exist, and yearns for it, and this is given expression to in this passage. Whether such a world exists or not, and whether man will not be able, in course of time, to ameliorate his lot by adopting a different standpoint in relation to things and events of this world, are certainly different questions, but it cannot be said that Máya has been foreshadowed by taking a pessimistic view of existence on this earth. The passage in the Chhándogya Upanishad, where it is said that a cover of untruth hides the ultimate truth, is another commonplace sentiment, daily expressed by innumerable people, even in countries where they have not the remotest idea about such a relentless being like Máya pursuing the unfortunate denizens of this earth. A truth is very often found overspread with a layer or deposit of untruth, the work of ignorant persons, and the wise man has to remove the coating of untruth, in order to get at the underlying truth.

DIALOGUE BETWEEN SVETAKETU AND A'RUNI

“ Finally, in that celebrated conversation between Svetaketu and A'runi * * * we are told that everything besides the A'tman is merely a word, a mode and a name.”¹ A'runi says to his son Svetaketu that from one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay. We here utterly fail to see any reference to Máyá. The connection of the One with the manifold, which has sprung out of the One, is only sought to be explained. Though there is a difference in name or description, the essence of everything made of clay is clay. So the essence of all things, that have proceeded from the Self or Brahman, although they go by different names and description, is one and the same, that is to say, Brahman. There is absolutely no room here for the installing of a being like Máyá and making it display its power.

THE MATERIALS THAT EASILY LED SAMKARA

One very curious conclusion which this writer draws, after referring to the extracts from the Upanishads above quoted is, “ We do find in the Upanishads all the material that may have easily led Samkara to elaborate a theory of Máyá out of it.” I am bound to say that this is forming a very poor estimate of the abilities of the great Samkara. Whatever may be the views of Samkara, and however strongly we may consider it necessary to criticise them, it cannot for a moment be said that Samkara was a man of such intellect and parts as to be ‘ easily led ’ by stray passages or the face-value of things. He could very

¹ Ranade, *Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1928, p. 227.

easily dive deep into the meaning of phrases and expressions and bring to the surface whatever worth might be hidden in them. Such words as 'veil,' 'knot,' 'blindfoldness,' 'ignorance' and 'unreality' never could or did ensnare him and lead him to a direction where truth did not lie. Whatever views he expressed, he did so as the result of his conviction, brought about in a different manner. In giving expression to his views, he never allowed himself to be deterred by any word or phrase. He was past-master of dialectics, and knew how to sweep away all obstructions in the shape of words and phrases, by employing his art, of which he made good use, for gaining his point. In no time he would have torn to shreds, far more effectively than I have been able to do, the arguments advanced in favour of the doctrine of Mâyá, if for other reasons, which we would presently examine, he had not decided to make use of that doctrine.

DIRECT EVIDENCE REGARDING MA'YA': SVETA'SVATARA UPANISHAD

We will now consider those passages in the Upanishads, which contain direct reference to the word 'Mâyá.' The reader should remember that, up till now, we have not dealt with any passage where the word 'Mâyá' occurs. All the extracts quoted above have been considered by writers to lead indirectly to the doctrine of Mâyá. It is admitted by all that the use of the word 'Mâyá,' in the sense of illusion, "can be pointed out only comparatively late, not earlier, that is to say, than Svet., 4,10."¹ In a quotation from Rig-veda, VI, 47, 18, found in Brihadáranyaka Upanishad (2,5,19), the word 'Mâyá' occurs in connection with Indra, who appears in various

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 228.

forms through the power of Má'yá. The word there has not been used in the sense of illusion. But when we come to Svetásvatara Upanishad, we find for the first time the word ' Má'yá ' used, and the great Lord is described as Máyin. Prakriti is there called Má'yá and the great Lord, Máyin or maker, and the whole world is said to be filled with what are his members. We have pointed out that the Svetásvatara Upanishad is a comparatively new Upanishad; that in this Upanishad the Highest Being or Brahman is identified with Rudra or Siva, a mythological god, and, for that reason, it is looked upon as a sectarian Upanishad; that here also we find for the first time a lowered conception of Brahman, inasmuch as a personality, in the shape of a Lord or Ísvara, has been considered necessary to be introduced, who is made to play the rôle of a personal God towards the individuals, which is the last thing that the ancient authors of the Upanishad doctrines would think of doing. In this Upanishad also, we find prominent mention of the Sánkhyá philosophy, for which reason it is considered by many as an Upanishad of the Sánkhyá system of philosophy, which is dualistic, as opposed to the monistic philosophy of the Upanishads. At the same time, this Upanishad unequivocally upholds the monistic theory of the Upanishads. In fact, no Upanishad contains so many heterogeneous elements as Svetásvatara does, and no Upanishad affords such a prolific field to all kinds of thinkers to draw from, and we can, therefore, well understand why Samkara considered it expedient to write a special commentary on it. There cannot be any doubt that by the time Svetásvatara Upanishad was composed, the high strain that the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads had produced upon persons of average intellect had been distinctly felt. Those who could not ascend the highest top, which the doctrines pointed to, had obviously become anxious to make a compromise, but as a compromise of this kind is

impossible, for ideas in their nature irreconcilable cannot be harmonised, this Upanishad presents a curious mixture of irreconcilable elements. The monistic theory that had acquired great fame and prestige could not be altogether cast away, and therefore finds honourable mention. The desire for a personal God had again been awakened in the minds of the many, and he is brought back. The essentials of the Sāṅkhya philosophy find comfortable accommodation in this Upanishad. The Svetāsvatara Upanishad may be looked upon as heralding the epoch when the Upanishad literature, on account of its fame, began to be widely made use of for creating authority for schools of thought, that struggled to gain publicity and recognition. Even when the word 'Māyá' has been used in this Upanishad, it has not been used exclusively in the sense of illusion. "The creation is Māyá, in its original sense of work, then of phenomenal work, then of illusion. The creator is Māyin, in its original sense, of worker or maker, but again, in that character, phenomenal only."¹ The reader can well understand why the point of view is shifted from time to time, because this Upanishad does not contain all throughout the consistent expression of one distinct idea.

PRASNA UPANISHAD

The word 'Māyá' is also mentioned in the Prasna Upanishad, at the end of the first question, where it is said that to them belongs that pure Brahma-world, in whom there is nothing crooked, nothing false (anritam) and no guile (māyá). From the context it would be seen that the word 'Māyá' here refers to what is within the person himself and peculiar to him, and not to anything that exists outside of him. The guile, or ignorance, or illusion,

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, p. xxxvi.

or by whatever name it may be called, that the person has to leave behind, in order to qualify himself for the Brahma-world, is personal to the man, and not cosmic. So the word 'Má'yá' here is used in a different sense. That this word existed in the Aryan vocabulary and had different meanings, cannot for a moment be doubted, but the sense in which it has been used will have to be gathered from the context, and one should not jump to the conclusion that in every use of the word 'Má'yá,' the modern doctrine that goes by that name is indicated. The reader has to bear in mind that the Prasna Upanishad is not accepted by many as belonging to the group of earlier Upanishads.

It can, therefore, be unhesitatingly stated that only once in a comparatively new Upanishad, the Svetásvatara Upanishad, the word 'Má'yá,' has been introduced, and that also apparently in a different sense. Even Deussen, the most ardent supporter of the doctrine of Má'yá, and who is very anxious to establish that the main doctrines of the Upanishads are that the world is false and that Brahman is unknowable, is unwilling to rely upon the extract from the Svetásvatara Upanishad for support. He is aware of the fact that on account of the late introduction of the theory in such a comparatively new Upanishad as the Svetásvatara Upanishad, "the theory has been propounded that we ought to recognise in this doctrine a secondary speculation only developed in course of time from the theory of universe adopted in the Upanishads."¹ Accordingly, he proceeds to say, "we propose now to show that this is not the case * * * but that this peculiar and apparently far-fetched idea is seldom expressed in absolute simplicity, and usually appears under forms which are completely explained as an adoption of the *empirical

¹ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 228.

modes of knowledge which are natural to us all, and refuse to be shaken off." ¹ In order that he may not be accused of having relied upon a comparatively new Upanishad, he devotes his attention exclusively to the Brihadáranyaka, the oldest Upanishad, and to the philosophy therein expounded by the ablest of philosophers, namely, Yájñavalka. We have discussed above every passage from the Brihadáranyaka Upanishad he has relied upon, and we have found that the ideas that have been expressed there are quite in keeping with the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads, and do not indicate the existence or application of the theory of illusion. In most cases we have found that the passages relied upon as indicating the presence of Máya refer to the stage of duality and the changes that are constantly going on in this world. Nothing is constant or permanent in this universe. Everything is undergoing change. Growth and decay are the two main characteristics of the things of this world, not even excluding the ideas formed in the human mind. Because a thing would change, one is not justified in saying that it is the work of Máya. The One exhibits itself in numerous forms of beings, creatures and things. They undergo constant changes, and ultimately go back to the One, from out of which they had come. Because change is the order of the universe or because most things are transitory, one is not entitled to say that the universe is the work of Máya. It is nowhere predicated of substance, a thing that exists, or reality, that it should exist permanently in one form. We have seen above that when this fact of change is not made use of, the transitoriness of existence is utilised for showing that Máya is at work. Illusion or Máya cannot be established by establishing either change or transitoriness. Neither can it be established by referring

¹ *Ibid*, p. 228.

to the ignorance of man or his imperfect nature. There are many things which he takes a long time to understand, and many more which he has not yet been able to understand. Neither change, nor the transitoriness of things nor even ignorance of man, can be utilised for raising up the structure of Máya.

GAUDAPÁDA

We will now proceed to consider the views that Gaudapáda, and, after him, Samkara, take of this doctrine of Máya and the manner in which they handle it. It is not necessary to go through the Brahma-Sutras of Bádaráyana, which are only concise summaries of the Upanishads. Even Bádaráyana does not give out exactly which Upanishads he has summarised, beyond saying that he has summarised the Upanishads. If the clear texts of the Upanishads, considered in the light of their context, fail to reveal the existence of the doctrine, it is useless to refer to the aphoristic summaries of Bádaráyana. The Brahma-Sutras made their appearance long after the Upanishad period, and some are of opinion that they were written after the Buddhistic doctrines had been well established, in the second century before the Christian era. We would, accordingly, first ascertain the manner in which Gaudapáda viewed the fundamental doctrine of the Upanishads, as he happens to be the first person, after the Upanishad age, to revive the monistic doctrine of the Upanishads, and then proceed to consider the view of Samkara who, by his commentaries on the Brahma-Sutras and the older Upanishads, laid the foundation for the spread of the Upanishad literature in comparatively modern times.

The dates of birth and death of Gaudapáda cannot be exactly ascertained, but there cannot be any doubt that

he lived in the eighth century A.D., as it is a well-known fact that he was the teacher of Govinda, who was the teacher of Samkara. The dates of birth and death of Samkara are fairly certain. He was born in 788 A.D., and died when only thirty-two years old, in 820 A.D. So it can be safely said that Gaudapáda flourished in the latter half of the eighth century. We cannot say exactly whether he was himself a Buddhist, but there is scarcely any doubt about his being a staunch admirer of Buddha and he held the view that the teachings of the Upanishads tallied with those of Buddha.¹ Gaudapáda did not bring out any other *Kárikás*, except the *Mándukya-káriká*, the first chapter of which is employed in interpreting the *Mándukya Upanishad*, whence the entire work is known as *Mándukya-káriká*.

THE SUNYAVA'DA DOCTRINE OF BUDDHISM

In order to understand Gaudapáda's view properly, it has to be borne in mind that he was born after the Buddhist doctrine had been fully developed by the different schools of Buddhism, and it is also necessary to understand the doctrines of the *Mádhyamika* and *Vijñānaváda* schools of Buddhism. The *Mádhyamika* school of Buddhism preached the *Sunyaváda* doctrine or the doctrine of nihilism. The school is so named, because it supported a middle doctrine between existence and non-existence. All phenomena, according to this school, are like shadow, the mirages, dream, *Máyá*, without any real nature. Even Buddha himself is a phenomenon, mirage or dream, and so are all his teachings. It is mere false knowledge to suppose that one is trying to win a real *Nirvána*. The *Vijñānaváda* school of

¹ S. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 423.

Buddhism, with very slight alteration, accepts the teaching of the Mádhyamika school. The so-called external world does not exist. All sense-knowledge is the work of imagination, it has no substance or truth and is a creation of Máya or mirage or dream. Everything is the work of this Máya, the perceiving subject and the object perceived. There is no legitimate or positive truth. All qualities as well as substances are imaginary creations of ignorant minds.

MA'NDUKYA-KA'RIKA'

In his Mándukya-káriká, which consists of four parts, Gaudapáda deals with the four states of the self, unreality, unity and the extinction of the burning coal. The one is the ultimately real, which cannot be defined, grasped or expressed. The world is a dream, existence is unreal ; nothing existed in the beginning, nothing exists in the end, and nothing exists in the present ; all ideas regarding the many and the one are imaginary and false. Duality is the work of Máya ; one mind appears many in the dream as well as in the working state; everything is misery, all desires and enjoyments should be stopped; one should remain motionless and still; the state of Brahman is that which is free from dissolution, distraction, appearance, and knowledge, that is to say, a state of vacuity. Not a single thing has any existence ; all existence is illusory like the *máyáhasti* ; neither do things exist nor do they not exist; the only one knowledge is devoid of motion and substance.

On a comparison of the contents of the Mándukya-káriká with the Mádhyamika and Vijñānavāda doctrines, it will be found that Gaudapáda had fully accepted the conclusions of the two schools of Buddhism, and had accordingly reduced the conception of A'tman or Brahman of the Upanishads to a form which can hardly be distinguished

from the Buddhist Vijñāna or vacuity. He took for his text only a very small Upanishad, the Māndukya Upanishad, which is considered by many as not fit to rank with the earlier Upanishads. It is very strange that Gaudapāda would leave severely alone the chief Upanishads, and the only reason that can be ascribed for his doing so is that he did not feel himself quite safe in their company for drawing the conclusions that had captivated him. The Buddhist doctrine was in full blaze, to which he at once succumbed, for it is a much easier thing to subscribe to a negative or destructive philosophy than to probe the depths of the highly abstruse and comprehensive philosophy of the older Upanishads. The doctrine of Māyā which Gaudapāda develops could never have been taken from the older Upanishads, to which he does not make even a passing reference. The Māndukya Upanishad does not contain any reference to Māyā as a theory, or to its active operation in creating illusions. In this Upanishad are to be found only the four states of the Self, which are taken up by Gaudapāda but are treated by him in a novel manner. There cannot be any doubt that the doctrine of illusion developed by Gaudapāda had been taken from the Buddhist philosophy. To do Gaudapāda justice, he never pretends to explain the doctrine of A'tman or Brahman in the light of what is to be found in the Upanishads. In the light of the current philosophy of the times, that is to say, the Buddhist philosophy, he tried to understand the doctrine of A'tman. So far as Gaudapāda is concerned, the doctrine of Māyā is to be looked upon as an exotic plant which he engrafted upon the soil of the Upanishads.

SAMKARA : HIS ADMISSION OF GAUDAPĀDA'S INFLUENCE OVER HIM

When we come to Samkara, the renowned commentator of all the earlier Upanishads and the Brahma-Sutras, it

cannot be said that he has not fully taken into account everything that is to be found in the earlier Upanishads, relating to the doctrine of Máya, and we may well expect, in his treatment of the doctrine, full authority for every step in his argument. To understand Samkara's treatment of the subject, his connection with Gaudapáda, or more properly, the great influence exercised by Gaudapáda over him, has to be taken into account. Even if it be not admitted that Gaudapáda lived to teach Samkara, there is no doubt that Govinda, the teacher of Samkara, was the pupil of Gaudapáda. In his *bhásya* on Gaudapáda's Mándukya-káriká, Samkara freely admits that he was greatly influenced by the wisdom of Gaudapáda and that he looks upon Gaudapáda as the person who rescued the great teachings of the Vedas. All this credit certainly cannot go to Gaudapáda, an annotator of a small detached Upanishad of questionable antiquity. Not a word of praise is bestowed upon Bádaráyana, the author of the Brahma-Sutras, which Samkara annotated. The reason for this fulsome praise heaped upon Gaudapáda is to be sought for in the view that he held, and which Samkara had accepted. Bádaráyana was most likely a monotheist and not an absolutist, like his commentator Samkara, as his sutras are taken by some scholars to be more consonant with the interpretations put on them by Rámánuja than by Samkara. "There are certainly some sutras which, as Dr. Thibaut has shown, lend themselves far more readily to Rámánuja's than Samkara's interpretation." ¹ That Samkara was partial to the view of Gaudapáda does not admit of any doubt, and when we consider the manner in which he introduces the doctrine of Máya, the matter becomes an absolute certainty.

¹ Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, 1916, pp. 189-90.

SAMKARA ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE OF MA'YA' BUT NEVER
PROVES IT

Samkara first turns his dialectic guns against the unorthodox systems of the Buddhists and Jains and the orthodox Vaiseshika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, and next devotes his attention to a consideration of the Vedānta doctrine of the older Upanishads. In interpreting that doctrine he adopts an altogether different attitude. We do not here propose to go into the details of Samkara's interpretations of the Upanishads, as we intend to restrict ourselves to the enquiry, how far he has been able to establish that the theory of Māyā is part and parcel of the main doctrines of the Upanishads. We have distinctly stated that for a proper interpretation of the Upanishads, the texts, which are clear enough, should be relied upon and not the explanations and glosses of individual commentators. When a commentator, however, tries to explain the teachings of the Upanishads exclusively in the light of one particular theory, we would naturally expect him to substantiate his position, by quoting chapter and verse. But in this we are entirely disappointed. Nowhere Samkara says how he came across the doctrine of Māyā. He boldly and loudly proclaims the view that Māyā or illusion is eternal, but he never proves his case. He argues, and argues with great force and vehemence, against the pluralists, deists, and theists, but when he comes to the doctrine of Māyā we find him quietly taking it for granted, never attempting to prove it. What was the necessity for it, how an absolutist like him could admit a rival power, Māyā, by the side of the Brahman, and what was his authority for doing so, he never condescends to say. He states that the ultimate truth cannot be arrived at by reason, and that for finding it one should rely implicitly upon the Upanishads, and thereafter,

starts with the idea that not only the external world, but the senses, even the cognitive self, are illusion, the work of Máya. If he gives any argument for making this stupendous assumption, it is that since only Brahman exists, everything else is bound to be false.¹ What a poor spectacle the master of dialectics presents! With regard to the nature of both the Absolute and Máya, and the manner in which he arrived at those conceptions, Samkara is a pure dogmatist. The reason is obvious. Samkara dared not give the arguments which Gaudapáda had clearly employed for arriving at his conclusion, that the world is a huge illusion. Gaudapáda did not mind if he were taken for a Buddhist. But Samkara would be the last person to let the world know that he had relied upon the arguments of the Buddhist school, which were the only arguments available, for calling the world, the senses, even the ego, as the work of illusion. After having vehemently criticised the Buddhists, in order to shew that there was an ultimate Being, however attenuated or devoid of attributes Samkara made him, he considered it highly compromising to openly adopt the arguments of the Buddhist school, regarding the theory of illusion. Samkara had fully accepted the conclusions of Gaudapáda, and the manner in which he had drawn them, by the use of the doctrine of illusion, taken from the Buddhists, but with regard to all this, Samkara maintained a discreet silence.

Samkara is perfectly right when he says that the ultimate reality is one. The Upanishads have at every step emphasised it. The Upanishads have similarly distinctly stated that the stage of many or the stage of duality does not constitute the ultimate reality. At once Samkara sees his opportunity and marches out his argument that the stage of many is the work of illusion or Máya. To say that

¹ S. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 485.

the stage of many does not constitute ultimate reality is one thing, and a quite different thing to say that the many are the result of illusion. Samkara made use of the apparent loophole for introducing the doctrine that he had imbibed from Gaudapáda, who had learnt it from the Buddhists. Samkara here behaves like an opportunist and twists the Upanishad view of the many to mean illusion, when all that the Upanishads say is that we should reduce the many into one in order to find out the ultimate reality. No wonder, therefore, Samkara does not trace the origin of Máya or enter into a discussion of the texts where the theory of Máya is to be found. Nowhere in the older Upanishads has the argument been advanced that because Máya is at work, the world is false. It is Samkara alone who says that it should be concluded that everything except Brahman is illusion, because Brahman is the one reality. Those writers who think that Samkara had based his doctrine of Máya on such and such texts of the Upanishads are absolutely in the wrong. A man of keen intellect like Samkara would never think of relying upon stray expressions which, as we have seen, clearly convey different ideas. He preferred to draw a general conclusion by twisting the main doctrine of the Upanishads, that since Brahman is the ultimate reality, everything else must be the work of illusion. We have already explained that neither change nor transitoriness, the common characteristics of the manifold, can be treated as the work of Máya, or indications of unreality.

DOCTRINE OF MA'YA' FOREIGN TO THE A'TMAN PHILOSOPHY

We have thus traversed the entire length of time, from the days of the Rig-veda to the period when Samkara wrote his commentary, but have not come across any indication of a theory of Máya, made use of by the ancient

thinkers of India, for explaining the riddle of the universe. We have found that with the help of the interpretation of Sáyana, a commentator living in the fourteenth century A.D., whose mind was thoroughly saturated with the theory of Máya as expounded by Samkara, the idea of Máya is thrust into a topic where it has absolutely nothing to do. We have also seen that the earlier Upanishads have over and over again asserted that the essence of everything, animate and inanimate, is Brahman. Everything in the Upanishads has been reduced to Brahman, just as everything has been asserted to have sprung up from Brahman. We have also found it very straightforwardly stated that since everything ultimately resolves into Brahman, Brahman is the ultimate reality. Nowhere do we find it stated that the world, with everything in it, is the work of illusion. If that were the dominant idea, and, as a matter of fact, next to the idea of the sole reality of Brahman, it would be so, it should not have remained hidden in certain stray passages, out of which it had to be extracted with great effort, but should have been mentioned at the beginning as a root idea, just as we find it stated by a class of Vedántists, in later times. We also do not find, in the older Upanishads, the mention of the word 'Máya.' The word *avidyá* certainly occurs in the Upanishads, but it always means personal ignorance, due to want of knowledge of Brahman. This ignorance vanishes as soon as knowledge is gained, and such ignorance is not synonymous with cosmic Máya, the sense in which the word Máya is used. Far from being the main basis of the Upanishad philosophy, the doctrine of Máya is foreign to it. If it were not so, instead of minutely tracing all things back to Brahman, they would have been dismissed in a few words as the work of illusion. But inasmuch as the theory of Máya was the last thing which the philosophers of the Upanishads had in view, for explaining their position, they had been at

considerable pains, and took the help of every available metaphor, in order to establish that the ultimate reality, Brahman, was at the bottom of everything. Rámánuja vehemently opposed Samkara's introduction of the theory of Máya and his view of the unreality of the world. Samkara's interpretation of the Upanishads is not the only interpretation current, and like every other interpretation, stands or falls according as it is supported or not by the texts. We find that his doctrine of Máya is entirely unsupported by the texts of the earlier Upanishads.

MA'YA' AND THE MATERIALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA

We have seen before that the Upanishad period did not give birth to only one kind of philosophy. Side by side, as has been the case in other countries, two great currents of thought, idealism and materialism, had been developed. Idealism, in the case of Indian philosophy, developed into a rigorous monistic philosophy, while materialism ultimately merged in nihilism. We have explained that the Buddhist philosophy is of materialistic origin and is not the outcome or development of the A'tman doctrine, but, on the other hand, represents the climax reached by the materialistic philosophy of India. When the Buddhist philosophy was in the ascendancy, and a revival of the study of the Upanishads had commenced, leading thinkers of the times, who had been very much impressed with the doctrines of the Buddhist schools, began to read into the main doctrines of the Upanishads the conclusions of the Buddhist philosophy. In the eighth century, the leading personalities were Gaudapáda and Samkara. The efforts of Gaudapáda, who wrote on avowedly Buddhistic lines, did not lead to any mischief, but in the case of Samkara, who did not openly deprecate the A'tman philosophy or its Scriptural origin, but only professed to explain it, it was productive of

far-reaching consequences. Highly gifted and intelligent as he was, Samkara found out the possible point of contact between the A'tman and the Buddhist doctrines. The manifold that had come out of the one, in its state of separateness, was in a kind of disgrace, so to say, with the authors of the A'tman doctrine ; the world had also been totally exploded by the Buddhist doctrine. Samkara took hold of the manifold of the A'tman philosophy and launched against it his weapon of illusion, which he had found in the armoury of the Buddhist philosophy. This at once exerted very great fascination over a class of thinkers who always love short-cuts in solving philosophical difficulties. Samkara came to have a great following, in course of time, and voluminous literature poured in, with the result that the doctrine of Máya, according to a class of thinkers, came to be looked upon as a part and parcel of the Upanishad philosophy. Chronology was forgotten, development of two distinct lines of thought were not taken into account, and a foreign doctrine of Máya was affiliated to the A'tman philosophy, though opposed vigorously by another great class of Indian thinkers. When Oriental scholars began to apply their minds to the study of the philosophy of India, they found two separate classes of interpreters of the Upanishad doctrine, and it became a matter of temperament and choice to follow either of the two classes.

THE REAL ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF ILLUSION

The matter, however, cannot be left at this point. We have to go beneath the surface and find out the reason why the doctrine of illusion or Máya exerts such fascination over a class of thinkers, all the world over, who employ it as a basis on which to raise their philosophy. Every step that takes us onward through either the Vedántism of

Samkara or the philosophy of Kant, the two great systems in which the theory of unreality has found expression, makes it clear that the theory was resorted to, in the last instance, in a state of utter exasperation with the environment. To their grand conception of the Supreme Being is to be ascribed the conclusion that they afterwards drew that the human conception of the universe was an unreal one. The Vedāntist's Brahman was really overflowing with bliss, was bliss itself. Kant's God combined in Him the moments of supreme virtue and supreme felicity. Samkara unhesitatingly accepted that the ultimate reality is one and the One is free from sorrow, but then tormented him the misery that he found scattered all over the world. He had fallen into a deep trance and seen the beatific vision of Brahman, in whom the least discordant note was not perceived, but when he came back to himself, he found the gaunt shapes of humanity, in various grades of misery, dancing around him—imperfections staring him in the face. Can the blissful Brahman have in Him these elements of misery? Oh no, went up the fervent cry. It was impossible to conceive that misery and bliss could go together. Misery, therefore, must go, and with it the human conception of the universe. So also Kant thought at a subsequent epoch. At the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant frankly confesses that all the perplexities, errors and contradictions of previous metaphysics had been due to the confounding of the world of phenomena with the world of noumena. The universe as contemplated by human understanding must, therefore, be demolished. The deepest conviction of the authors of unreality in the identity of the Highest Good and the Supreme Being was responsible for the declaration of the unreality of the universe, as conceived by human understanding. The admission of the existence of misery or evil to them meant clear admission of its existence with His sanction, an idea which they at

once repelled, as being contrary to their conception of the Supreme Being. Their conception of the Supreme Being was so high that they could not ascribe any error of judgment to Him. If any error had been committed anywhere, it was ascribable to man and his conception of the universe. Therefore the universe was declared to be unreal.

Buddha, the founder of modern Buddhism, had also thought on similar lines. He was the heir to a throne. Whenever he came out of his palace, where he was surrounded by every kind of luxury, he witnessed human suffering in all its grades, which went deep into his heart, and he renounced the world for finding out the cause of and means for alleviating human misery. At the end of his investigation he decided that sorrow was the result of delusion or false knowledge. The best way to extinguish sorrow was to be convinced of the illusory character of the world. Nothing was permanent : all change and impermanence was sorrow.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Whether we go to Buddha, or Samkara, or Kant, we find the same cause at work. Impatience with human suffering, in the case of each, drove him to the conclusion that we must be living in a world of delusions, or else human misery cannot be explained. After coming to this conclusion, each began to work to establish the illusory character of the world in his own manner. Kant, who belongs to modern times, when exact knowledge had made great progress, approached the subject in a scientific spirit which, when analysed, turns out to be equally devoid of real worth, like the philosophies of Buddha and Samkara. Kant was in fact quarrelling with the existence of a process, by means of which knowledge is acquired. The sum and substance of what he says is that since knowledge has to be acquired through the medium of a process, consisting of categories, we do not know the real thing. "The logical consequence of his argument would be that in order

that things might be perceived as they really are, they should somehow be self-luminous or at any rate nothing should come from the perceiver to help in the work of understanding them, for otherwise the real character of the things would be missed. This would be virtually reducing oneself to the position of a sensationalist or materialist, according to whom the proper function of the intellect is the passive recording of perceptions or materials of experience. This materialistic position can only be avoided by taking up the point of view of pure idealism, by creating things out of one's ideas. But Kant never doubted the existence of things outside ourselves.''¹ Kant had practically to reduce himself to an absurd position in his effort to uphold his view. The Buddhist schools advance arguments after their own fashion, devoid of scientific precision, ultimately appealing to man, who is oppressed by misery. Samkara, as we have seen, performs his task by assuming what he should have proved.

Whatever may be the method adopted, we can unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the abovementioned thinkers had made use of the theory of illusion or *Máyá*, because they were unable to find a satisfactory explanation of the existence of evil. Of the three, Samkara could have alone successfully explained the conception of evil, if he had not adopted the Buddhist standpoint, for we will see later on that the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads afford a satisfactory explanation of the most important and troublesome question of evil, but Samkara missed his opportunity, as he made use of the doctrine of *Máyá*, foreign to the *A'tman* philosophy. Short-cuts are ineffective as well as dangerous, but more so when applied to philosophy; where neither a juggler's feat, nor a hoax in the shape of high-sounding words, extricates one out of difficulties, but only puts off the inevitable day of exposure.

¹ Author's *Theory of Unreality*, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 26-27.

CHAPTER VII

THE ETHICS OF THE UPANISHADS

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE UPANISHADS

The metaphysics of the Upanishads is as simple as it is unique. It is only when a person, pledged to a particular theory or mode of thinking, approaches it, that its simplicity is apt to be missed. The main doctrine has been so simply and forcibly put, that there can be no mistaking it. Brahman is the sole reality and the enquirer is told that he is that Brahman. Idealists who approach the doctrine are tempted to think that it denies the existence of the external world. Pantheists rush to the conclusion that the doctrine is nothing but undiluted pantheism. Deists press themselves into the belief that Brahman cannot but be the architect and controller of the world, since, after all, the reality of the world is not denied. All the while the doctrine retains its simple character, and one wonders why this confusion in thought should arise.

We have found that at the end of the Vedic period, both the cosmological and the theological standpoints had led to the assertion of the monistic theory of the universe. Like the forces of nature, the gods, who were many in number, had been ultimately traced back to one, the *Tad Ekam*. This conclusion was never departed from. What remained to be solved, the nature of the individual soul, was solved during the Upanishad period. The individual soul was found by the thinkers of the Upanishads to be no other than Brahman himself. This, along with what had been established before, conjointly produced the main doctrine of the Upanishads, that Brahman is the sole reality.

IT IS NOT PURE IDEALISM

They are completely mistaken who think that according to the Upanishads, the psychological approach is the true approach to the solution of the question of ultimate reality.¹ The reality of the world is not dependent on the individual. The reality of the world is dependent on Brahman, because Brahman is its essence, just as the reality of the individual is dependent on Brahman, because the innermost individual or A'tman is nothing else but Brahman. The ultimate reality, Brahman, is the essence of both the individual and the world. Because a man has to find out the ultimate reality with the help of reason, it does not necessarily follow that the true approach to the solution of reality is by means of the psychological argument. Brahman is the cosmological and also the theological principle, though it has to be grasped with the help of reason. It would be entirely misleading to say that God and the world are subordinated to man. What should be said instead is that man and the world are subordinated to God. The enquirer after all finds out that the inner self is also the ultimate reality. It makes a vast difference to say that the individual gives reality to everything, that is to say, the world and everything else receive reality from the individual. This is, however, not the case. It may be so, when the external world is a mere appearance, and those who want to be thoroughgoing idealists may adopt this standpoint. But, as we have pointed out, there is no room for an inference of this nature from the main doctrines of the Upanishads. The world has never been sacrificed to the individual by the philosophers of the Upanishads. When the A'tman is ultimately identified with Brahman, only in that stage everything is stated to be found in A'tman, because A'tman and Brahman are one

¹ Ranade, *Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Poona, 1926, p. 249.

and the same Being. After the identification of Self with Brahman, the God of old simply drops out, and man's relation with the ultimate reality is seen altogether in a new light.

NEITHER IS IT PANTHEISM

Just as the idealist commits the serious blunder of appropriating to himself the main doctrine of the Upanishads, the Pantheist is also wrong in thinking that it is nothing else but Pantheism. "Pantheism—God creates the universe by transforming himself into the universe. The latter confessedly has become God. Since it is real and also infinite, there is no room for God independently of the universe, but only within it. The term God and universe become synonymous, and the idea of God is only retained not to break the tradition."¹ Assuming this to be a correct exposition of Pantheism, we may say at once that the doctrine of the Upanishads is not synonymous with Pantheism. Brahman has nowhere, in the Upanishads, been said to have *transformed* itself into the universe and *thereby exhausted* itself. Brahman of the Upanishads always remains *infinite times greater* than the order of created things at any particular time, although certainly the order of created things has emanated from Brahman.² Nowhere in the Upanishads is Brahman understood in the sense in which Pantheism is used in the vocabulary of the language which created it. It is not at all fair to bring a word from a foreign language, carrying a particular meaning, and use it with reference to the fundamental idea of the Upanishads, because there is no other suitable word which can adequately express its meaning, the idea being altogether new. The pitchforking of the word infinite, which cannot be correctly applied to

¹ Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 1908, p. 160.

² *Purnasya purnamddaya purnamebābasisyate.*

nature or universe, which is certainly an ascertainable quantity, though man, on account of his limits, is not able to form a definite idea of it, does not improve the situation.

ETHICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY MISUNDERSTOOD

I have thought it necessary to make the metaphysical aspect of the A'tman philosophy clear, in order to proceed to consider its ethics. The ethics of a philosophy follows its metaphysics, and so long as the metaphysics of a philosophy is not clearly grasped, its ethics cannot be appreciated. There exists a great deal of misapprehension regarding the ethics of the Indian systems of philosophy, and more particularly that of the A'tman philosophy. According to some, it is doubtful if ethics, in the sense it is ordinarily understood, is possible in the case of such a system as the A'tman philosophy, while according to others, if it exists, it exists in such an attenuated form, that it can hardly serve our practical needs. It is needless to say that both views are equally incorrect. The extreme view first stated is due to the fact that as, according to one class of interpreters of the Upanishad doctrines, the world has no existence, there is no room for the conception of good and evil, or right and wrong. The second view is put forward by those who think that a system of ethics, properly so called, can only be said to exist, when the numerous details of life are categorically covered by the ethical standard.

One fact has to be mentioned, which the critics of the Indian philosophies very often forget. The thoughts recorded in the Upanishads were in existence at least so far back as 1500 B.C. The Upanishads are, strictly speaking, not treatises on metaphysics, much less treatises on ethics. General rules are given regarding the problems of ethics and, on account of its importance, the subject of metaphysics

is given more thought and space. It would be unreasonable to expect in the Upanishads, the subject of ethics to be treated in the manner it has been treated more than three thousand years afterwards, by such persons as Martineau, Green or Sidgwick, and the Upanishads should not be held up to ridicule because the ethical ideas are found there in a highly compressed form. After all, when it is remembered that the essentials of any system of philosophy can be expressed by means of a few simple sentences, the desire for lengthy treatment, particularly in the case of ancient systems, would seem to be extraordinary.

STANDARD OF HUMAN CONDUCT : INDIVIDUAL VIRTUES

Dealing with the present topic, I would follow the method adopted by a modern writer on moral philosophy,¹ and would first take up the question of human conduct before proceeding to consider the broad questions of ethics based upon metaphysics, such as the existence of God, as a necessary postulate of morality, and the subject of free will. The study of human conduct involves the consideration of the subject from two standpoints, one from the standpoint of the individual himself, and the other from the standpoint of society. We would consider the subject first from the standpoint of the individual.

BRIHADA'RANYAKA UPANISHAD

So long as the individual alone is concerned, the standard of conduct becomes comparatively simple, though even then the consideration of his relation with other individuals cannot be altogether left out. But such broad subjects as, that the good of an individual is part of the general good, do not strictly

¹ Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, London, 1924.

arise for consideration. We will find in the Upanishads abundant hints relating to the manner in which a man should regulate his conduct in this life. A person is ordinarily tempted to think that the good is reducible to pleasure, and what is conducive to pleasure is good for man, and that which is not conducive to pleasure, or productive of pain, should be looked upon as evil. That is to say, at first a man is tempted to accept the Hedonistic standard as his guide. That the standard of pleasure cannot be the proper ethical standard, is clearly stated in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad. Yājñavalkya, before he went to live the life of an anchorite, was anxious to make ample provisions for his wife Maitreyi, but at once the lady enquired of her husband, whether she would be happy if the wealth of the whole world belonged to her. Yājñavalkya replied that she would then spend her time like rich people, but there was no hope of immortality for her. He thereby tried to impress upon his wife the fact that a life of pleasure, which wealth brought in its train, should not be the aim of life.

In the same Upanishad, the triad is taught, to exercise control over oneself, to give or be charitably inclined and to be merciful.¹ After one has finished one's course of studentship, on the threshold of entering into domestic life, one is asked to cultivate the three virtues of subduing, giving and mercy.

TAITTIRIYA UPANISHAD

In the Taittiriya Upanishad, the virtues that have to be cultivated are enumerated.² A person should always tell the truth, should practise penance, learn to exercise restraint over himself, and try to be tranquil or be self-possessed, in the midst of disturbing factors. He should cultivate

¹ *Bṛhad.*, V, 2, 3.

² *Taitt.*, I, 9.

the virtue of hospitality. In the same Upanishad, the teacher, after he has finished teaching the Veda, instructs the pupil to say always what is true, never to swerve from the truth and to scrupulously do his duties. He is also enjoined to look upon his father and mother as gods, and admonished not to do anything that is blameworthy. Whatever he should give, give with faith, with joy, and with kindness.¹

KATHA UPANISHAD

In the Katha Upanishad, it is distinctly stated that he who has not first turned away from his wickedness, who is not tranquil or subdued, or whose mind is not at rest, can never obtain the Self even by knowledge.² Lest it might be thought that by learning only a man will be able to gain knowledge of the ultimate reality, it has been impressed upon a truth-seeker that character should be formed first. Unless a man has ceased to commit sins, is of good character, he cannot expect to realise the highest end, by knowledge only. This at once gives the lie to those who proclaim that on account of the nature of the Upanishad teaching, the question of cultivating the practical virtues either does not arise or is relegated to the background.

A very conspicuous instance of the exposition of the moral standard is to be found in the dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas, in the Katha Upanishad, where Yama distinguishes the 'sreya' from the 'preya,' the *good* from the *pleasant*. He says that the *good* is one thing and the *pleasant* another; these two have different objects, with which they chain a man. He who chooses the pleasant, misses his end, while he who chooses the good, decides well.

¹ *Taitt.*, I, 11, 1-3.

² *Katha*, 1, 2, 24.

A wise man prefers the good to the pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant. It is very much to be doubted if such a convincing exposition of the ethical standard has, so early in the history of mankind, been made anywhere else. If the Upanishads had contained no other reference to the ethical standard, this brief statement of it would have been quite sufficient. What the details of the good should be, are left to be found out by the individual, as they will vary from time to time, according to changing social circumstances, but the standard would continue to fulfil its purpose for ever. Such a statement of the moral standard, if made by a modern writer on ethics, would be looked upon as quite sufficient. So far as the individual is concerned, the standard of good, as distinguished from the standard of pleasure, is a sure practical guide.

THE MEANING OF PENANCE

We find a man enjoined, at every step, to go through penance. It is hoped no one would fall into the error of taking penance to mean oppressive asceticism. The leading of an abstemious life, a simple life of piety, as opposed to a life of dalliance and pleasure, is what is indicated by it. A well-balanced life is the principal objective of a moral man, and in the Upanishads a man is asked to live that kind of life. It would be ridiculous to drag into the present times, the kind of life that was considered well-balanced more than three thousand years ago, and to pronounce that it was devoid of moral worth. Even in India itself, so far as the details of conduct are concerned, those that were looked upon three thousand years ago as indispensable, are not so treated now, though the standard holds good still. The idea of a well-balanced life, which a life of penance or restraint indicates, means nothing more than the leading of a life in which the disturbing passions

have been kept under check and the duties have been performed, though what will constitute the duties of a man will have to be ascertained with reference to the age or the condition of the society, in which a man lives.

In the Chhándogya Upanishad, besides penance, a man is asked to cultivate liberality, righteousness, kindness and truthfulness,¹ quite a modest list of virtues, which if followed by an individual in modern times would entitle him to recognition as an ideal member of the society.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

Coming to a consideration of the ethical standard which a man should adopt, in regard to his relations with the other members of the society, we find the Isá Upanishad laying down the cardinal principle, deduced from the main doctrine of the A'tman philosophy which, in point of idealism and richness of thought, outshines the utilitarian doctrine, about which we hear so much now-a-days. It is said there that he who beholds all beings in the Self, and the Self in all beings, does not hate any one. A man is told to look upon his fellow beings as united with him in one divine bond. Could anything be more sublime, and at the same time so pregnant with practical hints for adjusting one's relations with one's fellow beings? Once the relation of man with the other members of the society is looked at from this point of view, all dealings, in respect of matters that may arise in course of innumerable social transactions, will stand most satisfactorily adjusted, since all men are placed on the same high level. As a matter of fact, this standpoint may be looked upon as declaring the fundamental principle, on which all details of conduct that may be

¹ Chhánd., III, 17, 4.

² Isá, 6.

necessary to be pursued by one individual towards another, should be based. The person of a fellow being thus becomes sacred, as he stands united with the rest in God. It is no longer a question of mere utility, or sympathy, or even compassion. The attitude towards one's fellow beings becomes at once elevated, and one ought not to think of doing what may be in the least harmful to them. The rich or the favoured few in life, no longer stand on a higher level than the poor or the unfortunate in the society. The claims and interests of all become alike. There remains no room even for the exercise of that sentiment by means of which, people are found so eager to take credit for having given pitiful doles for relieving misery. The Upanishads by laying down this principle has pitched the moral standard so high, that instead of complaining of want of a standard, it may be said that the standard is rather difficult to follow in daily life. But it will be at once seen that such a calculation can scarcely enter into the setting up of a standard, if it inevitably follows from the relation that exists between one man and another. The injunction to love your neighbour like yourself may fail, but the appeal that is made by a standard to look upon your neighbour as one with God can seldom fail.

ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE VEDAS AND THE UPANISHADS

We find that a great change has taken place in the ethical outlook during the Upanishad period, as compared with what prevailed in the Vedic period. Sacrifice or Karma, in the Vedic period, was looked upon as the chief duty that a man had to perform. The conception of Rta, law or order, was there, and it referred to the cosmic order as well as to the order that prevailed in the moral world. Rta was identified with truth, and also governed the sacrifices or rites. But most of the moral duties existing

during this period were in connection with religious or sacrificial observances. Man, during this period, took more care to adjust his relations with gods than with his fellow beings. He was anxious to please the gods, so that they might keep him safe from harm. In order to be released from sins, he approached the gods. The gods bound the sinners with fetters, and they also untied them when they were satisfied.¹ The gods granted favours when they were approached by means of sacrifices. All this is changed during the Upanishad period. The Upanishad thinkers do not approach the gods any more, their conception of morality does not any longer revolve round the sacrificial performances. The slavish tie that bound man to gods has been snapped, man has discovered himself, and from the point of view of the A'tman philosophy, the ethical standard is conceived. It is not implied that during the Vedic period, ordinary practical virtues were not cultivated, suitable for the simple ends of the people of those times. But the conception of good or right had not then been fully developed, and could not possibly be developed so long as merit or virtue arose mainly in connection with sacrifices offered to the gods.

FREEDOM OF WILL

We will now proceed to consider the ethical conception of the A'tman philosophy in its relation to metaphysics. The connection between metaphysics and moral philosophy is intimate. The consideration of the ethical standard of any system involves a consideration of its metaphysical standpoint. It is not enough that the existence of the self is admitted, and its activities are considered. The part that is played by the self, and the nature

¹ Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 121.

of its responsibility, that is to say, how far the acts of the individual can be ascribed to himself, have also to be considered. It is, therefore, said that the primary postulate of ethics is that acts should be ascribed to the individual himself, otherwise they become devoid, as it were, of moral value. This brings in the question of free will. How far is a man free in doing what he does? There are two classes of thinkers, the determinists and the advocates of free will. Before we examine the view expressed in the Upanishads regarding this fundamental question of free will, we would consider the arguments that are advanced respectively by the modern determinists and upholders of free will.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF DETERMINISM

The current arguments in favour of determinism may be summed up under six heads :¹

(1) The argument from physics. This argument rests on the principle of the conservation of energy, according to which hypothesis the physical energy remains constant, though there is change of one form into another, such as from heat into light. According to this view, the acts of man are carried out by preceding conditions of the body and brain, and that they are, therefore, physically determined, the will of man practically playing no part in the happening of acts and events.

(2) The second argument is taken from biology, which was brought to the fore by the spread of the doctrine of evolution. According to the fundamental conception of Biology, the working of any organism is fully accounted for by heredity and environment. Heredity gives it the capacities, and environment supplies the stimuli.

¹ Horne, *Free Will and Human Responsibility*, 1912, p. 77.

(3) The next argument is supplied by the philosophy of nature as a whole. Nature is fully explained mechanically, by means of physics, chemistry, biology, physiology and the law of causation. Events which happen are bound to happen, and science tries to find out the connecting links between the occurrences of nature. The universe is a huge physical mechanism, where law reigns supreme and man is only a small part of that mechanism. If there were an observer, who was properly qualified for the purpose, from the present he could infallibly predict the future.

(4) When we come to the subjective science of psychology, it is also stated that there is no room for the exercise of what is understood by free will. There is no mental state without a corresponding brain-state and the brain-state in turn is explained not by a mental state but by a preceding brain-state. "It is to be remarked that our modern knowledge of the localization of the brain functions, of the aphasias, of the insanities, is largely dependent upon it."¹ The sense of freedom that a man feels when he does certain acts is only the result of delusion, and delusions are very common mental phenomena. People have become habituated to the idea that they have freedom of action and have, in course of time, come to believe what they have been taught to think.

(5) Ethics also furnishes an argument in support of determinism. As a man's character is, so is his act. He cannot but act in the manner his character prompts him to act, and for that reason his act may be predicted, if his character can be precisely analysed and known.

(6) Theology also supports the view of the determinist. Those who believe in God, believe that He is omniscient. He not only knows the past, but knows fully well everything

¹ Horne, *Free Will and Human Responsibility*, 1912, p. 87.

that will happen in the future. So all that a man will do in future is known to God, which means that what a man will do has been settled long before, and he has no choice in the matter. This gives rise to the theory of predestination.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF LIBERTARIANISM

As against the arguments in favour of the deterministic view of man's acts, the following arguments are advanced and are deemed to be conclusive of the view that a man is a free agent :

(1) The nature of the energy which physics assumes to be entirely physical has been found, in course of investigation, to be something not purely physical. "The only energy we know first hand is psychical in character and this energy appears to be capable of effecting physical movements. It is easy to suppose that as some physical movements have psychical energy behind them, all physical movements may have the same. There is no proof but at least it is an hypothesis worthy of consideration. By substituting psychical for physical in the ordinary hypothesis of the conservation of energy, we save both physics and freedom."¹

(2) A man cannot be compared in all respects to an animal, because most of the animals have no choice in the sense that man possesses it. Besides, modern biological theories are couched in theological terms, which affords room for the view that the individual animal helps to make himself, though he is partly the product of physical forces.

(3) The universe cannot be looked upon as a machine. Even if we try to explain things in terms of physics and chemistry, we still have to explain how the chemical affinities

¹ Horne, *Free Will and Human Responsibility*, 1912, p. 103.



came to be what they are. This will inevitably lead to the suggestion of mind behind this mechanical universe.

(4) It may be said that the strongest motive determines the will, but a weak motive may be made strong, by paying more attention to it. The determinist may say that the cause of attention is a brain-state, but the libertarian will attribute the cause to purpose, though there may be a corresponding brain-state. "Its use here shews that science, not even the science of psychology, can have the last word on the free-will question. Purposes are more truly forward-looking than backward-looking, their causes are final, not efficient. * * * The brain may indeed be, in part at least, the efficient cause of attention, but its final cause cannot be short of intention."¹

(5) "Two restrictions are to be placed upon the outright affirmation that the character determines the acts. The first is, in the case of children the acts determine the character; these acts may have many origins, one of which, especially in adolescence, is free choice."² The other restriction is that though character determines acts, "it is not finally fixed at any point in time."

(6) The argument against free will that is derived from theology is sought to be met by adopting the lines of reasoning followed by such writers as Martineau and Professor James. According to Martineau, God certainly knows all knowable things, but what a person in the exercise of his free will is going to do is not one of the knowable things. To that extent, therefore, the foreknowledge of God is limited by the free will of a human being.³ According to Professor James, God is compared to an expert chess-player.

¹ Horne, *Free Will and Human Responsibility*, 1912, pp. 119-20.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.

³ Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, 1888, Vol. II, Bk. III, Chap. II.

Just as an expert chess-player knows all the possibilities in the play, but does not know the actual move that a player may decide upon, so God knows all things that are open to a human being, but does not know the exact thing he would do, in the exercise of his free will. God's foreknowledge is to that extent limited.

The foreknowledge of God and the free will of a human being may be harmonised in another way. "Foreknowledge may be so perfect that God knows what I will freely do, what I am freely doing. If foreknowledge is not the mechanical prediction of the astronomer but the viewing of the content of future time as present by a Divine Mind, why may not such knowledge be co-existent with freedom? When a father, perhaps unseen by the son, sees the acts of the son, knows them to be what they are, is the son thereby not free in his acts? The knowledge is the father's, the act is the son's. So God's perfect knowledge may really embrace what a free-will agent will choose to do, without thereby affecting the inherent freedom of the act; it is not God's knowledge causing the action."¹

It is further stated, in support of the libertarian argument, that the biological science of modern times is finding room for mind as a contributing cause to evolution, that the fact of effort which a man exercises indicates the presence of free will, and the emotions of satisfaction, remorse, praise and blame, which may follow effort, naturally presupposes freedom for their existence, and, lastly, that it redounds to the credit of God if instead of turning a man into a machine, he makes him a free agent.

HUMAN FREE WILL IMPOSSIBLE ACCORDING TO CURRENT METAPHYSICS

We have given the arguments for and against free will, as stated by others. The reader will find that those advanced

¹ Horne, *Free Will and Human Responsibility*, 1912, p. 125.

in favour of free will are not only of a halting nature, but are mostly based upon probabilities, which may or may not happen, and when they are not so, they appeal to human vanity for support. It is significant that the theistic believer in the omniscience of God, comes worst off in his attempt to support free will. We now propose to shew that according to current metaphysics, free will, in the manner in which it is claimed to be exercised by man, cannot exist.

MIND BEHIND PHYSICAL THINGS AND LIFE DOES NOT
MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE

It is conceded that the physical order of things is a closed circle, into which nothing in the shape of an unexpected event can be compressed. It is also conceded that as is the case with the physical world, so it is with the biological world, to a large extent. But it is said that the attribution of a mind working behind the physical world and, in the case of man, the existence of an active consciousness of choice, put a different complexion on the whole thing. Even if it is granted that a design is working behind the physical order of things, and that design proceeds from a conscious mind, it does not appear why the physical world would not work with the same scrupulous exactitude as it does when working mechanically. On the other hand, on account of intelligent direction, there would not exist the chance of even the slightest deviation from the programme. But it is said that the presence of a mind, directing the entire operation of the physical world, turns it into the work of a free agent. Granting it does, does it follow from this that every now and then in the working out of the numerous processes, of which the physical world is composed, some will is being thrust to give things an unexpected turn? It is not difficult to conceive that before a programme commences to work, a

choice may have been made, by the intelligent director of the physical world, and that thereafter the entire programme is scrupulously worked out. If the physical world, conceived as mechanism, favours the determinist theory, it also equally supports that theory, even when there is a directing mind behind. The laws will work exactly in the same manner as in the case of a mechanism.

The same arguments can with equal force be used against the libertarian theory, when the biological field is surveyed. The presence of a psycho-physical theory of evolution does not in the least disturb the working of the animal world, according to fixed rules. The universe may not be a machine, but for that reason it cannot be said that an effect will not follow a cause, as it does in the case of a mechanical world. If life evolves according to fixed laws, framed by an intelligent being, the invariable effect would always follow the same cause.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FIELD IS ALSO A CLOSED CIRCLE

Coming to the psychological field, we find it admitted that the ordinary mental law is that the strongest motive determines the will, but because there is a chance of the weakest mind being made strong, by constant attention, the ordinary law may cease to work, and free will assert itself, because the attention is the result of a 'purpose.' The entire argument is vitiated by the assumption that all on a sudden a weak mind would become strong, by attention. When pursuing the chain of cause and effect, in the psychological field, can the case of a weak mind being made strong be kept outside the causal chain? Is the paying of attention in a particular case beyond the rules of causation?

- Certain weak minds can be made strong, and as a matter of fact, weak minds are being daily made strong, but that is

also the result of the interaction of environment and heredity. If one of the two factors changes, a change necessarily follows. A changed environment produces a different result. Given the cause, the result necessarily follows.

As the psychological argument is closely connected with the ethical argument, it is necessary to consider both, to a certain extent, together. It is said by the determinist that as the character is, so becomes the act. What a man will do in a particular case, can be foretold, if his character is fully known. But it is said that character cannot be treated as a fixed quantity. A drunkard may turn a new leaf, and remain sober the rest of his life, while a man who had been strictly sober till late in life, may yield to the temptation of drink. Likewise, an honest man may turn dishonest, and *vice versa*. Therefore, it cannot be predicted from the antecedent character of a man, that he would continue to remain the same as before, just as it cannot be predicted that the strongest motive will always determine the act. The whole fallacy is due to the assumption that if matters become complex, on account of the presence of some new factors, prediction cannot any longer be made. That is to say, prediction can be made in simple cases, as when the same state of things continues, but, otherwise, it becomes impossible. But the prediction is going to be made by a person, who is in full possession of all facts and circumstances through which a man is likely to pass, and which may give rise to the deviations. It is not going to be made by a person who is incapable of such knowledge, for, then he is incapable of predicting. Prediction cannot be made by everybody. Granting that, in a certain case, the state of things is so very complex, that no human being can predict the result, does it necessarily follow that certain fixed rules are not at work? This is taking undue advantage of current human ignorance. What weak motive will become strong, who will be able to change his present

character, whether this will happen all on a sudden, or after the lapse of a certain time, everything can be foreseen by a person qualified to do so, be he a human or superhuman being. Nothing goes astray in the ethical field, as nothing goes astray in the psychological field.

THE THEOLOGY OF MARTINEAU AND JAMES

We have to some extent anticipated the arguments which will have to be applied when dealing with the subject, from the theological point of view. It is needless to say that the arguments advanced in favour of freewill by Martineau and James are extremely childish. They used to attract some notice at one time, but there is hardly any person now, except a few theologians of the old school, who would subscribe to the curtailment of the knowledge of the Omniscient in the manner proposed by Martineau and James. God knows all knowable things, but when it is a case of knowing certain acts done by a man, he is unable to do so, because those acts are not knowable things! This may be dogmatically asserted, but is quite incompatible with the omniscience of God. It is simply gratuitous to try to raise man at the expense of God. James does not improve matters by conceding to the Godhead knowledge of all possibilities, but denying him at the same time knowledge of particular acts. What is generously granted by one hand is ruthlessly taken away by the other. James should not have used the expression "all possibilities," since a man of ordinary sense would understand from that expression that every particular act must have been covered by it.

FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL CANNOT BE HARMONISED

Let us now consider the case of harmonising free will with foreknowledge, as presented by Horne, with the help

of the illustration of a father and his son, where the father knows everything that a son would do, but still the son is said to act freely. This argument requires examination from two distinct standpoints. Firstly, could the son act in a manner other than he had acted ? Certainly not. What he would do, in the circumstances of the case, was quite fixed. His character, any wavering on his part, his final decision to do what he does, everything was fixed in the chain of events. When it is said that it is known from before what he would do, long before he does the act, it means, if it means anything, that he would perform that act, and nothing else. There cannot be the least doubt about what he would do. Who does not go through a process of thinking before he does an act ? The worst criminal, as well as the greatest saint, discusses in his mind what he should and what he should not do. This process, which a person goes through, does not in the least interfere with what is ultimately to happen, for the nature of the ultimate step taken calls it forth, as much as the process or chain of reasoning ends in it. So God not only knows what the son would do, but also knows the entire mental process, through which the son would pass, before the act is done. So far as the son is concerned, no other act was possible, and, therefore, the act was unalterably fixed. The character of the act is not in the least affected, because in going through a process the son is led to think that he is acting freely. Every one who acts, thinks he is acting freely, though God knows that he cannot do anything else than what he does and also the reason why he does so. Secondly, the foreknowledge in the case of God, means something different from what that word means when applied to an intelligent human being. The position of God is not exactly the position which has been ascribed to the father, in the illustration, with regard to the son. Everything that happens in this world, happens not only with God's knowledge, but happens

because He has willed it to be so. His will is being carried through numerous channels, animate and inanimate. Not only does He know everything, but He directs everything. If He is to be looked upon as the Supreme Cause, it must mean that. You may, if you like, conceive Godhead in a different manner, but do not, pray, after making Him the Supreme Cause, take away the acts of some beings and ascribe them solely to the latter, because your assumption does not permit you to do so. The acts done by human beings may be said to have been done by them, in the sense that God has directed those acts to be done through them. God is omniscient because it is He who directs everything. You cannot reduce Him to the position of an intelligent bystander, because you want to credit man with an independent will. Things may be harmonised, when they admit of being harmonised, not because you want them to be harmonised. Human free will is absolutely incompatible with the exercise of Divine Will. Not a single thing with which man has to deal is strictly speaking his own creation. He did not create the elements. He did not create the tendency of things to unite, nor the tendency of things to disunite either. He did not create a single feeling, or sentiment, or passion. He only puts things together, which admit of being put together, and disunites things, which admit of being separated from one another. The least change that takes place in him is brought about by the environment in conjunction with the tendencies that have developed in him. His purposes are thus prompted and shaped by the environment. By environment is to be understood here, not only his physical environment, but the sumtotal of his 'mental states at any particular moment. No doubt he is conscious. He is conscious of what existed, is conscious of the change that takes place, and if he be intelligent enough, that is to say, if in his case such a mental state is possible, he finds out to what causes the



changes are due. He is taken through the entire causal chain, whence arises the consciousness of self, its continuity, and also the delusion that he has been a free agent.

BERGSON AND FREE WILL

We will now examine the position taken up by the great modern pragmatist, Bergson, who is a stout champion of free will, before we consider what the Upanishads have got to say regarding the subject of free will, which is of such vital importance for man, in the ethical field. Bergson starts with a distinction, which admits of no controversy, so far as it goes, that ideas are different from material objects. Ideas do not occupy space, that is to say, are not extended, while material objects occupy space and are extended. He is of opinion that the whole controversy between the determinist and the libertarian has been confused owing to an illegitimate translation of the unextended into the extended, of the translation of quality into quantity. Once this confusion of duration with extensity, is dispelled, the objections raised against free will would disappear.¹

Bergson proceeds to attack the assertion of the determinist that, given from now onwards all the future antecedents, some higher intelligence would be able to predict with absolute certainty the decision which will follow. "As we shall see, the reasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenon are the very ones which prevent us from determining an act which springs from our free activity."² In the case of astronomical predictions, they are possible, because duration properly

¹ Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (Pogson), London, 1921, pp. xix-xx.

² *Ibid*, p. 193.

so called, remains outside the calculation. The astronomer "decrees that time shall go ten times, a hundred times, a thousand times as fast, and he has a right to do so, since all that he thus changes is the nature of the conscious intervals, and since these intervals, by hypothesis, do not enter into the calculations. Therefore, into a psychological duration of a few seconds he may put several years, even several centuries of astronomical time. * * * In truth, if the latter foresees a future phenomenon, it is only on condition of making it to a certain extent a present phenomenon, or at least of enormously reducing the interval which separates us from it. * * * We shall then be present in imagination at the phenomenon we wish to foretell; we shall know exactly at what point in space and after how many units of time this phenomenon will take place." ¹ But in the case of psychical phenomena, Bergson says, things are entirely different. "States of consciousness are processes and not things; that if we denote them each by a single word, it is for the convenience of language; that they are alive and therefore constantly changing; that, in consequence, it is impossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer by the loss of some impression, and thus altering their quality. I quite understand that the orbit of a planet might be perceived all at once or in a very short time, because its successive positions or the *results* of its movement are the only things that matter, and not the duration of the equal intervals which separate them. But when we have to do with a feeling, it has no precise result except its having been felt, and to estimate this result adequately, it would be necessary to have gone through all the phases of the feeling itself and to have taken up the same duration." ²

¹ Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (Pogson), London, 1921, pp. 194-95.

² *Ibid*, pp. 196-97.

All foretelling, in the case of psychical phenomena, according to Bergson, therefore, is seeing, for in order to be able to foretell psychical phenomena, one will have to actually go through them. And then, as regards the inner state, the same antecedents never occur, according to Bergson. "Now, if duration is what we say, deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments of a life-story. * * * Even the simplest psychical elements possess a personality and a life of their own, however superficial they may be; they are in a constant state of becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of being repeated, is a new feeling."¹ Lastly, causality as regular succession does not apply to conscious states, according to Bergson, and therefore cannot disprove free will. "By what right, then, do you apply it to these deep-seated states of consciousness in which no regular succession has yet been discovered, since the attempt to foresee them ever fails?"²

BERGSON'S ARGUMENTS EXAMINED : SEEING MAY BE AT THE SAME TIME FORETELLING

Bergson's argument in favour of free will may be divided into two parts. All foreseeing is in reality seeing, and hence it is meaningless to say that a psychical act can be foretold, when all its antecedents are given. In the case of physical events since duration does not enter into calculation, they may be foretold, but in the case of psychical phenomena, since it implies living over again every moment, it is seeing and not foretelling. Secondly, it is

¹ Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (Pogson), London, 1921, pp. 199., 200.

² *Ibid*, p. 203.

impossible for a thing to be repeated in the psychic arena, because *deep-seated* inner cause produces its effect once for all, which makes foretelling impossible, and thus the existence of freewill is proved.

It must have to be acknowledged that the psychical states *appear* to us to be far more numerous, compared with physical events, because we do not yet know exactly the numerous aspects of the things of the external world, and the still more numerous actual circumstances in which they grow and flourish, and therefore, so far as things external to us are concerned, we group them under a limited heads, on account of our limited knowledge of them. But in the case of psychical states, since they are within us and we are directly parties to them, each and every psychical phenomenon appears with all its richness and we consider ourselves overwhelmed with the immensity of psychical phenomena. Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that compared with external physical events, the inner states of consciousness are far more numerous. Let us concede that on account of the innumerable inner states, it is not often possible for a human being of ordinary intellect, to say what a man will do in future. Let us also concede that it is very difficult to reproduce another's actual life, as it may be lived. But when we once leave aside the case of a human being of ordinary intelligence, and take theoretically the case of a human being who has every power and means, which an ordinary human being lacks in, why should it be impossible for him to foretell, to the exact shade and colour, the psychical phenomena that are to happen in the case of an individual? But Bergson says, it is then seeing and not foretelling. He is presuming too much upon the ignorance of his reader by introducing this distinction between seeing and foreseeing. In the case of a person who foresees what another will do, you may, if you choose, call it seeing, so far as

the first person is concerned, but it is certainly a case of foretelling, with reference to the second person, whose acts are known long before. Strictly speaking, foreseeing applies to the case of a human being, when he is able to say what another human being would do. But, foreseeing cannot be applied to God—whom Bergson very carefully keeps out of the controversy—for He knows everything a human being would do, because He is directing everything a man does. In the case of God, since He knows everything, futurity cannot be said to exist in the human sense, for in the eye of God, everything is present, here and now, though so far as a human being is concerned, until he has actually done that thing, it cannot be said to have happened. But in the case of a human being of extraordinary powers, who is able to foresee the acts of another human being, even if the description of 'seeing' is applied to him, are the acts of another not foretold, when they actually happen afterwards? And then when we take the case of a Divine Being, who knows everything a human being would do, all the arguments advanced by Bergson fall to the ground, and one can well understand why he has not dragged God into the controversy.

STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS MAY BE FORESEEN LIKE PHYSICAL EVENTS

The other part of Bergson's argument is equally faulty. He is not right in saying that a state of consciousness cannot be repeated. He would have been certainly right, if he had said that the same kind of feeling does not require for its production always the same set of stimuli. The combinations of external stimuli may be, so to say, unlimited, but the resulting feelings or sentiments are limited in number. The different kinds of feelings can be very soon exhausted, by means of a graduated list. The qualitative differences of the

resulting feelings are limited, when compared with the unlimited number of the external stimuli. He should not have tried to lead the reader astray, by making use of the adjective 'deep-seated,' and prefixing it to psychical states, in order to establish that one psychical state cannot resemble another. Even if it be granted that each and every outward stimulus gives rise to a distinct psychical phenomenon, in the case of an ideal human being, who can correctly anticipate all outward stimuli and their resulting psychical phenomena, where is the inherent difficulty of his foretelling the future acts of a human being? The same difficulty that Bergson wants to create in the case of foretelling psychical phenomena, can be created in the case of foretelling physical events. How many physical events are actually foretold? To one that is being foretold, there are a hundred at least which a physicist is unable to foretell. Why? Because the physical events are also overwhelmingly numerous, controlled by innumerable circumstances, like the psychical phenomena, every one of which is distinct from the other, in the sense in which Bergson says the psychical phenomena are distinct from one another. Just as some physical events are repeated, so also certain psychical phenomena are repeated, and we daily find the foretelling of certain classes of psychical phenomena by men, just as we find certain classes of physical events are foretold. Like the foretelling of an ordinary physical event, such ordinary psychical phenomena as that a child will at once try to seize a red ball when brought before it, that a drunkard would readily accept a glass of drink when offered to him, that an unprincipled man who is in need will misappropriate his master's money, if he gets an opportunity, can be exactly foretold. Strictly speaking, physical events are distinct from one another, in the same sense in which Bergson contends that the psychical phenomena are distinct from one another. To assert that each and every psychical phenomenon is never repeated, is a gross

travesty of facts. In the case of an ideal being, human or divine, to whom all the tendencies of the human mind and external things, as well as the environment through which they will pass, are known, it will be just as easy to foretell any future psychical phenomenon, as it will be to foretell any physical event. In the result, the argument of the pragmatist does not advance the cause of free will any further than the argument of the ordinary libertarian is able to do.

A'TMAN PHILOSOPHY ALONE PROCLAIMS HUMAN AUTONOMY

We have thoroughly examined the arguments in favour of free will, and have seen that it is impossible to uphold free will, from the standpoint of current metaphysics. The current metaphysics makes a fundamental distinction between God and man, the Creator and the created. They fill up two distinct rôle. Man has assigned limits, which makes it impossible for him to exercise his will freely, in the sense in which the word should be properly understood. The metaphysics of the A'tman philosophy is completely different. It is unique. The relation between man and God, according to the Upanishads, is completely different from what it is, according to the other systems of philosophy. The Self or A'tman is equivalent to Brahman. The individual soul is placed exactly on the same level as the universal soul, the natural consequence of which is that the individual partakes of the character of the One, of which he is part and parcel. He is endowed with everything that characterises the Supreme Being. He becomes really free, as free as the Supreme Being himself. Correctly speaking he does not carry out the order of a different being, he takes the initiative in all matters, for it is A'tman or Brahman who shapes the entire universe. At every step he does what he has already decided to do.

He does not any longer claim freedom in the sense that he can decide what he likes, when placed between two opposites, which have come into existence independent of his will, but he claims freedom in the highest sense of the term, that he is a rule unto himself, firstly, in deciding what is to be done, and, secondly, in doing exactly what he has decided to do. The question of freedom, in the sense in which it is contemplated by the ordinary ethical standard, does not any longer arise, in the case of the individual. What he wills in the stage of Brahman, he does in the stage of the individual. If he must do a thing, it is not because he is forced by circumstances, such as heredity and environment, to do it, but he must do it, because he is true to himself, and does only what he has already decided to do, though it is worked out by means of a process, which is necessarily fixed. It is only when A'tman has realised its identity with Brahman, that he is able to realise how, like Brahman, he is free. The A'tman philosophy establishes autonomy in the most unambiguous language. We have said before that the philosophers of the Upanishads were not engaged in writing regular treatises on ethics, but by laying down the doctrine of A'tman they proclaimed for ever human autonomy.

We, therefore, find that the ethical standard of the Upanishads is one of pure autonomy. Taken along with the standard, by means of which all human beings are looked upon as one with God, and the list of practical virtues, the ethics of the Upanishads stands incomparably higher and richer than the ethics of any other system existing in the world.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

IGNORANCE, FEAR, AND THE CONCEPTION OF EVIL

Fear is the most primitive of human feelings. It was produced by the clash of infant human mind with the overwhelming elements of nature, which it could not either comprehend or control. The immensity of nature in all directions overpowered man and made him at once feel his insignificance. He began to be afraid of everything, the exact working of which he was not able to follow. Continued ignorance on the part of man nourished this feeling of fear which, in course of time, assumed huge proportions. Man became anxious to propitiate the causes of fear, for protecting himself against harm. We accordingly find the primitive Aryans approaching the elements of nature with prayers. In the Rig-veda, we find hymns addressed to the elements of nature which, on account of the powers displayed by them, the Aryans had commenced to deify. Indra, who is primarily a god of thunderstorms, is invoked in almost a quarter of the hymns of the Rig-veda. Agni, who is called *jāta-vedas*, or he who knows all created beings, is the next god in point of importance, to whom numerous hymns are addressed. After them came the other gods such as Maruts, Savitar, Surya and Varuna, to all of whom hymns are addressed. In course of time, the propitiated elements of nature are found to come to the aid of men. Indra is praised as the protector, helper and friend of his worshippers. "As the great god of battle he is more frequently called upon than any other deity to help the Aryans in their conflicts with earthly enemies. He protects the

Aryan colour and subjects the black skin. He dispersed 50,000 of the black race. He subjected the Dasyus to the Aryan and gave the land to the Aryan."¹ Like Indra, "Agni, is a great benefactor of his worshippers, protecting and delivering them, and bestowing on them all kinds of boons, but pre-eminently domestic welfare, offspring and prosperity."² Agni is looked upon as the great priest, who takes the offerings of men to the gods and is therefore called the 'oblation-bearer.'

Not only do we find men afraid of the natural elements, but the gods in their turn are afraid of the demons or evil-doers. The gods are constantly engaged in fighting the demons and in these fights Indra leads them. The notion of evil is present in the minds of all, the gods even not excepted. The conception of evil can thus be traced back to fear, which springs out of ignorance. There is not a single ethical system, in which the conception of evil does not play a conspicuous part. Whether in the shape of a being, who tries to vie with the beneficent power called God, or in the shape of a human tendency, which leads man to commit wrongs or sins, this conception of evil is most vividly present in the human imagination. The inevitable result has been that two dominant elements are conceived as exercising their influence over human destiny, each trying to gain supremacy. This cleavage effected very early in the human mind still persists, and two courses are spoken of as open to man, one leading to good, and the other to evil, of which every ethical system is bound to take notice.

NOTHING IS INHERENTLY EVIL

The habit of mind has thus been formed to accept evil as a permanent factor, which must be dealt with, before moral

¹ Macdonell, *Vedic Reader*, 1917, p. 44.

² *Ibid*, p. 3.

progress can be assured. If for a moment man would only free himself from the dominating idea of evil and look into the remote past and contemplate the progress that has been made since then, he will be astonished to find that the same thing has not been all this time treated as evil, just as the same thing has not been uniformly considered as good. Once this is perceived, the question of evil will assume an altogether different form.

In order that the reader may be the better able to follow the argument, let us for our present purpose divide evils into two classes, physical and moral, a classification which finds favour with most persons. Physical evils would mean such evils as may be expected from the working of external material causes, while moral evils would mean those arising out of human delinquency or turpitude. Let us conceive of the case of a man, who may have lived in the time when the hymns of the Rig-veda were first composed. There was at that time a very long list of physical evils. Let us take one of them. Man was afraid of the thunderbolt of Indra, and his condition was piteous, as he did not know how to protect himself against it. We may now compare his case with the case of a man of modern times, who lives in a magnificent building, on a hill top, which is effectively protected against discharges from the clouds. Take next an instance of moral evil, which pressed heavily on the minds of our ancestors, in the remote past. It may be chosen at random from such facts which constituted moral evils as, marrying outside one's caste, not worshipping the family gods, disbelieving the infallibility of the Vedas, eating forbidden food. Do the same ideas relating to any of these matters still prevail? Does the idea of moral defection based upon any one of these facts find continued acceptance? What has happened with regard to past ideas will happen with regard to our present ideas. You cannot hold fast to anything as constituting evil for all time to come. With the removal of

ignorance and the ushering in of an improved order of things, our ideas undergo a complete change. So there cannot be any doubt that there is nothing which is inherently evil. If once the idea of evil is clearly understood as being the result of human ignorance or imperfection, which is sure to be removed in course of time, our conception about evil stands completely changed.

EVIL A REMOVABLE QUANTITY

In view of what we have observed, let us consider the pronouncement of one of the modern writers on moral philosophy. "It is true that we can shew without difficulty how some of what we call evil in this world, as it is actually constituted, is the condition of the good. We can see that much good implies a struggle against both moral and physical evil ; and that the dependence of one individual upon another out of which arise all the higher moral or social qualities of man implies also the possibility of constant injury and injustice and the like. Goodness is developed by opposition ; happiness, as we know it, depends on the satisfaction of wants which imply imperfection and, in their intense form, positive pain, and so on. But it is not so much the existence as the nature and quantity and distribution of evil in the world that constitute the difficulty. So much evil seems wholly unnecessary ; so much smaller a measure of its quantity and quality would have sufficed, so far as we can see, to satisfy these necessities. A different distribution of it would seem far more conducive to the highest welfare of humanity than the present distribution of it. Even to attempt to shew that there is more good than evil in the world—whether the good be understood in some higher ethical or in the purely hedonistic sense—would be a very bold undertaking." ¹ It will be seen that in giving

¹ Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 235-36.

expression to his idea about evil, the writer has been all along in the firm grip of the notion that some matters are inherently evil, and however charitably inclined one may be to judge God's world, it would be a very bold venture to pronounce that there is more good than evil in this world. It is the same dominating idea of the cleavage of things into good and evil, the same idea of the rule of two powers, diametrically opposed to each other. If the writer had not been wanting in imagination and perspective, it would have been very easy for him to say that in comparison with the past, in the present times, there is relatively speaking a less preponderance of evil, and consequently a greater preponderance of good, and in that case it would have been very easy for him to find out the reason for it. Thereafter, it would have been very easy for him to say, with all the boldness at his command, that in the not very distant future, the preponderance of the good over evil would be very great, and, lastly, if he were not a confirmed pessimist, he would have pictured to himself a time, when evil, as a disturbing factor, would altogether cease to exist.

Let us go back for a while to the period when Buddha lived and when the Indian philosophies were reduced to the Sutra form. Buddha was tortured by the sight of suffering. Gotama, the writer of the Nyaya Sutras, was similarly affected by human misery. If it were possible for Buddha and Gotama to come back to modern times, with their former views of life intact, would not they be agreeably surprised to find what a great change has come over the world, and would not they consider it necessary to modify their conception of human misery, and their philosophical outlook, at the same time? On all sides, what were once called physical and moral evils are gradually disappearing, and one can confidently look forward to a time, when evil will altogether cease to exist. Whether it was Samkara, who sat down to interpret the philosophy of the Upanishads,

or Buddha, who wanted to proclaim to humanity his view of the world, that might help in relieving human sufferings, or Kant, who was anxious to establish that the thing-in-itself could not be known, it was the same idea relating to evil, which could not be weeded out, that led them to form their views about the world and the order of things. In the background of their philosophies will be found their ideas relating to this element of evil silently working and shaping their entire outlook.

CONCEPTION OF EVIL IN THE UPANISHADS

We will now proceed to consider what the earlier Upanishads have to say regarding this problem of evil. We have already made it clear that in the case of old records of thought, such as the earlier Upanishads, one should not expect to find systematic treatment of the different problems of philosophy. Solutions of important problems, expressed in pithy language, will be found lying promiscuously, and it becomes the reader's duty to disentangle them from the mass of irrelevant matters by which they are surrounded. In spite of great disadvantages, it is remarkable how the main thoughts, by means of frequent repetition, and on account of the clear manner of exposition, stand out in bold relief, from the rest of the matters with which they are found mixed up. We will accordingly find the utterances of the Upanishads unmistakable on this problem of evil.

MAN DOES NOT BECOME GREATER BY GOOD WORKS NOR SMALLER BY EVIL WORKS

In the course of his discourse with Janaka Vaideha, Yājñavalkya, while giving a description of the Self, says that he does not become greater by good works, nor smaller

by evil works. Him (who knows), Yājñavalkya continues, these two do not overcome: whether he says that for some reason he has done evil, or for some reason he has done good, he overcomes both, and neither what he has done, nor what he has omitted to do, burns or affects him.¹ Yājñavalkya then proceeds to make the idea still more clear by quoting a verse which says: "This eternal greatness of the Brahman does not grow larger by work, nor does it grow smaller. Let man try to find its trace, for having found it, he is not sullied by any evil deed. He that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, sees self in Self, sees all as Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him, he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from spots, free from doubt, he becomes a true Bráhmaṇa."²

We would here draw the reader's particular attention to the last verse of this Bráhmaṇa, which runs as follows: This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman: fearless is Brahman, and he who knows this becomes verily the fearless Brahman. We have already remarked that fear is born of ignorance, which is the root-cause of evil. The knowledge of Brahman removes ignorance as well as fear. In course of this discourse, Yājñavalkya makes it perfectly clear that a man becomes fearless as soon as he ceases to divide things into good and evil.

In the Taittiriya Upanishad, it is said that he who knows the bliss of Brahman, fears nothing. He does not distress himself with the thought, Why did I not do what is good? Why did I do what is bad? He who thus knows these two (good and bad) frees himself.³

¹ *Brih.*, IV, 4, 22.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 23.

³ *Taittí.*, II, 9.

In the Kaushitaki Upanishad, the same idea is expressed regarding good and evil, the origin of which is no doubt the saying of Yájñavalkya, but here we for the first time find a reason attached to it. It is said that he (individual) does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action, for he (the Self) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed ; and he makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed.¹ We would ask the reader to accept the main thought, but to discard the reason altogether, which is a subsequent addition made by a person of feeble intellect, who being unable to grasp the main idea, considered it necessary to add a reason, which is entirely out of keeping with the A'tman philosophy.

EVIL AND THE STAGE OF DUALITY

The Upanishads thus make it perfectly clear that nothing is inherently good or inherently evil. At the same time it is explicitly stated that what may be looked upon as evil in one stage, ceases to be so in the stage following. The first stage referred to is the stage of duality, and the next stage is the stage when the individual has identified himself with Brahman. In the first stage, when man looks upon himself as only one out of millions of individuals, he divides works into good and evil, feels pleasure for having done what he looks upon as good, and is sorry for having done what he considers to be bad. But in the next stage, the distinction between good and evil vanishes, as he has found out that nothing is inherently good or evil. •

Some critics take delight in observing that as regards the ethics of the Upanishads, the distinction between

¹ *Kaushl.*, III, 8.

good and evil cannot be maintained. This misconception is entirely due to the fact of their failing to bear in mind the two distinct stages which the philosophers of the Upanishads all along keep in view. In the first stage, the distinction between good and evil exists, but in the second stage, when knowledge of Brahman has been gained, this distinction ceases to exist, for he has then been taken behind the scenes; and has come to know the real spring of all human actions. The ordinary ethical standard holds good so long as knowledge of Brahman has not been gained.

KNOWLEDGE REMOVES IGNORANCE AND DESTROYS EVIL

We need not here enter into a consideration of the ordinary conception of good and evil, which is also found in the Upanishads, and we have seen that the virtues that have been enjoined to be practised tally more or less with the list of virtues that may be found enumerated in any modern treatise on ethics. What we have to form a clear idea of is the nature of the conception of things in that stage when the distinction between good and evil ceases to exist. What makes the philosophers of the Upanishads boldly proclaim that the division of things into good and evil cannot be ultimately made? As soon as knowledge of Brahman is gained, man ceases to call an act either good or bad. For him the distinction has ceased to exist, because knowledge of Brahman means the highest knowledge, and one who has gained it, from his mind the last vestige of ignorance has been chased away, and with it the inclination to divide things into good and evil. With the removal of ignorance, he becomes fearless, as fearless as Brahman. His knowledge enables him to take a true perspective of things and their inner connection, and he finds that neither

praise nor blame can attach to any act of man. The philosophers of the Upanishads maintain their position that there is no distinction between a good and a bad act, by establishing the new relation between the individual and Brahman. When all things have been traced back to the ultimate cause, the One, Brahman, who is found to be the essence of everything and the prompter of all works, the distinction between good and evil vanishes. As has been beautifully said in the Isá Upanishad, when all things are found in the Self, and the Self in all things, what sorrow, what trouble, can there be for a man who has seen this unity ? It is in the stage of duality that evil is found to exist. When the stage of duality is left behind, and the stage of oneness supervenes, as is the case when true knowledge or knowledge of Brahman is gained, evil for ever disappears, because everything is then found to be in order and the course of development of things is fully perceived. So long as man is not able to perceive, through ignorance, that instead of the apparent multitude of men and things working independently of one another in the creation, it is the one Supreme Cause that is working through them and all are collaborating in working out the same purpose, he is unable to cast off his ideas relating to evil and the sorrows of this life. But when he has once gained true knowledge and reached the stage of oneness, he perceives that the purpose of Brahman alone is being worked out, with whom he is indissolubly bound. Far from being oppressed by any grief, he, in that stage, overflows with bliss, like Brahman. In the next chapter, we will consider if the new relation, preached by the Upanishads, existing between the individual and Brahman, has the effect of destroying what is commonly understood and valued as the individuality of man.

NON-EXISTENCE OF EVIL FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCEPTION
OF BRAHMAN

Lastly, let us try to find out in another manner what has been achieved by following the mode of analysis pursued above. We have traced all things back to Brahman, and have found that there is no want of harmony, and, therefore, no evil exists. Let us now try to find out from the conception of Brahman, if all that we have established does not necessarily follow from it. What description do we find in the Upanishads of Brahman? Brahman is all knowledge and is full of bliss. The bliss of Brahman is described as immeasurable or infinite. If Brahman is full of knowledge or knowledge itself, and if Brahman is full of bliss or bliss itself, does it not follow that the whole creation, of which he is the essence, should be perfect, flawless, without any particle of evil in its composition? We can boldly say that if there is really any person who sincerely believes that God is the embodiment of perfect knowledge and all that is good, and who believes as the Vedic philosophers believed that the creation sprang out of love, he cannot for a moment think that the creation has in its composition a single particle of what is called evil. Man, with his imperfect knowledge, his overwhelming egotism, always feels sore at heart, cries down the world, and finds evil stalking from one end to the other. The spectre of evil constantly haunts him. If the world had not been destroyed by a class of Indian interpreters, but had been connected with God, and seen through Him, as we find it done by the philosophers of the Upanishads, the world would have been found a place of abode different from what it is ordinarily taken to be. It was once in the infancy of mankind that the real truth was discovered, but it was then, as it is even now, too deep for the ordinary human intellect to adequately comprehend it.

CHAPTER IX

RESULTS OF THE ATMAN PHILOSOPHY

STANDARD FOR JUDGING THE VALUE OF A PHILOSOPHY

The value of a philosophy is not to be judged by the very simple or extremely complex manner, in which the ultimate problems of God, universe and soul are tried to be solved, or by the bold and novel suggestions it makes regarding them. There are some, to whom solutions do not appeal, unless they are made in terms of simple arithmetic, while there are others who scarcely draw any satisfaction, unless the explanations offered are intricate and involved, for they stick to the belief that in order to justify itself, everything relating to philosophy should be extremely difficult and puzzling. Yet a third class of persons remain, product of the modern sensational way of looking at things, who refuse to find truths in statements, unless they break new grounds, and present things in a form quite different from the ordinary manner of looking at them. Running through these different standards of judging the value of philosophy is to be found the common demand for maintaining the point of view of ordinary humanity, which would seem to consist of, firstly, the desire to keep the freedom of the individual inviolate, and secondly, the advisability of keeping the ultimate reality, God, or by whatever name it may go, at a measurable distance, unmixed with, and separate from, the individual. It seldom suggests to thinkers that the comparative worth of a philosophy should be judged by the extent to which it is able to push further the truths of exact knowledge, at any

particular epoch of human progress. If it cannot, it will have to be admitted that such a philosophy has failed of its purpose. It is not thereby implied that tentative solutions regarding matters, which will take yet a long time to be accepted as demonstrated truths, should not be offered, for, that philosophy would indeed be barren which does not quicken human intellect to project its thoughts to some extent into the dim mist of the future, but what is meant is that a philosophy which fails to assimilate the truths of exact knowledge of the times, must be looked upon as resting upon no solid ground, and should be accordingly treated as a mere work of imagination, which might be admired from a distance but is useless for human purpose. In judging, therefore, of the value of the Upanishad philosophy, we shall have to find out its links of connection with the truths of exact knowledge. As we place in a connected form the results of the A'tman philosophy, we will state their point of contact with the admitted truths of modern times. In doing so, we would be better able to shew how the different commentators have signally failed to work out the A'tman philosophy, from its practical side, by engrafting upon it ideas entirely foreign to it.

EVERYTHING COMES OUT OF AND RESOLVES INTO THE ULTIMATE REALITY, WHICH IS ONE

The metaphysics of the A'tman philosophy, as has been pointed out, is very simple. The ultimate reality is one. The conception of the One is not formed at the expense of the many. On the other hand, the many have been raised to the highest level, and have been stated to be inseparable from the One. The sun, the moon, the stars, the elements, the entire animal world, and the world of inert things, have been included within the One. There is absolutely no difference between spirit and matter. What is the reason assigned

for this assimilation? It is because the essence of everything is the same. Things might appear different to the human intellect, they might have different forms or go by different names, but every bit of the manifold universe partakes of the nature of the ultimate reality. This will at once be admitted as a most striking union of idealism and realism. The conventional way of treating idealism and realism, from opposite points of view, receives a rude shock. Idealism has always thrived at the expense of realism. Realism must be destroyed, it must stand deprived of separate existence, before the full claim of idealism can be satisfied. But the philosophy of the Upanishads knocks this unthinking way of looking at things on the head. Realism and idealism lie side by side, in bonds of intimacy and affection, in the A'tman philosophy. The description of what is understood by pantheism, according to the western thinkers, it has been pointed out, does not apply to it. The A'tman philosophy does not make any intrinsic difference between mind and matter, but does not deny the difference, so long as it lasts. With the creation, the ultimate does not exhaust itself. Though the entire creation nestles in the bosom of the ultimate, its capacity is not restricted to the present or any particular mode of manifestation. It has been pointed out that the creation, however big it may be, cannot be called infinite which, properly speaking, is the description that applies only to the ultimate.

The A'tman philosophy therefore does not destroy the world. Far from destroying it, the reality of the ultimate has been bestowed upon it. The world stands fully assimilated to the ultimate reality. It is not till we come to the time of Samkara that we find an attempt made to wipe out the world, in order to maintain the dignity of the One. Not only the world but everything smacking of human perception or feeling has to be cast aside, in order to form a conception of the One. The negative or abstract One is thus set up for

the first time by Samkara. Apart from the predisposition of Samkara, the age put obstacle in the way of appreciating the deep truth of the A'tman philosophy. In spite of the unambiguous declaration in the Upanishads, that Brahman was the essence of everything, it was found impossible, in the existing state of knowledge, to place matter on the same level with mind. The temerity of the age, due to lack of scientific knowledge, is reflected in both the commentators, Samkara and Rámánuja. Like Samkara, who failed to bring the world on the same level with the ultimate reality, Rámánuja failed to completely merge the individual in the One. They did not find any encouragement, in the shape of scientific support, for maintaining the point of view of the Upanishads, regarding the world and the individual. Restricting ourselves to Samkara's interpretation of the Upanishads, so far as the world is concerned, which is declared to be illusory, we can unhesitatingly say that he created the greatest of mischiefs. Ever since the time of Samkara, a portion of Hindu India has been uttering the parrot cry of the unreality of the world, and this has contributed not a little to the retarding of the advancement of India. With the help of discursive knowledge, Samkara began to handle the intuitive truths of the A'tman philosophy, in an age which was sadly deficient in the materials of experience. What the philosophers of the Upanishads had been able to find out with the uncommon help of Yoga or concentration of the mind, the discursive intellect of Samkara failed to grasp. It was, however, left to a subsequent age, rich in the knowledge of scientific truths, to corroborate the fundamental teachings of the A'tman philosophy. But for this corroboration, however attractive the philosophy otherwise may be, it would not have carried to the mind that satisfaction which accompanies reasoned belief.



THE ULTIMATE REALITY OF MODERN SCIENCE

Let us now see how far the fundamental doctrine of the A'tman philosophy, that the One is the essence of everything, has for it scientific or rational support. It is very easy to attach a certain description, such as pantheism, which has a bad odour about it, to a theory, and then decry it, but the situation stands completely changed when a theory is found to stand the scientific test successfully. "From 1895 onwards, there came the new revelation in physics. Atoms were resolved by J. J. Thomson into more minute corpuscles, and these in turn into electrical units, the mass of which was explained as being merely one factor in electro-magnetic momentum. It began to look as though 'electricity' were to be the last and sufficient word in physical science. Rutherford explained radio-activity in terms of atomic disintegration, and pictured the atom as a positive nucleus with negative electrons circling round it. Matter, instead of being dense, closely packed stuff, became an open structure, in which the material even as disembodied electric charges, was almost negligible in size compared with the empty spaces."¹ "Lorentz's theory thus becomes an electric theory of matter, and coalesces completely with the view which follows from Thomson's discovery. But while Thomson explained electricity in terms of matter, Lorentz expressed matter in terms of electricity."² "The interpretation given of G. P. Thomson's³ experiments involved a dual nature for the electron—a particle (or electric charge) and a train of waves. Schrödinger, as we have seen, goes further, and resolves

¹ Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science*, Cambridge, 1929, p. xvii.

² *Ibid*, p. 389.

³ G. P. Thomson is the son of Sir J. J. Thomson.

the electron itself into a wave system. Thus a quarter of a century after the atom was resolved into electrons, the electron has been resolved into an unknown source of radiation or *disembodied* wave system. The last trace of the old, hard, massy particle has disappeared, and the ultimate conception of physics seems to be reduced to mathematical equations. Experimental physicists, especially if they be Englishmen, never feel comfortable with such abstractions, and already attempts are being made to devise atomic models which represent in mechanical or electrical terms the meaning of these equations. What success will follow the attempts cannot yet be predicted, but it seems certain only to be temporary. As Newton saw, the ultimate basis which underlies mechanics cannot be mechanical, and, if not now, then at some future day, we shall have to leave our fundamental concepts in the decent obscurity of mathematical symbols."¹

"Physical science represents one analytical aspect of reality ; it draws a chart which, as experience shows, enables us to predict and sometimes to control the workings of nature. But the clear insight into the meaning of physical science which is given by modern scientific philosophy shows that by its inherent nature and fundamental definitions it is but an abstraction, and that, with all its great and ever-growing power, it can never represent the whole of existence. Science may transcend its own natural sphere and usefully criticise some other modes of contemporary thought and some of the dogmas in which theologians have expressed their belief. But to see life steadily and see it whole we need not only science, but ethics, art and philosophy ; we need the apprehension of a sacred mystery, the sense of communion with a Divine Power, that constitutes the ultimate basis of religion."²

¹ Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science*, Cambridge, 1929, pp. 415-16.

² *Ibid*, p. xxi.

I have allowed the scientist to speak and criticise in his own way. According to modern science, the distinction between mind and matter has almost disappeared. I say 'almost' from the point of view of the scientist, who is still waiting for further researches to completely merge the two hitherto heterogenous elements into one homogeneous thing. At the same time the belief is definitely expressed that the ultimate basis of the material world must be something which is not material. That is to say, the entire universe will have to be understood in terms of consciousness.

MODERN SCIENCE CORROBORATES THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY OF THE A'TMAN PHILOSOPHY

Can we not then claim on behalf of the fundamental doctrine of the A'tman philosophy, which was proclaimed at least 3,500 years ago, that the essence of the entire universe is Brahman, the unqualified support of modern science? Does not the doctrine unmistakably say that the manifold of the creation are resolvable into one, and does not modern science endorse the same view? Can we, after this, say that the doctrine is only the result of unrestrained imagination? Samkara completely failed to penetrate into the depths of the fundamental doctrine, and being unable to untie the Gordian knot, thoughtlessly cut it, with the help of the Buddhist theory of illusion. Rámánuja subscribed to the reality of the world, not after a full appreciation of the great doctrine, but from a sense of ordinary realism which dominated him.

THE PERPETUATION OF INDIVIDUALITY

The Upanishad philosophy by establishing that the ultimate reality is one, left no room for the separate existence of the individual which, in the last analysis, completely merges in the one out of which it has arisen. No

doubt, in the order of created things, the individual has its assigned place, but like every other part of the creation, it resolves into the one ultimate reality. We will now consider whether it is necessary to perpetuate the individual, whether, by destroying individuality, we are really destroying a highly prized state of existence. In this world we find that only a few have reached the topmost rung of progress, while the bulk of humanity remains steeped in ignorance. In spite of this present glaring difference, no one doubts that there would come a time—though in the distant future—when all would reach a common level of progress and will be guided by the same standard. There is sure to come a time when the ideal of all would be one and the same, because that would be the best of ideals, being the right ideal. If we can picture to ourselves the time when, after passing through the numerous stages of progress, humanity ultimately reaches the last stage, in that stage, since all must have reached the same level of progress, what will be there to distinguish one individual from another? The experience, vision and foresight of each and every individual would be equally extended and rich. The standpoint of every individual would become the same. If that be so, what becomes of the individuality, which a class of persons are so anxious to perpetuate? In that last stage, which let us call the perfect stage, all become equally perfect. So long as there are different standpoints, there is room for different individualities and types of men, but when all have the common standpoint, which is the perfect standpoint, the necessity of individuality, in the sense in which it is contended it should exist, disappears altogether. The Upanishads say that in the stage of oneness, the perfect stage, the individual finds himself merged in Brahman. The perfect stage is the stage of perfect knowledge, as Brahman is knowledge itself. What has the individual to complain

of, if he merges in Brahman, who is knowledge itself as well as infinite bliss? Does he stand to lose anything? Or does he not stand on the highest of levels, and enjoy the freedom of the most free being? What a paltry intellect that man must have, who in the perpetuation of the so-called human freedom, feels more glorified than in the gaining of divine freedom? Does the individual suffer in any way or is he made to surrender anything worth retaining? On the other hand, does he not gain infinite times enhanced what he craves for? What mortal can be found, who boasts of freedom, whom the freedom of the Highest Being cannot satisfy, and who will, therefore, be unwilling to allow himself to be merged in Brahman? The perfect stage means the stage of Brahman, as well as the stage of highest freedom. Rámánuja, on account of his conventional mode of conceiving the relation that exists between man and God, could not muster up the necessary courage to identify man with God, which the A'tman philosophy for the first time boldly proclaimed. He dared not identify humanity with divinity. Can such a thing be dreamt of? Can the erstwhile lowly individual hold his head so high and aspire to be one with the Highest Being? While Samkara was deluded and proclaimed his theory of Máya and destroyed the world, Rámánuja lacked in courage and imagination, and tried to perpetuate the individual. Between the two time-honoured commentators, the A'tman philosophy, containing the highest truths for all time, regarding God, the world and the soul, stood completely mangled. It may have been difficult at one time to fully fathom the depths of the A'tman philosophy, since it appeared to be so uncommon, but that cannot be the case in the modern age, for, the present age is pre-eminently the time when the truths, the A'tman philosophy contains, can be best appreciated in the light of the truths of exact knowledge.

THE DIFFICULT NATURE OF RA'MA'NUJA'S TASK

The reader should remember that Rámánuja had a far more difficult task to perform than Samkara had. The establishing of the One, after destroying the world and the individual, was easily achieved by Samkara. The One, by means of this process, became so shrunken and shrivelled, and became in a manner so incómprehensible, its existence or non-existence nearly amounted to the same thing. When this One was completely withdrawn from the active field of human operation, it mattered very little to man whether he did or did not think of it. Samkara therefore had no very difficult task to perform. But when from the plain and unmistakable language of the Upanishads, Rámánuja found that the reality of the world could not be denied and that the separate existence of the individual could not be maintained, he had a very difficult task to perform—to maintain, on the one hand, the integrity of the A'tman philosophy, and, on the other, to keep intact the current trend of thoughts by which he was surrounded, amongst which the maintenance of a deity for human worship, was not the least. The Upanishads boldly preached that there were no gods, no deity to be worshipped. The gods who had been so long thriving on human ignorance, had been dashed to the ground. Humanity had been proclaimed to be divinity itself. Rámánuja staggered under the weight of this pronouncement. He gathered the courage to strike off all other deities from the list, but pleaded vehemently for the retention of one only, to whom the human being, remaining always human, may have the consolation to pray and ask for boons ! How many persons exist even in modern times who would like to differ from Rámánuja's way of thinking ? Rámánuja has been acclaimed for having met the demands of the human heart, for the reason that very rarely a man would be found who

can sincerely accept the idea of the identity of man and God. The idea strikes at the root of all the existing religions of the world. The One of the Upanishads may be permitted to exist as the ultimate reality of philosophy, but it cannot be permitted to shine as the God of religion, would be the cry of the entire religiously-minded people of the world. The great philosophers of the Upanishads knew this perfectly well, and that is why the teachings of the Upanishads were called secret knowledge, reserved only for those who were qualified to grasp them.

WHY MEN OF MODERN AGE ARE CALLED GODLESS

But what may be looked upon as the despair of those who are religiously-minded is full of high hopes and inspiration for those who do not feel deterred from ascending the highest top, because of the difficult and unfamiliar path that has to be traversed. Their number may not be many at the present date, but they count more than all the religiously-minded men put together. The initiative always comes from the advanced few, who undauntingly travel out of the ordinary rut, and the need for it is felt more than ever in the present times. Has any one seriously considered the reason why there is on all sides a falling off in the ranks of really religious men? Why a portion of mankind, that used to hanker after religious guidance, does not any more feel inclined to do so? Why is there an attempt in modern times to challenge the conventional ideas associated with God? These questions are not answered by thoughtlessly observing that the influence of materialism is responsible for the alarming increase of godless men. The real reason is something very different. The quarrel of the majority of the so-called godless men is not with a Being, who may be placed on high and called God, but with the current ideas relating to that Being.



That there is something ultimate, a man is more than ever convinced, in this age of extraordinary scientific progress. Science more than anything else unmistakably points to the existence of an ultimate reality, which is full of consciousness. If ever there was a time, when it was thought that science stood in opposition to God, that time has passed away, never to return. If people are found to be ungodly, it is because the ideas relating to God, which had been so long existing, are found incompatible with the numerous modern ideas by which they are influenced. The conventional conception of God as rewarding the virtuous and punishing the wicked has been found wanting. It has become necessary to change the existing ideas about God. They fail to appeal to the vast majority of truth-seekers any longer, since they are hankering for a conception of the ultimate, which will be in keeping with the demonstrated truths of the modern age and at the same time a real source of inspiration and joy to them. Writers after writers, in modern times, are coming forward and trying to enlighten man on the freedom he possesses, his creative powers and similar other things. Cornered by the current scientific idea of the ultimate reality, which they cannot get rid of, these writers are trying to derive consolation by making the individual as great as they can, with the help of their imagination and verbose language, which, as we have seen, does not stand the test of scrutiny. They have begun at the wrong end. Instead of deepening their conception of the ultimate reality and readjusting the relation of man with it, they are trying to magnify man who proves to be a broken reed, when arbitrarily separated from the ultimate reality. Once the idea of ultimate reality is properly formed, once the relation of man with that reality is properly understood, everything will fall into order, the entire chain of thoughts would stand adjusted, and the so-called revolt against God would be found to have died away.

A'TMAN PHILOSOPHY INAUGURATES A NEW AGE FOR MANKIND

The fundamental doctrines of the A'tman philosophy can fully satisfy the demands of rational truth-seekers. They go the utmost length that the reasoned faith of man is at present prepared to go, and much further. They gloriously open before man's view ideas about God, the universe and soul, which are bound to be accepted in the full fruition of time. Far from encouraging men to be godless, they send an inspiring message to even the most critically minded men, to come back to the truth-trodden path, and find the happiness they had despaired of finding. The Highest Being does not really live in glorious seclusion, which it is only given to man to admire from a distance and feel grateful. He is not found to take delight in setting problems for man to solve, and to award prizes, according to order of merit. He does not require a mediator between Him and man. Like a mighty potentate he does not send down representatives from time to time to control and guide the erring humanity. He can never think of deluding man by creating illusions. Man is made of the same eternal substance as Divinity itself, and ultimately merges in Him, after taking part in the development of a well-ordered and glorious creation, which is as much the result of his will as it is God's. Nothing exists, of which He is not the essence. Law, which is but another name for the Supreme Will, is all-pervading, governs everything, and nothing goes astray or works contrary to it. The same law governs man, but it is not a rule that has been imposed from outside. It is as much his law as it is God's. Nothing leads or can possibly lead to failure, for everything works unerringly as the will that guides everything is incapable of erring. If it is at all to be believed that there is a consciousness working at the back of creation, as modern science unmistakably

establishes, the idea of that consciousness cannot be formed in any other way. You cannot keep it within a closed circle, nor can you ascribe to the different parts of the universe, however numerous, activity or consciousness of different kinds. Neither can you say that the relation of the parts to the whole, and that of the whole to the parts, is anything but of an integral nature. Everything resolves into the one, because they are indivisible parts of the one. With a conception of ultimate reality shaped in this form, one can unhesitatingly accept and cheerfully install it in his heart. The doctrines of the A'tman philosophy, given out to the world, more than 3,500 years ago, wonderfully meet the up-to-date aspirations of man.

The cramping effect of religion, it has been pointed out, is due to the fact of its separation from philosophy. While the world is rapidly moving and thoughts are undergoing radical changes, religion remains stationary, because its doors have been shut against the entry of demonstrated truths. Fortunately in India, the separation of religion from philosophy was not countenanced and, accordingly, in the Upanishads we find the highest truths of philosophy woven into the religious texture. The philosophy and theology of the Upanishads are one and the same, being the two aspects of one and the same exposition of truths. If the theologians of later times wanted to break the bond of union, they tried to do so not by displacing the philosophy of the Upanishads, which they dared not think of challenging, but by construing it in a manner that served their object.

NO MYSTICISM ATTACHES TO IT.

The doctrines of the A'tman philosophy have nothing mystical about them. No greater disservice can be done to the highest philosophy, which was formulated at a time when humanity was still in its infancy, than by introducing

into it an element of mysticism. In a very simple manner, it is stated that Brahman is the ultimate reality ; that A'tman is equivalent to Brahman ; that the world and everything else emanated from Brahman. There is not the least mystery about these statements. If the Upanishads had ended with these statements, the question of mysticism would not have arisen. But since the philosophers of the Upanishads were able to get at these truths with the help of concentration, they frankly stated that these truths could be perceived by deep concentration by every one, and they also briefly mentioned the rules relating to such concentration. These rules of concentration in course of time were developed into the rules of Yoga. We have fully explained the nature of the Yoga rules, and have found that they have nothing mystical in their nature, and it would be extremely erroneous to associate mysticism with A'tman philosophy, because in the ancient times, in the absence of the more direct methods of modern science, a psychical process, which can be well understood and followed, had been discovered and made use of. In the Svetâsvatara, Katha, Mândukya and Prasna Upanishads, the Yoga system is treated as a psychical process, by means of which the knowledge of Self may be obtained. In several modern Upanishads and Samhitâs, the rules of Yoga are also stated, but nowhere anything of the nature of mysticism is attributed to them. Everywhere they are treated as rules of concentration, by means of which knowledge may be obtained. The aphorisms of Patanjali make this perfectly clear. The view that mysticism comes as a necessary sequel to the philosophy of the Upanishads, is as uninformed as it is full of mischief. Instead of recovering the A'tman philosophy from the mass of heterogeneous elements that have gathered round and well nigh stifled it, it would be a great pity if intellectual ingenuity is to be applied to make it more obscure by covering it over with a layer of mysticism.

Instead of making a fetish of mysticism, and treating the Yoga system as an exposition of that chimerical branch of knowledge, strenuous efforts should be made to place the rules of Yoga on a strictly scientific basis.

ITS ETHICS CARRIES THE MESSAGE OF
JOY AND HOPE TO ALL

The practical philosophy of the A'tman doctrine is as simple and inspiring as its metaphysics. Evil, as a distinct element, does not exist. It is only another name for ignorance. As right knowledge is gained, evil is found to disappear. A partial view of the world, which is only possible on the part of an ordinary individual, leads him to think that evil exists in the world. With the gaining of the highest knowledge, which is knowledge of Brahman, things are seen in their totality, and perfect harmony is seen running through the entire creation. Like ignorance, evil is not lasting. Knowledge destroys ignorance, and evil, the offspring of ignorance. With the help of the A'tman philosophy, the entire creation is found to be the abode of bliss, since its parts do not stand any more disjointed, but united in one integral whole, the Brahman. When that angle of vision has been gained, sin is no longer sin, crime is no longer crime, a murderer is no longer a murderer, that is to say, man stands absolved from the nature of liability, which is ordinarily attributed to him. But in the meanwhile, according to the conventional manner, crime is punished, virtue is rewarded and this continues till the right angle of vision is developed in each and every person, and things are adjusted accordingly. The whole thing is a process, consisting of innumerable stages, through which the will of the One is manifesting itself, and all are collaborating in the work of this development.

The value of the practical side of the Upanishad philosophy for mankind cannot be overrated. It proclaims to the

world a unique standard for assessing the value of things. People are oppressed with the idea of evil. Evil is, as it were, dogging the steps of man and giving him no rest. There is no getting rid of it. The A'tman doctrine sends the cheering message to all that no such thing as evil really exists. Man looks upon himself as a natural sinner—he thinks he is born in sin, nurtured in sin, and would die in sin. The A'tman doctrine banishes sin and sinners, evil and evil-doers, crime and criminals, from the world. The degrading conception of man being hemmed in on all sides by sin or evil is banished for ever. Not that the doctrine denies altogether the existence of what is conventionally known as sin, or evil, or crime, but it puts an entirely different interpretation on the same set of facts. What is considered as sin, or evil, or crime, should be really looked upon as the result of ignorance, which will disappear, as soon as men have acquired the proper knowledge. The Upanishad doctrines take a different view of human nature, and the acts men are engaged in. No doubt tendencies are working, and results are following, but the results are as inevitable as the tendencies are, to which no praise or blame can be attached. It is the one Brahman that has split itself up into multitudinous parts, and is going through a process of its own selection, through the innumerable acts of mankind, to which the current ethical norms can have no application. The individual finds this, when he obtains the highest knowledge. The clarion call of the A'tman philosophy to mankind is, know thyself, realise thyself, and find out that thou art not an evil-doer or a sinner, for no such thing as evil or sin exists, but *thou art that*, which is good itself, bliss itself, because it is knowledge itself.

ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION WILL ELEVATE MANKIND

Can the reader adequately gauge the effect of the practical side of the A'tman philosophy on mankind? It

is full of tremendous potentiality for the future of man. As a guidance for human conduct, its value is incalculable. It is unfortunate that the commentators, Samkara and Rámánuja, with their theological bias, should have twisted the great doctrine, and kept the world long deprived of the benefit of its inspiration and guidance. Life on earth, in view of the A'tman philosophy, is turned into a pleasant and glorious existence. The world becomes an abode of joy. Dispel ignorance from your midst, and you will find the world resplendent with joy and bliss. A different kind of mentality will prevail among mankind as soon as the A'tman doctrine is fully grasped. An altogether different angle of vision will lead all sections of people to cheerfully co-operate in working out the destiny of mankind. No longer will the acts of man be viewed in the manner they have been so long looked upon. The more intelligent or fortunate brother will no longer look down upon the less intelligent or fortunate, but would cheerfully extend his helping hand to him. No longer would man look down upon man, because in conventional language he is called an evil-doer or criminal. Man will be more anxious to dispel ignorance from the midst of mankind than to think of employing his intellect in evolving new modes of punishment. The state will be engaged in activities of a different kind. The preachers of morality and religion would be engaged in disabusing the minds of men of their ideas about evil and sin. Once evil as a permanent factor is found not to exist, the moral and religious consciousness of man would stand greatly enriched. The causes of the physical and moral evils will be traced to their right sources. The work of mankind would enthusiastically proceed, for the doctrines of the Upanishads would destroy all human classifications, all sense of false superiority, and put mankind on the same level, and find it united in a common bond of love with the One. No doubt the ultimate

end will take a long time to reach. The world has yet to pass through numerous stages, spread over long periods, before it will reach its destination. But once given the assurance that everything is working for the good, that the shadow of a great evil is not constantly following man, an exhilarating sense of confidence would come into existence, which would greatly accelerate the work of progress. We have seen that the freedom of human will is the necessary corollary of the A'tman philosophy. The A'tman, who is Brahman, is free like Brahman, and this stimulating idea will not a little contribute to create that self-confidence, which is an essential element in human progress.

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ERRATA

Page ix, line 8, *for* 'Maya' *read* 'Māyā'

„ 22 „ 12 „ 'thousands' „ 'thousand'

„ 23 „ 26 „ 'of the the Indian' „ 'of the Indian'

„ 38 „ 8 „ 'Mandukya' „ 'Māndukya'

„ 51 „ 6 „ 'twam' „ 'tvam'

Pages 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, in the page headings, *for*
 'Evolution of Philosophy in *Rig-veda*,' *read* 'Evolution
 of Philosophy in *Upanishads*.'

Page 60, line 21, *for* 'these' *read* 'those'

„ 71 „ 4 „ 'has reached' „ 'has not reached'

„ 74 „ 16 „ 'twam' „ 'tvam'

„ 90 „ 5 „ 'humlby' „ 'humbly'

„ 95, lines 21, 26, 32, *for* 'Vāgasravasa' *read* 'Vājasravasa'

„ 129, line 26, *for* 'Constructive' *read* 'Upanishadic'

„ 131 „ 14 „ 'notexist' „ 'not exist'

„ 162 „ 7, insert 'of' *after* 'stripped'

„ 172 „ 29, *for* 'Brahmanic' *read* 'Brāhmanic'

„ 189₂ last line (note), *for* '1928' „ '1926'

„ 213₂ line 29, *for* 'individualis' „ 'individual is'